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This dissertation is a study of the Eastern Apache
nations and their struggle to survive with their culture
intact against numerous enemies intent on destroying them.
It is a synthesis of published secondary and primary
materials, supported with archival materials, primarily from
the Béxar Archives. The Apaches living on the plains have
suffered from a lack of a good comprehensive study, even
though they played an important role in hindering Spanish
expansion in the American Southwest.
When the Spanish first encountered the Apaches they
were living peacefully on the plains, although they
occasionally raided nearby tribes. When the Spanish began
settling in the Southwest they changed the dynamics of the
region by introducing horses. The Apaches quickly adopted
the animals into their culture and used them to dominate
their neighbors.
Apache power declined in the eighteenth century when
their Caddoan enemies acquired guns from the French, and the
powerful Comanches gained access to horses and began
invading northern Apache territory. Surrounded by enemies, 
the Apaches increasingly turned to the Spanish for aid and
protection rather than trade.
The Spanish-Apache peace was fraught with problems. The
Spaniards tended to lump all Apaches into one group even
though, in reality, each band operated independently. Thus,
when one Apache band raided a Spanish outpost, the Spanish
considered the peace broken. On the other hand, since
Apaches considered each Spanish settlement a distinct "band"
they saw nothing wrong in making peace at one Spanish
location while continuing to raid another. Eventually the
Spanish encouraged other Indians tribes to launch a campaign
of unrelenting war against the Apaches.
Despite devastating attacks from their enemies, the
Apaches were able to survive. When the Mexican Revolution
removed the Spanish from the area, the Apaches remained and
still occupied portions of the plains as late as the 1870s.
Despite the pressures brought to bear upon them the Apaches






The following description of Apache culture is by no
means complete. Rather, it is an attempt to give more
understanding to a people who have long been misunderstood.
Compared to European culture or American culture, the Apache
culture is vastly different. It is not necessarily better or
worse, it is not more or less civilized, it is simply
different. Therefore it is important to be aware of these
differences when telling the history of these people. Many
historians fall into the trap of trying to interpret a
foreign culture by judging it by the standards of their own-
-usually seeing the foreign culture as inferior and
therefore despicable. Other historians take a self-loathing
attitude, seeing their own culture as objectionable, while
trying to make the foreign ethnic group the perfect
interpretation of life. Both of these approaches fail to
recognize the fact that there is no perfect society. Every
society has its strengths and weaknesses, and each one has
its successes and failures. This work is an attempt to give
a fair interpretation to a people who have for the most part
been not only feared and hated throughout most of their
history but also admired for their resistance in the face of
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overwhelming odds. If, by reading this chapter, the reader
is given pause to reconsider his/her original opinion of the
Apaches, then the writer has accomplished his task. 
The Apaches are perhaps the most recognizable tribe of
Native American Indians. John R. Swanton suggests that this
is because of (1) their warlike character; (2) their
constant depredations along the Spanish, Mexican, and
American frontiers; and (3) the difficulty of forcing them
to give up their life style and accept reservation life.1 In
any case their notoriety has attracted the attention of
scholars and non-scholars alike. Multitudes of works have
been written concerning the Apaches, but the vast majority
focuses on the American period, especially the exploits of
such great Apache leaders as Victorio, Cochise, and
Geronimo. These works also concentrate on the western Apache
at the expense of slighting those to the east. 
On the other hand, the eastern Apaches of the prairies
and plains have been virtually ignored by comparison. This
neglect is strange considering the importance of these
natives on the history of the Southwest. The Apaches of the
plains are one of the major reasons that the Spanish Empire,
and later the Mexican Empire, did not extend farther than
they did. Still later their alliance with the AngloAmericans
moving into Texas proved to be invaluable in the Texan's
struggle for independence and later statehood. It seems,
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that despite their importance, only one book deals
exclusively with the so-called plains Apaches, and it leaves
much to be desired.2
The present work is an attempt to rectify that neglect.
The term "plains Apaches" is perhaps a misnomer, for none of
the Apaches lived a true plains Indian life style, with the
possible exception of the Kiowa-Apaches. The Apaches are
members of the Athapaskan linguistic group, which is one of
the larger language groups with speakers residing from
Alaska and Canada in the north to the southwestern United
States and northern Mexico to the south. The Apaches, along
with the Navajos, who are almost always considered a
distinct tribe, make up the southern division of the
Athapaskan family.
The Apache proper consists of six divisions: the
Western (San Carlos) Apaches, the Chiricahua Apaches, the
Mescalero Apaches, the Jicarilla Apaches, the Lipan Apaches,
and the Kiowa Apaches. Harry Hoijer divides the southern
Athapaskans into eastern and western groups based upon
linguistic differences. The western group consists of the
Navajos and the San Carlos-Chiricahua-Mescalero, while the
Eastern Group consists of the Jicarilla-Lipan and Kiowa
Apache--with the Jicarillas and Lipans having more in common
with each other than with the Kiowa Apaches.3 Most other
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scholars have accepted this division on linguistic as well
as cultural differences.
This study will concentrate on the Apaches of the
plains and its periphery. In this context, the term plains
Apaches refers to those Indians who spent at least part of
their annual migratory pattern on the plains.  Therefore,
the Lipans, Jicarillas, and Mescaleros will play major
roles. The Kiowa Apaches will be excluded because of their
remoteness from other Apache groups, as will the Western
Apaches and the Chiricahuas, who had virtually no contact
with the plains. During the height of their expansion the
plains Apaches inhabited the plains regions including parts
of eastern New Mexico and Colorado, western Nebraska,
Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.
In historic times the Lipan Apaches roamed the area
from the upper Nueces and Medina Rivers to the upper Red and
Colorado Rivers. By the last quarter of the eighteenth
century, they had been forced south by their nemesis, the
Comanches, and were ranging on both sides of the Rio Grande.
At this time they had to be satisfied with marginal lands
along the Great River and extended southward into Coahuila
and Chihuahua, although portions of the tribe continued to
camp in the vicinity of the Nueces and Guadalupe Rivers.4
The Jicarillas occupied the mountainous region of
southern Colorado and northeast New Mexico. They ranged into
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the plains of western Kansas and Oklahoma and into northwest
Texas.5 They generally camped between modern Albuquerque,
Chama, and Colorado Springs on the west to western Texas and
Oklahoma in the east. According to their legends, the
Creator gave them the lands bounded by their sacred Rivers:
the Arkansas, the Canadian, the Rio Grande, and the Pecos.6
The Mescaleros operated in an area bounded by the Hondo
River in the east, to Santa Fe in the north, to the Rio
Grande in the west, and to Coahuila and Chihuahua in the
south. Their favorite haunts were the Sacramento, Guadalupe,
and San Andreas Mountain ranges. They also inhabited the
Sierra Blanca and Davis Mountains. They, like all Apaches,
were mountain people who were never completely comfortable
on the plains. They usually wintered on the Rio Grande or
further south and traveled out to the buffalo plains in the
summer, sometimes as far as the Texas Panhandle.7
A major problem in dealing with the Apache Indians is
the confusion of names given them. These Indians, of course,
had no written language and so almost all information that
concerns them was related by Europeans or Americans, who
were more often than not their enemies. Even the name
"Apache" was not their own. In fact, the French used the
word to apply to the worst of robbers and assassins.8
The name "Apache" was first used by Juan de Oñate,
colonizer of New Mexico, in 1598. Frederick Hodge suggests
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that the term originated from "ápachu," the Zuñi word for
"enemy."9  This is the most commonly accepted
interpretation--perhaps for no other reason than that it
seems to be most fitting, for throughout the historic
period, the Apaches seemed to have been surrounded by
enemies. Another widely accepted theory is that the term
came from the Yuman-speaking Yavapais word, "e-patch,"
meaning "men that fight" or "fighting men."10  The Yavapais
also supply several other potential sources. Their word for
"people" is variously written as "Apátieh," "Axwáatca," and
"Apádje."11
There are several problems, however, with each of these
theories. When Oñate first used the word, he had not yet
encountered the Zuñi or the Yavapais. In addition, the
accent on the Zuñi word is different. Of course, if the Zuñi
"ápachu" were the origin, the Spanish might have corrupted
it to conform to their own pattern. Several scholars have
suggested that "Awá'tche," the Ute name for Apache, might be
a more likely source.12 While the Spanish had probably not
yet encountered the Ute either, the Pueblos living in the
area undoubtedly had. They might well have transferred the
name to the Spanish.13
In any case, the Apache called themselves N'de, or "the
people."  James L. Haley suggests that Tin-ne-áh is more
generically correct. Other versions include Dinë, Tinde,
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Inde, Tinneh, and Déné.14 The variance is due mostly to
Spanish and other recorders, as well as modern linguists
making different interpretations of the name, but also to
slight variances of the name within different Apache groups.
Of the numerous names bestowed upon various Apache
groups, only Jicarilla, Lipan, and Mescalero for Apaches
treated in this work have survived to the present. John
Upton Terrell identifies twenty-two names for plains Apache
groups. Almost all of the names were given to them by the
Spanish and are either corruptions of Athapaskan words,
Spanish idioms, or reflections of some Apache characteristic
or custom. Spanish documents are also notorious for
containing inconsistent spellings, adding to the difficulty
in identifying Apache tribes.15 
The Jicarillas, Lipans, and Mescaleros had little
contact with each other but recognized each other as members
of the same greater family. They were not always friendly
toward each other but rarely had lasting enmity. Most of
their struggles were localized and concerned hunting rights
or other territorial disputes. It is vitally important to
remember that there was no overall chief of the Apaches.
Indeed, there was not even an overall leader for any of the
separate tribes. 
Each of the tribes was nominally divided into bands,
which in turn were divided into the most important unit
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among the Apache Indians, the local group. A local group
consisted of a chief and his followers. The group's
membership was fluid. Members could join or desert at will,
resulting in a continual but gradual redistribution of the
population.16
In general, chiefs were chosen for their wisdom and
courage. Depending on the size of the group, there might be
several lesser chiefs. The Lipans often had a war chief and
a civil chief, with the latter having the greater power.17
Chiefs settled disputes, directed hunting, farming, raiding,
warfare, medicine dances, and diplomacy.18 Despite this wide
range of duties and the respect and importance imparted upon
the chief, his role was that of an esteemed advisor rather
than one who exercised arbitrary authority. In fact, the
chief had no coercive power at all. His continued leadership
depended upon the success of his policies and his ability to
persuade others. In fact, one of the most important
functions of the chief was to reconcile differences of
opinion and bring all divergent elements of the group in
line with the most popular view. Unresolved disputes
weakened his position as chief and endangered the survival
of the group. Those who strongly opposed the consensus might
split from the group, choose a new leader, and form their
own local group, thus leaving both parties in a weakened
position.19
9
The office of chief was not hereditary, but a worthy
son might have an advantage over other aspirants simply
because he had an excellent model before him, had the
advantage of superior training, and might have had access to
important inside information. Contact with Europeans and
their emphasis on hereditary succession tended to strengthen
family descent to the office. Europeans naturally came to
look upon the son of a deceased chief as the new leader,
regardless of his actual qualifications for the position, or
his support within the tribe. Europeans also inflated the
importance of the office by holding the chief responsible
for the actions of his group and demanding that he deliver
accused tribesmen for trial under white laws. Furthermore,
Europeans bestowed financial and symbolic favors on chiefs
who best conformed to the desires of the white man and
thereby artificially increased a chosen leader's influence
and prestige within his tribe.20
It is imperative to note that the difference between
Apache and European government was a major source of
conflict between the two groups. When Europeans negotiated
an agreement with a chief, they expected it to be binding on
all natives of the leader's tribe. From the native's point
of view, the agreement had no effect on Apaches outside the
chief's local group and even within the group it only bound
those individuals who agreed with and supported the chief's
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decision. Dissenters were discouraged from raiding the
Europeans but the chief had no authority to stop them.
On the other hand, after making an agreement, the
Indians considered it to apply to the European "local group"
as it did in their system. Therefore, Apache local groups
who established a peace with the Spanish at one settlement
would have no problem in raiding or attacking Spaniards
elsewhere, considering them beyond the range of the treaty.
The Spanish would retaliate, sometimes from the locale where
the treaty had originated, and cause the Apaches to claim
that the Spanish had broken the peace, never realizing that
the latter considered it broken when the Indians attacked
their outpost. Both sides claimed to be the victim and
accused the other of perfidity, when in actuality it was a
simple misunderstanding of each other's governmental system.
Local groups varied in size from 40 to 250 individuals.
Size was determined by the popularity of the leader of the
group, as well as by the ability of the group to live off
the resources of their territory. If the group grew too
large, they would deplete the resources of their range and
be unable to survive. Smaller groups, however, might not be
able to defend themselves effectively. When threatened or
planning a buffalo hunt, several groups would gather and
usually choose a temporary principal chief from their
combined leadership pool.21 
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Each local group was made up of a number of families.
An Apache family can be described as a matrilocal extended
family consisting of parents, unmarried sons, married
daughters and their husbands and children.22 This entire
unit did not live in the same structure. Each nuclear family
generally had its own dwelling but lived in a cluster near
each other. When a man and woman married, the male went to
live with his wife's family. From this point on he was
expected to provide for his wife's extended family.
Children were greatly prized among the Apaches.
Pregnant women, likewise, received special treatment but
were not pampered. They were expected to continue with their
chores. However, they were not required to perform strenuous
activities. At the time of birth, the husband would leave
camp so that the woman's mother might attend her daughter.
Other female relatives or friends might also assist. A
skilled midwife likewise attended. 
After the birth, the midwife washed the baby with
lukewarm water. Sometimes the midwife would rub the baby
with a mixture of red ochre and grease before wrapping it in
a soft blanket. The baby was then held up to the four
cardinal directions and shown the sun. Among the Jicarilla,
the baby was washed in water from at least two of their
sacred rivers. A few days later the father would name the
infant after some natural object. Twins were considered a
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sign of spiritual disharmony and one was usually killed
instantly. If both a boy and a girl were born, the male was
spared.23
Babies were taught at an early age to be silent,
because of the danger their crying might pose to the camp
when an enemy was near. If a baby sought attention by
crying, it was taken from the camp, strung from a bush in
its cradleboard and ignored until it became quiet. On some
occasions, Apaches were known to kill crying babies or even
those known to be prone to tantrums when the safety of the
band was at risk.24
At six or seven months the baby was allowed to wander
through camp on its own. All adults would help keep the
child from harmful items such as fires, scorpions, or
snakes. Disobedient children were doused with water but
rarely struck. Alonso de Benavides, religious custodian of
New Mexico, noted that the Apache taught and chastised their
children, unlike the other natives he had contacted. Perhaps
as a result of this, he noted that the children had great
respect for and were obedient to their elders. The children
were encouraged to roll naked in the snow, expose themselves
to the sun and certain other dangers in order to make them
hardy.25
As the children matured they would be taught the
various skills necessary to performing the tasks of their
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respective sex. Boys were taught to hunt and the skills
essential to becoming a successful warrior. Girls were
taught to set up dwellings, prepare meals, and tan skins.
They were considered fit for marriage after reaching
puberty. Boys were considered marriageable after returning
from a successful raid or war party, usually at the age of
eighteen.
The Apaches had a universal fear of death and the dead.
When a person died, their ghost was released and could do
great harm to the living unless it immediately departed to
the afterworld and stayed there. Most Apache burial customs
were meant to encourage the ghost to accept its fate and
leave the land of the living. The name of the deceased was
never mentioned aloud and the camp where the death had
occurred was moved. This relocation was generally more
symbolic than substantial.26
If the death occurred away from camp or on the warpath,
the body was generally left in a cave, thicket, or hole in
the ground. The fear of the dead extended beyond members of
a particular tribe. After a battle in enemy territory,
Apaches often desired to purify the region. Each man in the
war party would burn some of the hairs from the head of a
slain enemy. They believed that this action would drive the
spirits of the slain away from the area. If the Apaches
failed to secure a scalp after killing an enemy in Comanche
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lands, they often refused to return to the area for fear of
vengeful Comanche ghosts.27
The physical appearance of the Apaches varied.
Sometimes they were described as tall, straight, and robust,
while other scholars have said they were seldom large or
heavy, being slightly shorter than the average white man.
Ales Hrdlicka, a late nineteenth-century researcher, took
measurements of reservation Apaches and determined that
Apache men averaged 5' 6" and women averaged 5'. Despite the
differences regarding the size of the Apaches, almost all
agree that they were hardy, robust and athletic, with good
lung capacity, as well as wiry, evenly proportioned limbs
that were strong but not musclebound. Francisco Coronado, in
a letter to the king, said that the Apache had "the best
physique of any I have seen in the Indies."  They had broad,
round, rather flat faces with dark eyes and a complexion
that ran from light tan to rich chocolate.28
In summer men wore only a breechclout wrapped around
the waist, dropping as low as the knees in front and falling
to the ankles in back. The Jicarillas were particularly fond
of antelope skin chamois, which they fit around their
bodies, leaving their arms free. The men sometimes wore
buckskin leggings, and moccasins rounded out the outfit.
Apache moccasins were actually more like boots, reaching
nearly to the knees. They were made of dressed buckskin,
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which had several folds that could be brought up to protect
the thigh. When folded down, the folds could be used to hold
small implements and trinkets. The soles were made of thick
undressed hide with the fur side out. The Comanche often
called the Apache "Tá-ashi," meaning "turned up," referring
to the toes of their moccasins.29
In cooler weather Apache men wore a long-sleeved
deerskin shirt or jacket. Jackets had a heavy fringe of
buckskin strings around the shoulders, longer sleeves, and
neck hole decorated with elaborate beading. In cold weather,
a bison or mountain lion skin was draped about the body like
a robe. In later times, a wool blanket replaced animal
skins.30
Women wore a two-piece outfit made of deer, elk, or
antelope skin. A short skirt was tied at the waist and left
loose at the knees. A shirt or jumper was worn over the
head. It was made of a full-grown doe skin, dressed until it
was as pliant as cloth, with the hair left on the tail and
the dew claws on the legs. The women cut a hole in the
center for their head and wore it with the tail behind. In
later times women beaded their dresses elaborately, and they
sometimes had a fringe of tin jingles on it.31
A division of labor existed among the Apache along
sexual lines but was not rigidly drawn. In general, both men
and women shared in garnering food and maintaining the
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family. Women generally gathered the wild foods that were
available and preserved and stored surplus food. They
fleshed, tanned, and sewed skins into clothes or other
items. Women were responsible for setting up the dwelling,
gathering firewood and water, preparing meals, and making
any household utensils they might require.
Men spent much of their time hunting. They were also
responsible for protecting the camp, which might mean long
hours of keeping vigil, especially when an enemy was
believed to be near. They protected and cared for the horses
and raided for more animals when necessary. If the group
suffered casualties at the hands of the enemy, it was the
man's responsibility to initiate or join a war party to
exact revenge. Like the women, men were responsible for
making any tools or instruments needed in pursuit of their
duties. They made arrows, bows, flint knives, and rope from
braided strands of rawhide, twisted buffalo hair, or
horsehair.
The Lipans, Mescaleros, and Jicarillas all hunted
buffalo and used it as a major source of food and materials.
Early Spanish explorers noted the almost total dependence of
the early Apaches of the plains, the Querechos and Vaqueros
in particular, on the buffalo.
In truth, buffalo did supply the natives with a wealth
of material. The skin provided a covering for their shelter,
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as well as material for clothing, bedding, capes, and
blankets. The meat, liver, tongue, and other edibles
supplied a food source. The stomach, bladder, and other
internal organs were cleaned out and acted as containers.
For example, a buffalo stomach, cleaned out, filled with
water, and tied off on both ends made a serviceable canteen.
The intestines were used in the fashion of sausage skins.
Cleaned, the native stuffed it with buffalo meat and some
herbs and made pemmican, which could be easily carried by
travelers.
Apaches also utilized other parts of the animal. Hooves
could be ground into powder to make glue. Buffalo blood was
often drunk when the kill was fresh, but some of it was
collected and stored. When it dried and became powdery it
could by ground and moistened to create a paint-like
substance. The brains of the animal were used as a lubricant
in the tanning process. Sinew and tendons were used for
sewing and making bow strings. Bones served as tools,
ranging from clubs, axes, and picks, to needles and eating
utensils. Buffalo teeth were often strung into necklaces or
other decorative items. Finally, with no wood on the plains,
dry buffalo dung made an effective fuel. For the plains
Apaches, the buffalo was a galloping department store that
could supply virtually all of their needs.
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In pre-horse days, the Apache would follow the buffalo
herds, camping among them but away from the feeding animals,
causing little commotion. Hunters would approach bison
watering holes and smear their faces and bodies with mud.
They would then hide, stretched out in the deep trails made
by the bison or in brush shelters they constructed. The
natives shot the animals with arrows as they passed. As the
herd moved off, the hunters would try to wound one or more
of the animals in the rear, without alarming the rest of the
herd. If the herd stampeded, they would try to gather any
dead or crippled animals left behind.32
The surround was another common method of hunting
buffalo. A band of natives would encircle a small bunch and
approach from all sides while yelling savagely, killing as
many of the confused animals as possible with arrows and
lances. If the grass was dry, the Apache might set fire to
it in a circle around the buffalo to hinder their escape.
Unfortunately, this method often resulted in singeing the
buffalo hides, thereby rendering them useless for conversion
into robes, but it left the meat intact.33
Once the Apaches acquired horses, hunting buffalo
became much simpler. It also became more widespread. The
Lipans who had always lived on the plains had easy access to
buffalo herds. The Jicarillas and Mescaleros, however, who
lived on the edge of the plains and in the mountains
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bordering the plains, had more difficulty in gaining access
to the animals. Once these tribes acquired the horse,
however, they could easily reach herds for the annual
buffalo hunt. 
Other large game animal included deer, elk, antelope,
and, in the mountainous regions, mountain sheep. The deer
and antelope were sought more for their skins than for food.
Apaches also hunted smaller animals such as beaver, rabbit,
squirrel, chipmunk, porcupine, prairie dog, ringtail,
opossum, wood rat, and peccary. Horses, mules, burros, and
wild steer became food sources in post-European times.34
The Apaches differed on the consumption of fowl. The
Jicarillas ate turkeys, doves, grouse, quail, and snow-
birds. Some Mescaleros ate turkey, quail, and dove, but
others disdained them; the Lipans ate wild turkey but
refrained from consuming most other birds, especially water
fowl.35
While men were primarily responsible for hunting, women
were relied upon for gathering wild berries, fruits, and
edible plants. Agave (mescal) was plentiful within the
territory of the Mescalero and was such an important article
in their culture that the term "Mescalero" came to mean
"gatherer (or eater) of mescal."  Sotol had smaller crowns
than Mescal but was also collected. In a special process,
mescal and sotol could be baked into thin sheets to make
20
"bread."  The sheets were pulverized in wooden bowls or
depressions in rocks, water was then added to make dough,
and the mixture was then cooked in the ashes around a fire.
Sometimes the mescal and sotol were stored in parfleches for
later use, or placed in caves or caches for emergencies or
times of scarcity.36
Almost all of the Apaches farmed to some degree. The
Jicarillas cultivated a variety of crops, sometimes using
irrigation to aid in growing squash, beans, pumpkins,
cantaloupes, peas, wheat, tobacco, and maize. The most
extensive agriculture occurred on the upper Arkansas and its
tributaries. Corn, the most important crop, was stacked in
rows and dried, and then a sufficient supply for winter food
and spring seed corn was buried before the Jicarillas set
out for the plains to hunt buffalo and other plains
animals.37
The Mescaleros and Lipans had little interest in
farming and it was completely subordinated to hunting and
gathering. Minimal care was given to the crops. The worst of
the weeds might be removed and thorny bushes might be laid
around the periphery to keep out animals. An irrigation
ditch might be dug if it could be done with minimal effort.
Often, the natives would break camp after planting and
return when they suspected the crop was near maturity to
harvest any that survived.38
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When the Spanish first encountered southern
Athapaskans, they noted no farming. They did observe
substantial trade between Apaches and Pueblos. The Apaches
brought buffalo, deer, and antelope skins as their main
trade articles. Meat, fat, and tallow, were also brought to
trade, and the Jicarillas manufactured ollas, a species of
crude potteryware, and jícaras, a round basket, to trade. In
later times, captives from other tribes, horses, and mules
became trade commodities. In exchange, the Pueblos supplied
corn, squash, cotton cloth, and blankets. After the arrival
of the Spanish, European items assumed a prominent part of
the trade as the Apaches bartered for knives, hoes, wedges,
picks, bridles, hats, beads, and other trifles. The Apaches
also discovered that the Spanish would trade for native
captives the Apaches had taken from other tribes, which
undoubtedly increased the aggressiveness of the Apaches.39 
As long as the Apaches traded with the Pueblos, they
had little need to grow their own crops. With the arrival of
the Spanish, who used much of the excess crops grown by the
Pueblos, and at times, captured visiting Apaches and sold
them into slavery, the Apaches seem to have become more
interested in agriculture. In addition, as the Comanches
pressured the Lipans and Mescaleros southward, away from
easy access to the Pueblos, it seems logical that they would
have more interest in planting, although, as seen above,
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agriculture was always expendable, and the crops might be
left behind with little sorrow.
The acquisition of horses apparently strengthened the
use of agriculture among the Apaches. Because they were
among the first tribes to obtain the horse, they quickly
became dominant on the plains. This dominance gave them the
security to combine agriculture and hunting into an annual
cycle. Once the Comanches began to pressure the Apaches from
the north, however, the agricultural portion of the cycle
became a danger to the Apaches. Because of the seasonal and
sedentary nature of agriculture, the Comanche knew where to
attack the Apaches at their rancherías and then escape into
the plains. As the Apaches began losing control of the
plains, their attachment to farming, limited as it was,
provided a weakness to be exploited by the Comanches and
other enemies.40
There is much debate among historians concerning,
where, how, and when, the American Indians first acquired
the horse. Generally, it is agreed that the Apache were
among the first to acquire the animal. It is unlikely that
strays from Coronado or De Soto's expeditions supplied the
first horses, as many early historians argued.41 It is also
unlikely that the natives possessed horses prior to 1600, at
least not in numbers large enough to have had any effect.
Only after the Spanish established themselves in New Mexico,
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at Santa Fe in particular, did the natives in the area have
easy access to horses. They could also observe the use and
advantages offered by the horse, and eventually learn to
control the animal. At some point between 1600 and 1650, the
Apaches adopted the horse into their culture. By 1650 they
were using the horse in raids. Donald E. Worcester estimates
that the Apaches were using the horse no later than 1620 or
1630.42 By this time, the Spanish were no longer able to
keep these animals from the natives. Large herds of wild
horses, known as "cimarrones," roamed the vast area of
northern Mexico.43  
When the Apaches first encountered horses, they were
most likely seen as simply another food source. Their next
logical use would have been to use horses as beasts of
burden, replacing dogs. Horses would have allowed the nomads
to accumulate more wealth, by allowing them to carry more
baggage when they moved. Finally, the natives would learn to
ride their new horses and eventually use them to their
advantage in raids and warfare. 
Because they were among the first natives to acquire
the horse, the Apaches quickly dominated their neighbors.
The horse dramatically increased their ability to acquire
wealth. The natives continued to subsist primarily off
buffalo, but with horses, they were able to make larger
kills and travel greater distances in search of them. Horses
24
allowed the natives to transport a greater amount of the
kill to camp. In addition, mounted Apaches could attack the
sedentary Pueblos quickly and more efficiently than they had
on foot. The horse likewise allowed them to carry off more
plunder and escape into the plains before the Pueblos could
mount an effective resistance.
The horse not only became one of the main targets of
raids but eventually became an important trade item. The
advantage of stealing horses was that they could be driven
off by the raiders. The Apache in New Mexico quickly
discovered that they could steal horses from the Spanish and
then return later to trade the horses for corn, metal goods,
and other items that were more difficult to steal in a
raid.44
The Apaches lost their dominance across the southern
plains when horses spread beyond their control and other
tribes acquired them. A major reason for this turnaround was
the fact that the Apaches never completely became horse
Indians. First, and probably most important, the Apaches
never learned, or at least never took the time, to breed
horses. Because of their proximity to an almost endless
source of horses, they preferred to steal them, trade for
them, or capture wild horses rather than raising their own.
One French explorer noted in 1724 that the mares had
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miscarriages, because the Apaches rode them constantly on
raids or when hunting.45
A second reason for the decline of Apache power was the
fact that for the most part they were always more
comfortable on foot than on horseback. After all, as
mentioned earlier, the Apaches were essentially a mountain
people. When hard pressed by a determined foe in battle, the
Apaches often released their stock and fled to the mountains
or to rugged terrain to continue the fight. Normally, plains
Indians afoot were virtually helpless. The Apaches, on the
other hand, often became more effective.46 The Jicarillas
and Mescaleros both had strongholds in their home range. The
Lipans, who were more completely adapted to plains
lifestyle, were less apt to go afoot, but in later times,
when driven from the plains to the hilly country around San
Antonio and later to the Rio Grande, they too often avoided
pursuit by striking out on foot in rough terrain.
Finally, unlike most other plains Indians, the Apache
often consumed horses. Many plains tribes consumed horses
out of necessity, but few ate it as a part of their regular
diet. The Apache seem to have been the chief horse eaters. A
Spanish missionary noted in 1744 that the Apaches raided the
Rio Grande frontier for horses, not only for riding, but for
eating. The horseflesh was apparently considered one of the
"greatest dainties."47  The Lipans, who became more plains
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oriented than other Apache groups, were less likely to eat
horses because they were essential to the bison hunt, and
for carrying tepee poles and covers.48 Many other plains
Indians abhorred the idea of eating horseflesh, and as a
result held the horse-eating Apaches in contempt.
In any case, horses played an important role in Apache
raiding and warfare. The Apaches made a sharp distinction
between "raiding" and "warfare."  A raid had as its main
goal the acquisition of horses or plunder. The members of a
raiding party generally attempted to avoid contact with the
enemy. Ceremonies concerning raiding were aimed at enhancing
concealment and avoiding pursuit.49 Raids could be called
for by anyone who needed horses or felt that the camp
resources needed to be replenished. A warrior would announce
his intentions of staging a raid, usually after seeking the
approval of the band leader, and a dance would be held.
During the dance, those who wanted to participate in the
raid would join in. Raiding parties usually consisted of
from eight to twelve individuals who volunteered to follow a
chosen leader. An extremely popular or successful leader
might have many more followers.50
Because of its very nature, the raid often resulted in
warfare. A war party generally was formed to avenge Apache
casualties. An Apache who had lost a family member usually
called for a war party to punish those responsible for a
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loved one's loss, and family and friends of the deceased
played a large role in this activity. In some cases the band
leader would send runners to other nearby bands to recruit
warriors for the endeavor. War parties might consist of as
many as two hundred men and almost always included a shaman,
or medicine man, who would encourage proper behavior,
interpret signs and omens, and make predictions of the
upcoming battle. Women often accompanied the war party as
well, especially wives of chiefs. The women drove stolen
stock, acted as sentinels, and even fought on occasion. Once
the war party had been proposed, all who planned to
participate would gather for a series of dances and speeches
designed to set the mood for the event. Surprisingly, there
were fewer restrictions placed on the members of a war party
than on a raiding party.51
Before setting out on a major campaign, or when an
invasion or attack seemed imminent, the Apaches chose a safe
haven for their families and non-combatants. The Jicarillas
and Mescaleros generally chose some interior mountain range
with a water supply and available wild fruit. A small
defensive party would stay behind to defend the families. In
later times, the Jicarillas often left their families under
the protection of the Spanish around Santa Fe. If little
warning was received, the men might mount their horses and
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plan a defense, while the women and children fled into the
hills, mountains, or rugged terrain for protection.52
War parties armed themselves with bows and arrows,
lances, war clubs, leather shields, iron darts (known as
chuzas), and sometimes leather body armor for both rider and
mount. The primary weapon of the Apaches was the bow and
arrow. Even after the introduction of the gun, most Apaches
still preferred the bow and arrow because of the ease of
access and the rapidity of fire. In fact, in the 1780s the
Spanish began trading guns to the Apaches in the hopes that
they would discard the bow and arrow and lose their
proficiency with the weapon. Viceroy Gálvez, who advocated
the policy suggested that the guns sold to the Indians be
long barreled to make them awkward to use on horseback and
that the quality of metal, stocks, and bolts be inferior. It
was hoped that with time the Apache guns would break and
become useless. Thereafter, when the natives once again were
forced to use bows and arrows they would be much less
experienced in manipulating them.53 The policy backfired,
however, because the Apaches did not give up the bow, but
instead used them to cover their musketeers so that they
could load and fire in security.54    
Single curved bows, three to four feet in length
predominated. Bow strings were made of buffalo or deer
sinew, worked, soaked in water, and peeled into strands.
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Three or four strands were then twisted together to make one
long string. Bows functioned well in dry weather but in wet
weather the string absorbed moisture and became useless.
Warriors carried their bows unstrung, tying the bowstring to
one end of the bow and tying a loop in the other end that
could be slipped over the free end. Spare strings were
carried in case of breakage. Mescal fibers could be used as
a substitute string in an emergency. An Indian could present
and string his bow, and shoot an arrow almost as quickly as
a man could shoot a musket. A dozen arrows could be fired in
the time it took to reload it.55
Each warrior produced his own arrows, using hard, well-
seasoned wood with four longitudinal flutings. The arrows
were two to two and a half feet long and had three feathers
for fletching attached to the nock end. Apaches did not chip
flint arrowheads. Instead they whittled the tips of wooden
arrows to a point and hardened them in fire. They did
utilize arrowheads found in ancient campsites. Stones with
points or sharp edges might be used if they could do so with
minimal work. Sometimes Apaches would break stones on the
chance that the pieces might serve as arrowheads. After
European contact, the Apaches began to acquire metal
arrowheads made from barrel hoops.
Shafts were tested by passing them through their teeth
and biting down to straighten them. Apaches customarily
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stained their arrows red with animal blood and sometimes
dipped them in the sap of Yucca angustifola, a non-poisonous
plant deemed to have "mystic power." Some Apache poisoned
their arrows by dipping the tips in snake or spider venom or
in an extract of a deer's gal bladder that had been rotted
by a rattlesnake bite, but such action was rare.
Medicine men who specialized in weaponry usually made
lances. Sotol stalk, heated, straightened, and smoothed was
a popular material for lances. Young spruce was also used. A
lance measured between seven and twelve feet long. Like
arrows, early lances had a fire-hardened point. In later
times the Apache used knives, bayonets, cutlasses, and lance
tips to arm their lances. The lance shafts were one and a
half inches in diameter with a blade attached with sinew or,
in later times with a brass ferrule. Mescaleros customarily
set a tripod of lances at the opening to their dwellings and
hung their shields, quivers, or other apparel on it.56
 The Apache war club was actually more of a mace. A
fist-sized rock was wrapped in rawhide and then attached to
a wooden handle by a short length of flexible rawhide. The
connecting tab, two or three inches in length between the
handle and the head of the club, prevented the club head
from breaking off when it struck its target. The one and a
half foot handle had a loop that passed through the handle
to slip the wrist through.57
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Crude, hiltless, single-edged, pointed scrapers made of
flint or chert were the standard knives among the Apaches.
Early Apaches sharpened their knives with their teeth. The
knives were placed in rawhide sheathes and usually simply
tucked under their belts. The Mescaleros often cut a belt
loop in the sheath while the Jicarillas carried theirs
dangling from loops attached to their belts.58
For defense the Apaches used shields and body armor.
Dried and hardened buffalo bull hides were used to construct
shields. A buckskin cover was stretched over the shield,
overlapping the edges by about six inches. Small holes were
punched in the edge of the buckskin and a drawstring was run
through these, drawn up tightly, and then tied to create a
smooth, tight cover. In battle the native wore the shield by
placing his left arm through both of the buckskin loops and
holding it between himself and his enemy. When using his bow
he was unprotected but after firing he quickly recovered.
Shields made in this manner were tough enough to deflect
bullets unless hit dead on.59
Apaches sometimes made armor of folded hides.
Successive layers were glued together to increase the
effectiveness of the armor. A protective coat of gravel or
sand was glued to the outer surface to help deflect arrows
and bullets. Quilted cotton armor became more popular after
contact with the Spanish. The armor also became thicker,
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presumably to make it more effective against bullets, and
longer. A slit was added in the front and back to allow for
mounting a horse. Similar hardened hides, cut into circles
and made to overlap like fish scales, were used to protect
the breasts and sides of horses.60
The Jicarillas, Mescaleros, and Lipans all lived in
tepees, at least while on the plains, but all three tribes
also had supplementary dwellings for other regions. Early
Spanish explorers were impressed by the size and quality of
the tents of the Querechos on the plains. Vicente de
Zaldívar, in 1598 noted bright red and white bell shaped
tents among the Querechos, built as skillfully as those in
Italy and large enough to accommodate four mattresses or
beds. The covering hide was tanned so well that no matter
how much it rained, they would not leak or stiffen and upon
drying remained soft and pliable. Zaldívar was so impressed
he bartered for one to bring to camp and was further
impressed to discover that it weighed less than two
arrobas(approximately fifty pounds).61 
Besides the tepee they sometimes built huts or
wickiups. A circle of poles or saplings were bent over and
tied at the center. Spaces between were thatched with local
growth; yucca leaves or scrub in the desert regions, grass
in the transition zone, tree bark or hides in the mountains,
and reeds or branches in the river bottoms. A skin or
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blanket might be draped over the exterior to minimize drafts
and improve insulation. When the camp relocated, the brush
huts were simply abandoned but the tepees were dismantled
and transported by horses and mules, or dogs in the pre-
horse days. The heavier poles served as a travois or pole-
drag to transport possessions. 
In addition to tepees and wickiups, the Mescalero also
built brush ramadas. The ramada was a pole framework with a
brush roof and open sides. Its purpose was to provide a
comfortable, shady work area. In certain areas caves were
used as temporary shelter, especially when on the move, so
that time would not have to be taken to set up and take down
tepees or other dwellings. In certain seasons Apaches
apparently lived in the open without even a lean-to for
shelter.62
  
The above summary of Apache culture is by no means
complete. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the
characteristics that would most influence their relations
with Europeans. First, it is necessary to understand the
home range of the various elements of the Apache tribes,
their migration patterns, and regions they deemed especially
important. Second, Native American government and social
structure differed greatly from the European concept and as
such lay at the root of many of the conflicts between
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Apaches and Europeans. Third, the horse revolutionized
Apache life style but did not dramatically change thier
culture. Instead, the horse simply increased what they
already had, their range of occupation, their
aggressiveness, and their accumulation of wealth. Fourth,
the Apache concept of warfare and their weaponry differed
drastically from that of Europeans. Apaches, like most
Native Americans practiced a limited form of warfare
primarily aimed at taking plunder. Finally, the nomadic life
style of the Apaches made it difficult for the Spanish and
other enemies to subdue them. Their tepees and other
material culture allowed them to relocate with minimal loss
or disruption to avoid enemies. All of these elements
combined to make the Apache a distinct people whose struggle
to maintain control of their homelands spanned centuries and
survived the attempted conquest by the Spanish.
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APACHE INDIANS FROM THEIR FIRST ARRIVAL IN THE SOUTHWEST
 TO THE SETTLEMENT OF NEW MEXICO BY THE SPANISH
The first contact between the Apache Indians and the
Spaniards occurred when Francisco Vázquez de Coronado
encountered a roving band of Querechos on the plains. His
meeting and all subsequent meetings until the beginning of
the seventeenth century, with one exception, were cordial.
Much of the damage attributed to Apaches by historians was
in fact caused by inter-Pueblo warfare, with possible
assistance by allied bands of Apaches. Most of these
Apaches, however, were not eastern Apaches, or Apaches
living on the plains, but Navajos or western Apaches from
Arizona and western New Mexico. To repeat, the Apaches who
lived on the plains for the most part kept the peace with
the Spaniards.
In order to understand the relationship between the
eastern and western Apaches, one must first understand their
arrival in the American Southwest. The Athapaskan linguistic
family, like other Native Americans, migrated to the
Americas from Asia across the Bering strait. They were one
of the last groups to make the passage. The Athapaskans 
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currently known as the Apaches broke away from the greater
Athapaskan stock that occupied the interior of Alaska and
northwestern Canada and traveled to the south. They ended up
in the American Southwest sometime between 700 A.D. and
1525.
The route is in as much dispute as the arrival date.
Three possible routes have been suggested. The first
suggestion carries the Apaches along the high plains east of
the Rocky Mountains. A second possible route has the Apaches
traveling through the Rocky Mountains. The third proposed
route traverses the plateau or Great Basin west of the
Rockies.
The most widely accepted route is the plains route.
Supporters of this route argue that the Apacheans wandered
south along the buffalo-rich high plains east of the Rockies
over succeeding generations. When they reached the area of
present- day eastern New Mexico and Texas, where the Rockies
taper off, they swung to the west, where the agricultural
Pueblos made tempting targets. Enemy tribes might also have
assisted in pushing them to the west. Later migrations of
the Apachean tribes would have followed but were prevented
from making the final swing to the west by the presence of
their earlier arriving kinsmen and so filtered instead
across the southern plains. In this scenario, the earlier
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migrants became the Western Apache and the later arrivals
became the Eastern Apache.1
The Rocky Mountain route, however, is the most
unlikely. While Indians afoot would as likely traverse
mountain ranges and rough territory as an open corridor,
presence of food, water, and other tribes would have a
greater effect on the route chosen. Game would be more
abundant on the plains to the east or in the basin to the
west, and either of these two routes would more likely be
followed by the roving migrants.
The intermontane route also has a significant amount of
support. There are a number of potential routes through the
Great Basin and the connecting Columbia and Colorado
Plateaus. In this scenario, the Eastern Apache led the
migration, swinging east at the southern end of the Rockies
to move out onto the plains. The Western Apache then
followed and settled the area of present-day Arizona and
western New Mexico.2
It seems likely that both the plains and intermontane
routes might be correct, depending on the tribe. The Eastern
Apache most likely arrived in the southwest via the High
Plains east of the Rockies, while the Western Apache and
Navajo likely traveled via the Great Basin route. Part of
the evidence for this assumption is the fact that when the
Spanish under Francisco Vázquez de Coronado traveled through
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the Southwest, they found no evidence of any "wild tribes"
in the area around Zuñi, Hopiland, Acoma, Taos, and Jémez,
although they were there for two years and specifically
asked about the country and its inhabitants.3
Adolf Bandelier and John P. Harrington both suggest
that the Apaches were present but "cleverly hiding."4  This
seems unlikely, considering that the Apaches rarely hid from
the Spaniards. Even when the natives tried to avoid the
Europeans, the Spaniards recorded glimpses of them or at
least smoke signals.5 For Coronado and his men to have seen
no sign of natives in the area seems conclusive proof that
none lived there.
Since Coronado did encounter Apaches (Querechos) on the
plains and later explorers found the Navajo firmly
entrenched in the West, it is unlikely that the Western
Apaches would have migrated across the Pueblo country to
establish themselves in Arizona in such a relatively brief
period of time. Since later explorers noted sparse Apache
presence in the Rio Grande valley, it seems that they were
stragglers rather than the advance guard of migration. In
any event, the Pueblos would certainly have informed the
Spanish of a great migration through the area.
In addition, the fact that some Pueblo languages had
separate terms for Eastern and Western Apaches while others
had a generic term for all Apaches bolsters the idea of the
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two-route theory. Those tribes who had contact with only
Eastern or only Western Apaches would obviously have but one
name for Apaches. On the other hand, those tribes who lived
in a more central location and had sporadic contact with
both groups would probably develop different names to
distinguish between the two groups. If, as Dolores Gunnerson
suggests, both Eastern and Western Apaches migrated from the
plains, there would have been no reason for the Pueblo
tribes to distinguish between the two groups, other than to
distinguish individual bands. This would have resulted in
many more than two names.6
The other major debate concerning the Apaches is the
date of their arrival in the Southwest. Many scholars place
their arrival at approximately 700-800 C.E. The evidence for
this early date is the destruction of numerous pueblos in
western New Mexico that began during this time period.
Harold Gladwin argues that Apache tribes ruled the upper
Gila and Mimbres by 1150. He describes the Apaches as
virile, aggressive nomads, practicing hit and run tactics
with no fixed settlements that could be destroyed. The
Pueblos, on the other hand, were tied down by the necessity
of protecting their families, homes, and possessions. These
natives became vulnerable when they left their protected
villages to draw water, obtain meat, or sow, tend, and
harvest their crops.7
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Jack Forbes posits that the Apaches were the original,
or earlier, settlers of the Southwest and were pushed out by
the Pueblos in the 1300s.8 This theory seems unlikely given
the aggressiveness of the Apaches in historic times. While
it is apparent that much of the Pueblo destruction was
indeed caused by inter-Pueblo fighting, it is likely that
the Pueblos used various local Apache groups as allies in
their wars. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the Pueblos
could have driven the Apaches from the region if they had
already been there.
More recently, some historians have challenged the idea
that the Apaches were responsible for the destruction of the
Pueblos prior to the 1400s. Dolores Gunnerson suggests that
most of the destruction previously blamed on the Apaches was
actually caused by wars among the Pueblos themselves. She
notes that the Spanish recorded marked hostility between the
Pueblos, but no nomads living in the area. The Teyas and
Querechos of the plains, rather than being hostile toward
the Pueblos, had established a peaceful and mutually
profitable trade with them by 1540.9
Perhaps the best argument against Apaches being
responsible for Pueblo destruction prior to 1540 is the
former's motive for warfare. Apaches generally attacked for
plunder or revenge. The destruction of a pueblo gained them
nothing. First, the Pueblos did not generally launch attacks
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against Apaches. Secondly, the Pueblos did not usually hunt
buffalo or otherwise intrude into Apachería. Thirdly, the
Apaches had no desire to occupy the abandoned pueblos.
Finally, the Apache had little desire to farm abandoned
Pueblo lands. In fact, destroying pueblos was detrimental to
the Apaches because it removed a source of plunder. As long
as a pueblo remained productive it was a source of trade and
plunder, but once destroyed it served no benefit to the
Apaches.
Pueblo to Pueblo aggression, however, had a motivating
factor. The destruction of a pueblo by another benefitted
the survivor by removing a rival for trade with other
natives as well as a possible source of attack. In addition,
destruction of neighboring Pueblos opened up new lands for
farming and destroyed a potential haven for enemy Apaches.
This is not to suggest that Apaches never raided
Pueblos, at times to the point of forcing their abandonment,
but such intensive attacks usually occurred during times of
duress, when there was a drought, or after the arrival of
the Spanish, when the Europeans started recruiting Pueblos
as auxiliary troops for raids against Apaches. Also, as the
Spanish began to confiscate a greater amount of Pueblo
production, the Apache raids became a greater burden on the
remaining grain stores, often causing the abandonment of a
pueblo.
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In any case, the first encounter between Apaches and
European came with Francisco Vázquez de Coronado's
expedition in 1540. In the vicinity of the Texas Panhandle,
Coronado's entrada encountered the Querechos, and further
east the Teyas. Almost all scholars agree that the Querechos
were Apaches, but there has been much debate over the
Teyas.10 The Teyas have been identified variously as
Apaches, Jumanos, and Caddoans.11 The strongest arguments
can be made for identifying them as Apaches or Jumanos.
There are compelling arguments favoring an Apache
identification. Both the Querechos and Teyas used dog
nomadism, which was not attributed to any other group. Both
names are Pueblo names and equivalents for both names are
found among Pueblo languages.12 Adolph Bandelier recorded,
while working at Cochití, that a plains tribe called by the
Queres "Kiruash" (Querecho?) had invaded the Río Grande
Valley in pre-Coronado times. Coronado's chronicler, Pedro
de Castañeda, recorded a similar incident involving the
Teyas. It is possible, therefore, that both the Querechos
and Teyas were involved in the attack and were simply
different bands of Apaches.13 
Further, arguments generally used to dispute an Apache
identification for the Teyas can be easily refuted. The
enmity between the two tribes could have simply been an
intra-tribal dispute and does not necessarily indicate that
53
the two tribes were of different nations. The fact that
Teyas painted themselves while Querechos did not is a moot
point since some Apache tribes used paint while others did
not. The fact that the Teyas were more sedentary and
practiced farming also does not eliminate the possibility
that the Teyas were Apaches. The Jicarillas of later times,
for example, were sedentary and practiced agriculture.
Finally, the fact that the Teyas dressed similarly to the
Quivirans simply shows that they were adaptable. The
Jicarilla, who lived in the vicinity of the Pueblos adopted
many elements of Pueblo culture and dress.14 It is not
possible therefore to eliminate the possibility that the
Teyas were Apaches.
There are equally strong, or perhaps stronger arguments
linking the Teyas to the Jumanos. Some scholars argue that
Teya was a version of the Caddo word Texia, meaning friend
or ally, and the source for Tejas, associated with the
Hasinai, or Caddoan, of east Texas. The term might have been
used to indicate partners in a widespread trade network
throughout the area of Texas and New Mexico. In the
seventeenth century the Jumanos were a part of this network.
The Apaches, on the other hand, had never been associated
with the trade. The Tanoan Indians who accompanied Coronado
simply identified the Teyas as trading partners or allies.15
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Arguing that the Teyas were Jumanos, Nancy Hickerson
points to the geographical location of the Teyas, the
cultural similarities with later Jumanos, and the enmity
between the Querechos and Teyas. The location of the largest
ranchería of the Teyas was in Palo Duro canyon, the general
area where Jumanos were found later. The Teyas also showed a
great amount of knowledge of the geography of the region
especially to the south. In fact, an elderly Teya remembered
encountering Cabeza de Vaca's party years earlier. Those who
escorted part of Coronado's army back to the Pecos River
informed the Spanish when they reached the river that it ran
south to join the Tiguex (Río Grande) twenty days to the
south and then turned east. The Spanish (and possibly the
Teyas) thought it probably flowed into the Mississippi.16
Culturally, the description of Teyas facial painting
and clothing styles fit with Jumano culture. The Querecho
(Apache) enmity with the Teyas is consistent with the long-
recorded power struggle between the Apaches and the Jumanos
for control of the plains. The Apaches eventually won the
struggle, which might account for later Spanish records
reporting Jumanos in widely separated areas. If the Apaches
won control of the Plains area, they would have driven a
wedge forcing the Jumanos to divide into two groups.
Whether the Teyas were Apaches or Jumanos cannot be
determined with certainty. Neither possibility can be ruled
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out completely, and since the Teyas do not appear in later
records, the problem of identification is even more
difficult. For the purposes of this paper, the Teyas will be
considered Jumanos, since strong evidence supports this
identification.
  In any case, when Coronado's entrada first
encountered the Querechos, the natives were not in the least
agitated. Instead, they came out of their tents to
scrutinize the newcomers and asked the vanguard what the
army was. The Querechos communicated with sign language in
such a manner that Pedro de Castañeda noted that "they made
themselves understood so well that there was no need of an
interpreter."17  The Querechos expressed an extensive amount
of knowledge concerning the territory to the east,
describing a great river that may well have been the
Mississippi. Obviously, the Querechos traveled the plains
and the surrounding country extensively.
The Spanish were generally pleasantly impressed by the
Plains Indians, recording that they were better warriors and
more feared than other nations the Spanish had encountered.
Castañeda noted that they were "a kind people and not
cruel," and were "faithful friends."18  Obviously the first
meeting between the Spanish and the Apaches was quite
cordial. The Apaches were cooperative and peaceful. Indeed,
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other than curiosity, the Querechos took little note of
Spaniards passing among them.
After Coronado returned to Mexico, the Pueblos perhaps
encouraged the Querechos to settle nearby as allies against
a possible Spanish return. Later explorers did find
"Querechos" in the mountains around both Acoma and the Hopi
Pueblos, but they were most likely Western Apaches arriving
from the west rather than Eastern Apaches migrating from the
plains. Juan de Oñate, colonizer of New Mexico, reported
hostility between Querechos and Pueblos, but also noted a
vibrant trade between the two. The Pueblos apparently used
the Querechos as allies or mercenaries to attack and plunder
enemy Pueblos.19
The next historical encounter with the Querechos came
from Francisco Ibarra's expedition in the summer of 1565.
Ibarra and sixty soldiers marched north from San Juan in
Sinaloa, across the Río Mayo to the Yaqui river valley and
then apparently northwest to the pueblo Paquimé, most likely
Casas Grandes in northern Chihuahua.20 The principal
chronicler of the Ibarra expedition, Baltasar de Obregón,
used the term "Querecho" to refer to several tribes met on
the expedition.
The first encounter with a "plains" Indian was with a
"comely young man, handsome and well attired," who fled upon
seeing the Spaniards. Two horsemen pursued him and after he
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stoutly resisted until his strength and arrows gave out, his
captors brought him before Ibarra. The governor reassured
the trembling native with kind and soothing words and gave
him clothes, beads and other gifts to win his favor. The
Querecho was then released and encouraged to tell his people
of the presents and kindly treatment by the Spanish in order
to encourage them to visit the Spanish.21
Later, three hundred Querechos arrived in the Spanish
camp, having been brought in by the earlier native. They
were lively, noble, friendly, brave, and able bodied. The
women and children were attractive and the whole group
arrived dancing, singing, and making strange faces toward
the sun, which was all part of their ceremonial sun worship.
The Spanish treated the natives kindly and gave them gifts
and iron trifles.
The Querechos stated that they were three days from
Cíbola and four days south of the cattle. They claimed to
live on slopes and in sheltered places during the summer and
were enemies of the Querechos of the plains.22
There are several points to consider concerning
Obregón's Querechos. First of all, there is a possibility
that these Querechos were not Apaches at all. Obregón could
have been using the term to indicate generically any unknown
nomadic tribe. The Ibarra expedition was far west of any
location that Coronado's expedition had reported seeing
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Querechos. If Obregón's Querechos were indeed Apaches, it is
likely that they were Western Apaches, which would account
for their location and the fact that they were "enemies" of
the plains Querechos.
Obregón, in several instances, distinguishes between
Querechos met by Ibarra's expedition and those of the
plains. He noted the warlike characteristics of the natives,
commenting that it was only natural since they bordered with
the fierce plains Querechos. His statements indicate that he
believed he was much closer to the plains than he actually
was, and increases the probability that his Querechos were
not plains Apaches but were either Western Apaches or some
other non-related nomadic tribe.23
The next encounter with Apaches on the plains occurred
in 1581 with the Chamuscado-Rodríguez expedition. Fray
Augustín Rodríguez organized the expedition to spread the
Gospel to the natives to the north of Nueva Vizcaya. The
expedition consisted of three friars, nine soldiers led by
Francisco Sánchez Chamuscado, nineteen Indian servants, six
hundred head of cattle and ninety horses. The little
expedition left Santa Bárbara in June 1581, following the
course of the Conchos to La Junta de los Ríos where the
Conchos enters the Río Grande. They then followed the latter
river upstream as far as the vicinity of Taos, encountering
numerous tribes along the entire journey.24
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In the vicinity of the Galisteo River, the expedition
headed east for the plains. When the Spaniards reached the
Pecos River, they noticed a column of smoke and headed for
it. They encountered a ranchería of five hundred huts and
tents and were met by four hundred men armed with bows and
arrows.25 The natives inquired by sign the purpose of the
entrada. The Spanish replied that they had come as friends,
but both sides remained wary and the natives seemed intent
on firing arrows at the Spaniards. Rather than provoke a
conflict, the Spanish withdrew to await further
developments.
The Spanish tried to attract the natives with friendly
actions but were determined to subdue them by force if
necessary. Father Rodríguez made the sign of the cross as a
sign of peace and upon seeing it the natives returned the
sign and welcomed the Spaniards into their camp. Father
Rodríguez dismounted and gave the natives a cross to kiss
and soon the natives were rejoicing and offered the
Spaniards everything that they had.
There were approximately two thousand natives at the
ranchería. At the request of the natives, the Spanish camped
nearby while the natives marveled at the new arrivals. The
Spanish called the attention of the Indians and fired a
arquebus among them at which the terrified natives fell to
the ground as if stunned. The Spanish were pleased with the
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reaction, but the natives asked the Spanish to refrain from
further discharges because it frightened them, their wives
and children, and "stunned their senses."26
These natives were very similar to Coronado's
Querechos. They wore only buffalo hides and deerskins. They
lived off the buffalo during the summer and fall, but during
the rainy season went in search of prickly pears and yucca.
They used dogs as pack animals, loading them with fifty to
seventy-five pounds each and tying them together like a pack
train with maguey ropes. Normally, they would travel three
to four leagues per day.27
After a brief stay at the ranchería, the Spanish
expressed interest in the buffalo herds. The natives
informed them that the herds were two days to the west, but
none of them would accompany the expedition there. The
Spanish decided to attempt the journey on their own.
However, after two days of wandering over the plains and
finding no cattle, they returned to the ranchería for a
guide.
Again, the natives refused to supply a guide, so the
Spaniards kidnapped a native, bound him, and brought him
before Chamuscado to resume their journey in search of
buffalo. The Indians became notably angry at this forced
abduction, but the Spaniards maintained a careful vigil and
no fighting broke out. The following day, with their captive
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in tow, the expedition once again set out in search for the
buffalo herds. Three days later they found some water holes
frequented by the natives and used hoes to open them
sufficiently to water their stock. Here, they killed their
first buffalo. They questioned their captive concerning the
buffalo and were assured that they would find the herds the
following day at another water hole.
As promised, the following day they reached some
lagoons of brackish water, near the headwaters of the
Canadian River, and found large herds of buffalo. They
killed forty with their arquebuses. The native explained
that the water and the valley extended to a river that
flowed where the bulk of the animals lived. The Spanish
opted not to travel any further because of a shortage of
supplies. They packed up the buffalo meat they had gathered
and returned toward the ranchería.
The Spanish sent their native guide ahead, well laden
with meat and content with having witnessed the success of
the Spanish buffalo hunt. When the Spanish arrived at the
ranchería, the natives welcomed their return, the guide
having told his people of the fabulous hunt, and the natives
were apparently impressed enough to forgive the kidnapping.
In fact, the Apaches expressed interest in taking the
Spaniards to where there would be many cattle. The Spanish
rejected the offer and gave gifts of buffalo meat to those
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who seemed to be tribal leaders, but promised to return
soon. The natives indicated that they would await their
return. Although the natives appeared to be mollified by the
safe return of their tribesmen and the gifts, the Spanish
still kept up their guard lest the Apaches try to avenge the
kidnapping under the pretext of peace and friendship.28
The Chamuscado-Rodríguez expedition establishes the
Apaches as living in approximately the same region they had
been in at the time of the Coronado expedition. These
Indians showed themselves to be quite amiable as well. After
preparing to meet the Spaniard's approach with force, they
quickly welcomed them as friends and despite the kidnapping
of one of their tribesmen, they apparently parted on good
terms. No doubt a part of this cordial departure resulted
from the successful Spanish buffalo hunt. The killing of
forty buffalo in such a short time must have impressed the
horseless natives, as indicated in their interest in taking
the Spanish to where the greatest number of buffalo grazed.
Finally, their guide once again expressed an extensive
knowledge of the region, indicating that these natives
roamed extensively across the plains.
The next expedition to the north, that of Antonio de
Espejo did not encounter the plains Apaches. It did,
however, note the presence of mountain Querechos in the
vicinity of Acoma and the Hopi pueblos. Groups of Querechos
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seemed to have alliances with some Pueblos and to be enemies
of others. In any case, it is most likely that these
Querechos were either Navajos or Western Apaches who had
settled in the area from the west. The Espejo expedition
found no Querechos, or other potential Apaches, in the area
east of the Rio Grande.29 This again supports the idea of an
early split migration of Eastern and Western Apaches.
The Rodríguez-Chamuscado and Espejo expeditions set off
a struggle in Mexico to acquire permission to colonize this
promising region. Before permission was finally bestowed
upon Juan de Oñate, however, two unsanctioned expeditions
would attempt to claim the right. The first of these
expeditions was led by Gaspar Castaño de Sosa, lieutenant
governor of Nuevo León.
Castaño de Sosa marched up the Pecos River encountering
many recently built but abandoned rancherías. He came upon a
lone Indian, most likely an Apache, but none of the
interpreters could understand him. Castaño gave the native
some corn and told him he should tell his people to come out
and not be afraid. Four days later, after traveling through
an older abandoned ranchería, the vanguard saw a group of
Indians and approached them. The Indians fled into a swamp.
The Spaniards managed to capture two men, two women, and one
of the pack dogs.
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They took the captives back to camp to bring them
before Castaño, but the lieutenant governor was absent,
having gone to recover some horses. The captors thereupon
released the women with all their possessions but kept the
men and a pack dog, which always fascinated the Spaniards.
When Castaño returned he was pleased to find the captives,
but he had no interpreter. Castaño released the natives and
their pack dog, giving them meat and corn and telling them,
by signs, that they should not be afraid.30
A few days later Castaño's expedition had the first
known battle with the plains Apaches. The vanguard spotted a
group of natives while attempting to cross a river. The
Spanish unsuccessfully tried to communicate but eventually
withdrew. One of the Spanish Indian guides lagged behind and
when the group of natives saw him alone, they seized him,
stole some rope, threw him into the river, and then shot him
with arrows.
The following day a large number of natives appeared
near the Spanish camp, but Castaño could not induce them to
enter. Instead, the Indians attempted to run off some of the
Spanish cattle. Castaño sent a patrol out to drive them away
and the Indians fired arrows at them. The Spaniards fired
back and killed several in self defense. Four of the Indians
were captured and brought before the Spanish leader for
punishment. Castaño ordered that one be hanged while the
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other three, mere youths, were spared and kept as
interpreters. In order to hasten the language learning
process, each of the three youths was assigned to an
individual Spaniard. Despite the efforts of the Spanish, all
three escaped, taking an ox with them.31 
Later, at one of the northerly pueblos, probably either
Picurís or San Juan, Castaño's party saw a group of natives
encamped in some huts, about the distance of a long arquebus
shot from the pueblo. The natives had come to the pueblo for
refuge during the winter but began to leave as the Spanish
approached them. Castaño sent word that they should return
and the Spaniards spent a peaceful night in the huts of
these Indians. The expedition soon came to an ignominious
end when Captain Juan Morlete arrived with orders from the
viceroy to arrest Castaño and bring him and his followers
back to Mexico.32
In retrospect, Castaño encountered at least two groups
of plains Apaches. The first group, met at the southern
fringe of the plains, were hostile, wanting little to do
with the Spanish, except to steal their animals. This was
caused by the fact that these Indians had most likely been
in contact with Spanish slavers and were therefore
suspicious of the motives of any Europeans in their
territory. Their attack on the Indian guide at the river
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might also be attributed to their resentment toward a native
guide of potential slavers.
The second group of Apaches were those encamped near
the Pueblo. As seen earlier, Apache tribes often wintered
near Pueblos. They, having much less contact with the
Spanish, reacted in a neutral manner. At first, they
attempted to leave but later apparently welcomed the Spanish
into their camp. 
The second illegal expedition was that of Francisco de
Leyva Bonilla, whom the governor of Nueva Vizcaya sent in
1593 to punish some Indians who had been stealing from
frontier ranches. Bonilla took it upon himself to carry his
expedition into New Mexico and established his headquarters
at San Ildefonso, approximately twenty miles northwest of
Santa Fe. For approximately a year he and his followers
searched among the Pueblos for treasure, finally marching
across the plains toward Quivira. Along the way Bonilla
argued with Antonio Gutiérrez Humaña who eventually murdered
him and assumed command of the expedition. Humaña and his
followers later met their death, probably at the hands of
the Quivirans. Five Mexican Indians escaped. One of them,
Jusepe, was captured by the Apaches and lived with them for
a year before making his way to the Spanish settlements that
had been established in New Mexico by Oñate.33
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Here again, the Apaches encountered by the expedition,
based on the scant information available, appear to have
been amicable. Bonilla and Humaña managed to pass unmolested
through the plains. Surely had they encountered hostility
among the Apaches, the Indian informant would have related
such an occurrence to Oñate. The surviving Mexican Indian,
whether captured or rescued, was treated well and had no
difficulty leaving the Apaches to join the Spanish in New
Mexico.
Meanwhile, in Mexico, there was a struggle to gain the
right to colonize New Mexico. The winner of the struggle was
don Juan de Oñate. After over two years of preparations and
delays, Oñate finally reached the Pueblo of San Juan on the
upper Rio Grande, approximately twenty-five miles north of
Santa Fe, in July 1598 and established his headquarters. A
short time later, he relocated to another Pueblo which he
called San Gabriel at the juncture of the Chama and the Rio
Grande. After exploring the immediate and outlying areas
Oñate set up mission fields for the Franciscan friars that
included the Apache Indians. 
Francisco de San Miguel was assigned the province of
Pecos, including the Vaqueros of that region to the Sierra
Nevada and the pueblos of the "gran salina" behind the
pueblo of Puaray. Francisco de Zamora received the province
of Picurís with all Apaches in that area, along with the
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province of Taos and the upper Rio Grande valley. Friar
Alonzo de Lugo worked the province of Jémez and the Apaches
and Cocoyes of that region.34
Father San Miguel had accompanied the expedition of
Vicente de Zaldívar, one of Oñate's officers, to the buffalo
plains. Fray San Miguel had remained at the Pecos pueblo
while Zaldívar and his men continued east. Approximately
eleven leagues east of Pecos, four Indian herdsmen
(Vaqueros) approached the expedition. The Spanish gave them
food and presents, whereupon one of the natives arose and
called in a loud voice to many other natives that had been
hidden. The natives entered the Spanish camp and were also
given gifts. Zaldívar asked for a guide to the land of
cattle and they willingly furnished one.35
The following day the Spaniards met three more natives
who came down from a ridge. Zaldívar inquired concerning the
location of their ranchería and was told that it was a
league away but was also told that the natives were
disturbed by the presence of the Spaniards. In order to calm
and reassure the natives, Zaldívar visited the ranchería
with a single companion, telling the three natives to go and
forewarn their camp of his approach. Three-quarters of a
league away from the Spanish camp small groups of natives
began to approach Zaldívar asking him for friendship.36
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Zaldívar distributed gifts among the natives and they
implored him to visit their camp. Although it was dusk,
Zaldívar decided that he must visit the camp lest he appear
afraid. He was received with great friendship and did not
return to the Spanish camp until late at night. At dawn the
following morning, groups of natives arrived at the Spanish
camp with gifts of pinole, a drink made from ground toasted
corn mixed with water. Zaldívar distributed additional gifts
and informed the natives that he had been sent by don Juan
de Oñate in order that they might know that he could protect
those natives loyal to the crown and punish those who were
not.
Upon hearing this, the Vaqueros were well pleased and
asked for assistance against their enemies, the Jumanos.
Zaldívar promised that he would endeavor to insure peace
among all the tribes. The Spanish departed on good terms and
continued their search for the buffalo. A few days later
they encountered a group of Vaqueros returning from trading
with the Picuris and Taos pueblos. The Vaqueros had traded
meat, hides, tallow, suet, and salt for cotton blankets,
pottery, maize, and some small green stones (turquoise). 
The following day the Spaniards found a ranchería of
fifty tents made of tanned hides. The tents were bright red
and white in color, bell shaped with flaps and openings, and
were large enough to accommodate four mattresses without
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difficulty. Zaldívar was so impressed with the tents that he
bartered for one and brought it with him to the Spanish
camp. After one final unsuccessful attempt to capture some
buffalo, Zaldívar and his men headed back to New Mexico.
Less than two years later, Oñate himself led an
expedition across the plains to visit Quivira. With seventy
men and more than seven hundred horses and mules Oñate set
off in June 1601, guided by the Indian Jusepe, the survivor
of the Humaña expedition, and Zaldívar's guide during his
trip to the plains.37 
Along the Canadian River, Oñate's expedition
encountered Apaches who welcomed the Spaniards with
demonstrations of peace. The Spaniards responded with
generosity so that within a short period of time Apache men,
women, and children flocked to the camp, raising their hands
to the sun, their sign of friendship. The natives brought
some small black and yellow fruit that grew in abundance
along the river, and the Spanish ate large quantities of
them without ill effects. The Apaches also brought fat and
tallow to the Spaniards who gave the Apaches in exchange
hard tack, tobacco, and some trifles.38
The Spanish continued on, encountering several
rancherías occupied by Apaches "who are masters of the
plains."  They had no permanent settlements but wandered
with the buffalo. Despite the fact that the Spaniards were
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intruding upon the Apache's territory, the natives made no
attempt to harm the Europeans and none "became
impertinent."39
Traveling on toward Quivira, the Spaniards discovered a
large ranchería with five to six thousand inhabitants,
called by the Spanish "Escanjaques."  There is much
controversy concerning the identity of the Escanjaques. They
shared many traits with the Apaches:  they did not farm but
lived solely off the buffalo, they used the same sign of
peace and friendship as the Apaches, and some lived in
buffalo hide covered structures.
On the other hand, most of their living structures were
made of branches. They were dirty, dark, and of ugly
complexion as compared to the Apaches, and they apparently
did not use dog-pole drags. The most telling difference,
however, was the fact that the Spanish distinguished between
the Escanjaques and the Apaches and they apparently spoke
different languages. There were some Apaches living among
the Escanjaques. Oñate's Indian interpreter Jusepe could not
communicate directly with the Escanjaques but had to talk to
the Apaches, who then translated to the Escanjaques. The
Escanjaques were apparently either Kansa or Osage, or more
likely a Tonkawan group.40 In any case, they were not
Apaches.
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The Escanjaques eventually turned on the Spanish when
the Spanish returned from Quivira. The Apaches, however,
appear to have maintained their peaceful stance. Thus,
during Oñate's governorship in New Mexico, the plains
Apaches continued their peaceful attitude toward the
Spaniards. They were wary of the Spanish presence in their
territory, as well they should have been. Such an expedition
as Zaldívar's or Oñate's were threatening to the Apaches for
several reasons. First, since their motive was unknown to
the Apaches, they posed a military threat if they proved to
be hostile. Second, the Apaches had no doubt heard of slave
raids to the south and might well have feared that this was
the purpose of the expedition. Finally, an expedition of
such size would have negative effects on the buffalo herds.
Zaldívar noted that the buffalo herds had moved off upon the
approach of the Apaches returning from their trading
expedition to New Mexico. Large Spanish expeditions could
disrupt the migratory patterns of the buffalo, and this
augered ill for the horseless Apaches. Accordingly, it was
reasonable that the Apaches showed concern for the approach
of the Spanish into their territory. 
During Oñate's governorship, the Spanish became aware
of numerous "wild tribes" in the region surrounding the
Pueblos. Until 1600 the Apaches and Vaqueros were mentioned
as separate peoples. "Apache" was usually used in reference
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to the Navaho, western Apache tribes and those living in the
vicinity of Taos and Pecos. "Vaquero" was used to refer to
those natives living among the buffalo. By 1601, the
Vaqueros were also being called Apaches. This transition can
be seen clearly in the expeditions of Zaldívar and Oñate.
Zaldívar called plains tribes "Vaqueros" while Oñate, just
two years later, called the same natives "Apaches."
At this time, it becomes extremely difficult to
distinguish between different Apache groups. Spanish sources
often used the term Apache to describe a group of natives
with no further specifics. At other times, sources are
overly specific, giving a name, usually of an Apache chief
or some other equally temporary condition. That particular
name might never appear again or the same tribe might be
referred to by a different name when a new chief assumed
leadership with nothing to connect the tribe to its former
name. Because it took years for names to become attached to
a specific tribe, the early volatility of nomenclature makes
it impossible in many cases to determine with certainty an
affiliation with an existing tribe.
The Spanish had several clashes with Apaches during
Oñate's term, but it seems that most if not all of these
were with western Apaches or Navahos. In 1599 for example,
Apaches helped to defend Acoma against Oñate's forces. These
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Apaches were most likely Chiricahua, Western Apaches, or
Navahos.41
Both Zaldívar and Oñate appear to have promoted good
relations with the plains Apaches. In fact, after Zaldívar's
journey, a Vaquero chief with more than two hundred warriors
visited Zaldívar at San Marcos. The chief expressed great
joy at the encounter and gave the Spaniard a piece of
buffalo meat and other gifts. He informed Zaldívar that he
and his people were friends of the Spanish. The Spaniard's
trip also seems to have improved relations between the
plains Apaches and at least some of the Pueblos.42
Shortly after Oñate's return from the plains in 1601,
the Quivirans sent an ambassador "of high standing and
seriousness" with 600 servants with bows and arrows to New
Mexico. He invited the Spanish in friendship to return with
him to fight together against their enemies, the Ayjaos,
apparently the Escanjaques. Both sides conversed in Apache,
a mutually understandable language. The ambassador also
informed Oñate that they had traveled to Quivira by a
roundabout route and that if they had traveled due north
they would have arrived more quickly. The Quiviran was
apparently suggesting a route by way of Taos.43
When Oñate refused the ambassador's request, the
Quiviran asked for a dozen soldiers, with which he would be
content. Oñate again refused, partially because of a mass
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desertion of settlers that had occurred while he was in
Quivira. The Quiviran made a final plea for six soldiers, so
that he would have at least something to show his king when
he returned. Oñate finally relented and picked six soldiers,
ordering them to make ready. The ambassador left, leaving
behind two guides to direct them by the more direct route.
Later, Oñate changed his mind and the soldiers never made
the trip.44
Oñate missed a golden opportunity to establish firm
relations with the Quivirans, with great ramifications for
the Spanish in the future. His lack of manpower, however,
made honoring the Quivirans request too risky. His refusal
to make the journey or send his soldiers means that he lost
an opportunity to learn more about the Apaches living in the
vicinity of Taos. Apparently they were at peace with the
Quivirans since the ambassador was confident that six
soldiers and two guides could traverse their territory
safely.
It might also have solved the question of Apaches that
Oñate had learned of who lived in Pueblos, one less than
fifty miles from San Gabriel that contained fifteen plazas.
The "Pueblo" was probably Taos, where the Apaches often
camped while trading.45 Oñate, in the same letter, describes
the pueblo of the herdsmen as "nine continuous leagues in
length and two in width, with streets and houses consisting
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of huts. It is situated in the midst of the multitude of
buffalo."46  If this is the ranchería visited by Zaldívar,
the use of terminology such as streets and houses seems a
bit extravagant. Perhaps Oñate was exaggerating for effect.
Oñate also describes his efforts concerning the
Apaches. He claimed to have compelled them to render
obedience to the king, but not, he added, by means of legal
instruments used in the rest of the provinces. His effort
had caused him much labor, diligence, care, long journeys
with armed forces, in addition to being constantly alert to
danger.47 Despite his efforts, internal dissension caused
Oñate to offer his resignation in 1607, and by 1609 he had
been replaced as governor of New Mexico.
For the first half century of contact, relations
between the Spanish and the Apaches were relatively cordial.
Other than Castaño de Sosa's clash with Apaches on the
plains, there was no other recorded hostility between the
plains Apaches and the Spaniards. To the contrary, the
relationship seems to be one of trust, respect, and
friendship with Apaches coming to visit Spanish leaders and
to trade with the Pueblos.
The hostility with Apache tribes was primarily with the
Navajos or western Apaches. The Acoma rebellion, where
Apaches aided the Pueblos, was the most obvious hostility.
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Acoma would be much more accessible by western Apaches than
by eastern Apaches who would have had to travel through a
relatively dense population area to reach it.
The other area of potential Apache conflict came from
the north of Spanish settlements. A long period of drought
between 1560-1593 increased tensions among the Indians
living in the New Mexico area by lessening the food supply.
This drought could have affected the plains Apaches and
caused them to move into the mountains bordering on the
Pueblos, but it is more likely that the Indians moving into
the mountains were western Apaches who were seeking closer
proximity to the Pueblos.
The Apaches living on the plains would have been less
affected by a drought because of the buffalo, from which
they obtained almost everything that they needed. Any
surplus could be traded to the Pueblos. Apaches living in
the mountains or west of the Rio Grande would be competing
with Pueblos for game in the area and though many of them
farmed to some extent, their crops would be adversely
affected by the lack of rain. Lack of horses would also
limit the ability of the Apaches to overcome Pueblos by
themselves, but with assistance of friendly Pueblos to
provide a base of operations and additional weapons, men,
and supplies, Apache raiders might successfully attack a
Pueblo. 
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In any case, it appears that any conflict between
Apaches and Spaniards, or Apaches and Pueblos was limited to
the Western Apaches and that the Apaches of the plains
remained peaceful and friendly.
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THE ASCENDANCY OF THE APACHES, 1607-1691
During the seventeenth century, the Apaches began their
march toward a dominant position on the plains and in the
area east of the Río Grande. They had inhabited the area for
years but shared it with numerous other tribes. Overall,
Apaches were a relatively mild-mannered people who traded
with nearby pueblos and only on occasion warred with their
neighbors. 
By the middle of the seventeenth century, however, the
Apaches began to assert their dominance. Advantaged by their
geographic position, the Apaches were able to trade with the
Spanish, or raid them with impunity. Their proximity to the
main source of horses allowed them to control the
distribution of this vitally important animal and monopolize
its use. With the advantage of access to Spanish material
and horses, the Apaches quickly assumed dominance of the
plains and began subduing and isolating their enemies. By
the end of the century, the Apaches had become lords of the
southern plains.
After Juan de Oñate's resignation in 1607, there were
several years of confusion during which the Spanish crown
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debated the fate of New Mexico. No great wealth had been
discovered, and since the natives were hostile, the
conversion of them was unpromising. The deciding factor
proved to be the uncertain fate of the few converted natives
should the Spanish withdraw. The Council of the Indies felt
it was unjust to desert the recent converts, but also felt
that relocation of them would be too disruptive to their
lives. In 1609 Fray Francisco de Velasco, arguing in favor
of a continued Spanish presence in New Mexico, underscored
the Council's position. He claimed that the Picurís, Taos,
Pecos, Apaches, and Vaqueros had formed a league among
themselves to exterminate the Spanish-friendly pueblos.1
Interestingly, Father Velasco included the Vaqueros in
this pact. Whether such a plan actually existed or not is
certainly debatable. As seen previously, bands of Apaches
often worked with individual pueblos toward common goals and
for plunder, but it is unlikely that these natives had an
organized alliance aimed at exterminating the pro-Spanish
pueblos. It is even less likely that the Vaqueros, or
Apaches from the buffalo plains, would be so directly
involved in such a plot. Most likely, Father Velasco
portrayed the worst possible scenario in order to increase
support for a continued Spanish presence in New Mexico.
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Once Santa Fe was founded in 1609-1610, the Spanish in
New Mexico began to have increased contact with the natives
of the region, including the various Apache groups. One of
the first groups to be given a specific name was the Quinia
Apaches, named after the chief of the tribe. The Quinia
Apaches lived ten leagues north of Taos, and it is possible
that these natives were the ancestors of the Jicarilla
Apaches.2
From 1621 to 1626, Fray Pedro de Ortega, the missionary
at Taos, had contact with the Quinia Apaches. Chief Quinia
was favorably disposed toward the Spanish. In fact, his
friendly attitude toward the Spanish caused him to be shot
with an arrow by one of his own people. Fray Ortega and
another friar skilled in surgery traveled ten leagues in
order to administer to Quinia, and when the chief recovered
he decided to convert to Christianity. He was baptized by
Fray Ortega in 1628.3
Chief Quinia visited Santa Fe in 1629 to guide Fray
Bartolomé Romero to his tribe. Romero had been appointed to
convert Quinia's tribe by Fray Alonso de Benavides,
custodian of the New Mexican missions. Quinia brought his
son and a famed native warrior that he had captured in
battle with him. Both of these natives accepted baptism and
the Spanish governor, Francisco de Silva Nieto, acted as
godfather to Quinia's son. When Quinia and the missionary
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departed, the governor and fifty soldiers escorted the friar
to the ranchería.4
The escort proved to be unnecessary because the Quinia
Apaches did not resist the Spaniards, but rather welcomed
them and sought baptism. In fact, in one day the group built
a log church. The governor and Father Romero helped carry
the logs, and the soldiers and Indians pitched in to
assemble the building. After getting the missionary settled,
the governor returned to Santa Fe. Father Romero continued
to teach the natives, but Quinia soon rebelled and at one
point attempted to murder Romero. Having failed, Quinia took
his tribe to a new location away from the missionary's
influence. A single native remained faithful to father
Romero and protected him several times when the Apaches
returned and attempted to kill him. Eventually, Romero
abandoned his post and returned to Santa Fe.5
The Spanish also showed interest in Christianizing the
Vaquero Apaches. The first conversions from this tribe
occurred through contact with friars at pueblos where the
Vaqueros came to trade dressed buffalo hides. During one of
their visits, the Vaqueros learned that the Spanish had a
sculptured image of Mary, the mother of Jesus, at a chapel
in Santa Fe. They went to see it and were impressed--first
seeing it at night when it was surrounded by many lighted
candles with music playing in the background. Several
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principal chiefs visited, worshipped, and converted at this
site.6
This promising beginning was frustrated when Governor
Felipe Sotelo sent a Pueblo Indian captain to raid nearby
tribes and bring back captives for slaves. The captain
raided the camp of the Vaquero chief who had been most vocal
in his support of Catholic conversion. The chief had a
rosary given him by Father Benavides, and when the Pueblos
attacked, he held it before him and begged for his life. It
was to no avail. The Vaquero leader was killed along with a
number of his followers. Others were taken captive and
brought back to the governor. The attack on the peaceful
Vaquero camp created an uproar among the religious
community. The governor was displeased by the protest of the
clergy but accepted the captives regardless. He later
released them because of the clamor that surrounded the
attack.7
As a result of this incident, Benavides remarked that
the Vaqueros revolted throughout the province. However, when
Benavides departed in 1629, he expressed his belief that the
Spanish were reclaiming control over the area. In his
revised Memorial of 1634, Benavides was even more positive.
He proudly remarked that through the work of the
Franciscans, the Vaquero Apaches were at peace once more and
many had been Christianized. Otherwise, he continued, they
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would have already killed all of the Christians upon whom
they had warred.8
Benavides also mentions a tribe known as the Apaches of
Perillo. The tribe's name, which means "little dog,"
originated from a spring in the Jornado del Muerto, north of
El Paso. A small dog had discovered the water hole five to
six miles west of the road, accessible only through a narrow
canyon. The Perillo Apaches lived in the vicinity of the
spring. Despite being "very warlike," Benavides asserted,
"they are more to be trusted than the forgoing nations and
we pass by way of them with less anxiety."9  There is a
general consensus that the Apaches of Perillo made up a part
of the natives eventually known as the Mescalero Apaches.10
Concerning the Apache nation as a whole, Benavides
noted that "without exaggeration, it alone has more people
than all the Nations of New Spain [put] together, even
including the Mexican [nation]."  He further claimed that
armies of more than 30,000 had been seen on their way to war
with each other.11 Obviously this is an exaggeration,
especially the latter statement concerning Apache armies.
Part of Benavides's motivation was to encourage further
missionary activity in New Mexico by enlarging the number of
potential converts in the region.12
Serious trouble began brewing between civil and
religious leaders of the province of New Mexico in the
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1620s. This struggle would be an important factor in dealing
with the Apaches. Both civil and religious authorities
blamed each other for lost opportunities and for creating
problems that eventually led to a breakdown of relations
between the Spanish and the Apaches. Governor Sotelo's raid,
mentioned above, set the stage.
The conflict between the clergy and civil authorities
exploded during the governorship of Luis de Rosas, who
arrived in New Mexico in 1637. Rosas took the struggle
directly to the Vaquero Apaches on the plains. Being
disappointed by a lack of trade with the Vaqueros at Pecos,
Rosas apparently blamed the priest stationed at Pecos for
the lack of activity and forcefully dragged him back to
Santa Fe. The governor later sent an expedition toward
Quivira that killed a number of Vaqueros and captured even
more to be brought back to Santa Fe, where they could be
sold as slaves in Nueva Vizcaya. The Pecos Indians
vigorously protested these activities, because they relied
upon trade with peaceful Vaquero Apaches for many of their
goods.13
Rosas's raids increased the hostility of Apaches on the
plains. Supporters of Rosas claimed that his raids helped to
force the Apaches to reduce their activities, but evidence
indicates that the Vaqueros were relatively peaceful toward
the Spanish at the time. In the midst of this power
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struggle, the Taos Indians revolted and fled to the plains
to establish a new pueblo at El Cuartelejo, apparently in
present-day Scott County in western Kansas.14
The Taos natives lived among the Apaches for
approximately two years before Juan de Archuleta led twenty
Spaniards and Indian auxiliaries to bring them back to
Taos.15 Obviously, despite the Spanish raids and the use of
Pueblo auxiliaries, the Plains Indians continued to have
relatively peaceful relations with the Pueblos. The Taos
natives chose to abandon their homes and flee to the plains
for life among the Apaches, rather than face potential
problems and the burdens of tribute placed upon them by the
Spaniards. A number of other Pueblo groups followed that
same pattern and Apaches sometimes fought to help defend
these runaways when Spaniards came looking for them.16
During the 1650s, slave raids on the Apaches increased.
Governor Juan Manso de Contreras (1656-1659) managed to
convince some Picurís to join the Spanish on slave raids.
This was a departure from the generally friendly relations
that these Pueblos had with the Apaches. Contreras's
successor, Bernardo López de Mendizábal, increased the
hostility toward the Apaches by provoking hostility at every
possible opportunity in order to "legitimize" the taking of
captives. According to Spanish law, only captives acquired
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in wars of reprisal were legitimate candidates for
enslavement.17
Mendizabál drew up more than ninety decrees to justify
the taking of captives, and he claimed to have owned ninety
Apache slaves during his term. They were employed in
sweatshops (obrajes), along with unemployed Pueblos and
Spaniards, to produce goods for export. These workers washed
hides, tanned leather, painted leather door hangings, and
manufactured shoes and leather doublets. Earlier, Governor
Rosas had similarly used Ute and Apache captives to enrich
himself.18
At one point, Governor Mendizábal organized a slave-
raiding expedition of forty colonists and eight hundred
Pueblos and sent them to the plains. They brought back
seventy captives, but in their absence, Apaches from other
areas raided the weakened settlements, killing villagers,
stealing livestock, and taking captives of their own.19
Perhaps as a result of increased Spanish raids, the
Apaches of the plains stopped bringing their dog trains,
women, and children into the Río Grande Valley. Instead,
they limited their trade with the border pueblos, especially
Pecos and Las Humañas, or allowed Spanish traders to seek
them out on the plains. Despite the lessened contact, the
Spanish continued to take captives. They seized captives who
came to the border settlements to trade, provoked trouble
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when they visited the rancherías to trade, or hired Indian
allies to capture Apaches for them.20
Not every expedition to the plains was with such
malicious intent, however. In 1660 Captain Diego Romero led
a party of soldiers out to the plains to trade with the
Apaches. The Indians welcomed the Spanish party. They
informed Romero that his father had visited them years
earlier and had fathered a son with one of the Apache women.
They indicated that Romero should do the same. Romero
complied, apparently undergoing a native marriage ceremony
before sleeping with one of the Apache women. Various other
ceremonies were performed during his stay in which the
Apaches made him a captain, awarding him with two bundles of
skins and a tent.21
Whether these types of ceremonies improved the
relationship between the Spanish and the Apaches of the
plains is unclear. The Apaches did not take such ceremonies
lightly, but they had honored several other Spaniards,
including Romero's father, with the title of captain. The
Apaches perhaps hoped that by offering such titles to
Spanish leaders they could escape the slave raids. The
success of such a ploy seems tenuous at best, since the
slave raids continued and plains Apaches were at times the
victims.
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Apache raids seem to have increased along the southern
Río Grande, especially at the pueblo of Las Humañas. In
1650 the Spanish in New Mexico had traveled to the upper
branch of the Colorado River in Texas where they discovered
some pearls and established trade with the Jumanos in the
area. For the next several years, the Spanish exchanged New
Mexican articles for buffalo hides. The plains Apaches,
probably in an attempt to prevent this trade, increased
their attacks on Las Humañas, the most logical base for
exchange.22 
In 1652 Apache raiders plundered Las Humañas and
profaned the church, carrying off twenty-seven women and
children as captives. The Spanish responded with an
expedition to the Sierra Blanca Mountains that left the
Apaches "well punished."23  It is unclear who the raiding
Apaches were. They apparently came from the Sierra Blanca
mountains to the east, and they might have been the
forerunners of the Mescalero. It is likely that these
eastern Apaches attacked the pueblo to disrupt its trade
with the Jumanos, enemies of the plains Apaches. 
By 1660 Las Humañas was still an important trading
center, but the Jumanos from the region beyond the Pecos
were replaced with Apache traders. The visits were not
always peaceful, but they increased in frequency.24 It is
apparent from the activities around Las Humañas that the
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Apaches were extending their influence further south,
forcing the Jumanos, their rivals in the area, to retreat.
In 1659 a severe famine caused Apaches to come to the
northern pueblos to trade their captives, and, in some
cases, their own children for food. The Franciscan
missionaries took advantage of the situation to purchase
many of the Apache children and convert them. The governor
of New Mexico also took advantage of the situation to seize
and enslave many of the Apaches who peacefully came to
trade.25
This event proved to be an important turning point for
the Apache Indians. The insatiable desire of the Spanish for
slaves, and perhaps the success and profitability in selling
their captives, caused the Apaches to become slave traders
themselves. By supplying slaves, the Apaches also lessened
Spanish raids on their own rancherías, so, in effect, they
began dealing in slaves for self preservation.
Prior to 1659, the Apaches had traded mainly hides,
meat, and salt, with a few slaves bartered or given as gifts
from time to time. After 1659, however, slaves became such a
major part of the trade that the seasonal trade fairs in New
Mexico came to be called "ransomings."  Most of the slaves
appear to have been Caddoan stock taken in raids toward
Quivira.26 
100
Thus, by 1660, the Apaches of the plains were becoming
more aggressive toward their neighbors. This forced the
Jumanos of the plains further south out of contact with the
Spanish and Pueblos near Las Humañas, allowing the Apaches
to dominate contact and trade in that area themselves. They
raided the Quivirans and other Caddoans to the east to
supply slaves for the insatiable Spanish market. They
maintained a relatively peaceful coexistence with the
Spanish in New Mexico, withdrawing from direct contact to
reduce friction and relying upon the Pecos pueblo as their
primary trade outlet. 
The decade of the 1660s saw drought, famine, and
pestilence weaken the Pueblos and Europeans. It most likely
affected the plains Apaches as well. When there was adequate
rainfall for Pueblos to produce surplus crops and for plains
Indians to hunt a surplus of game, peace generally
prevailed. When drought caused a reduction of crops
available for trade or game became scarce, the Apaches often
turned to raids to acquire corn and other goods from the
Pueblos, sometimes overrunning their smaller settlements.
When the drought ended, peace generally returned.27
The crisis hit first in the southern Pueblos. In 1661
at Las Humañas, a crop shortage caused both natives and
Europeans to consume crops before they were ripe. Between
1667 and 1669 no crops were harvested and the inhabitants
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were reduced to eating cow hides, toasting them to make them
more edible. In the midst of this crisis, an epidemic,
possibly small pox, ravaged the Indian towns. Four hundred
and fifty natives starved to death at Las Humañas alone.28
With hundreds dying, the southern Pueblos planned to
rise up, with aid from the Apaches, and overthrow the
oppressive Spaniards. Several plots were discovered and the
leaders hanged, but the Piros and Tompiros did revolt with
the assistance of Apaches, only to be crushed by the
Spanish. The natives were then impressed into service to aid
the Spanish against their former Apache allies. Once the
Apaches were faced with these attacks, they responded by
changing their tactics from small- scale raids to full-scale
attacks aimed at destruction of the Pueblos.29
During the winter of 1668-1669, Governor Juan Rodríguez
de Medrano summoned the New Mexico encomenderos to Santa Fe
to organize a campaign against eastern Apaches who had been
harassing the Saline Pueblos.30 The encomendero of Las
Humanas had died and when his son refused the summons, the
governor transferred the encomienda to Juan Domínguez de
Mendoza for three generations in reward for his valuable
services in leading many campaigns against the Apaches.31
Domínguez de Mendoza showed his worth when, in 1670,
the Apaches from the Seven Rivers district (lower Pecos)
swept through Las Humañas, sacking the church, smashing and
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breaking sacred images and ornaments. The Apaches killed
eleven inhabitants and carried off thirty captives. Mendoza
promptly responded by gathering thirty Spaniards and three
hundred Pueblos to pursue the raiders. The expedition
managed to kill thirteen Apache warriors and recovered six
Christian captives.32
Despite Domínguez de Mendoza's vigorous activities, he
could not save the pueblo from destruction. In 1672 the
Apaches launched another massive attack on Las Humañas. This
time after robbing and sacking their way through the pueblo,
they plundered the cattle and sheep herds that had
previously been very productive. After the raiders withdrew,
they prevented the Pueblos from working in the fields or
hunting. They repeatedly crept to the pueblo at night and
ambushed citizens. Under this constant harassment, the
inhabitants, consisting of approximately five hundred
families, eventually packed up and evacuated the
settlement.33
The Saline pueblos followed shortly thereafter. Within
a five-to six-year period, over twelve hundred families from
six pueblos were driven from their homes. The refugees fled
to pueblos along the Río Grande. Some settled in Socorro and
Senecú. Others fled all the way to the El Paso region. Still
others fled to the Isleta and Albuquerque regions. The
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Apache raiders, however, did not relent and pursued the
fleeing natives to their new residences.34 
In January 1675, the Apaches surprised Senecú, killing
the missionary and most of the inhabitants. Survivors fled
to neighboring Socorro or El Paso. During the following
year, Apache raids destroyed several other pueblos and
churches and killed many Spaniards and converted natives.
Spaniards retaliated by hanging captive Apaches or selling
them into slavery.35
While the Saline pueblos were being ravaged in the
south, the northern pueblos, especially Pecos, escaped
virtually unscathed. Most of the Apache raiders were from
western New Mexico, either Navaho or Western Apaches, and
they could not easily reach Pecos because of the intervening
settlements along the Río Grande. Other raiders came from
the mountains to the south or southeast of the Saline
pueblos. The Apaches from the plains appear to have been
relatively docile during this period. In fact, the plains
Apaches continued to attend annual trade fairs at Pecos even
as the pueblos to the south were suffering from destructive
raids.36
The Spanish, with increasing unrest among the Pueblo
Indians and escalating hostility among many of the Apache
groups surrounding New Mexico, were no doubt gratified by
the relative peacefulness of the plains Apaches. The
104
Vaqueros, for their part, needed a place to trade their
hides and Quiviran slaves and therefore were reluctant to
cause trouble at Pecos. The Spanish were also interested in
news from Quivira. They incessantly questioned Apaches
visiting Pecos concerning the potential wealth of the
Quivirans, asking the natives if, in their raids on that
eastern tribe, they had noticed any golden bands or other
signs of riches. While the negative answers of the Apaches
left many Spanish disappointed, others still held dreams of
discovering the fabled cities of gold from the days of
Coronado.37
One of the most important factors leading to the
increased aggressiveness of Apaches during the middle of the
seventeenth century was their acquisition of the horse.
Afoot, the Apaches were at a disadvantage when attacking
pueblos or Spanish settlements. They could not escape
quickly, especially when laden with plunder. Therefore,
trade was a more profitable means of securing the items that
they desired. Once they obtained the horse, however, it
became a much simpler process to raid. Apaches could
approach settlements quickly, then without warning  attack,
plunder, and escape, almost before the inhabitants could
respond and defend themselves. If horses were the targets,
then the process was further simplified by the fact that the
plunder "carried" itself.
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The Apaches began using horses for purposes other than
food at some point between 1620 and 1630. By the 1650s
horses were being used in raids against Spanish and Pueblo
settlements, and by the 1670s Spanish horse herds had been
reduced dramatically. The Río Grande valley was virtually
depleted of horses by raiding Apaches. The Santa Fe presidio
cavalry was essentially horseless with no means to pursue
and punish marauders. In 1677 Father Francisco de Ayeta, the
Franciscan superior of the New Mexico missions, brought a
wagon train of supplies to Santa Fe, including one thousand
horses for the troops. He later returned to Mexico to bring
more. On his return to New Mexico in 1680, with wagons of
supplies, horses, and fifty soldiers recruited from Mexico
City, he encountered Spanish refugees fleeing from the
Pueblo Revolt on the Río Grande.38
It is unclear how large a role the Apaches played in
the Pueblo Revolt. Apaches certainly had no love for the
Spanish and had, in fact, many grievances against them, most
relating to slave raids. Still, the only Apaches positively
identified as having directly participated in the revolt
were a group called the Achos, who lived near Taos. These
Indians are usually identified as a band of Jicarillas. In
any case, they apparently assisted the Taos and Picurís in
massacring and expelling Spaniards from the vicinity. Either
the Achos or other Apache groups also gave practical support
106
to the rebelling Pueblos by rounding up and tending all of
the horses they could find, thus denying their use to the
Spaniards and freeing the Pueblos to focus on the sheep and
cattle herds.39
It will be remembered that the Pueblos and Apaches in
this northern area had an unusually close relationship. The
Picurís had fled Spanish rule to live among the Apaches of
El Curatelejo in the 1630s. Many of the refugees had been
forced to return to Picurís shortly thereafter, but at least
a few stayed among the Apaches for several more years. No
doubt there was at least some intermarriage between the two
tribes, which would have strengthened the bond. If the Achos
were indeed from El Cuartelejo, this would account for their
participation in killing Spaniards during the revolt.
Other Apache tribes also had involvement with Pueblos
who were planning revolts. The Spanish in El Paso believed
that they had thwarted an earlier uprising of the Pueblos
that would have included Apache support. In 1653 Captain
Francisco de Ortega pursued a group of raiding Apaches who
had stolen a herd of mares from the Río Abajo area. Ortega's
party caught the raiders in a surprise attack at night and
killed them all while recovering the herd. From signs, knife
marks, and other things discovered in the camp, they
discovered how the Apaches had been in communication with
some of the Christianized Indians. A large confederation was
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uncovered and the guilty Indians punished. As a result, the
Apaches in the area became more peaceful and friendly.40
There are numerous other examples of cooperation or at
least suspected cooperation between Apaches and Pueblos.
Governor Antonio de Otermín (1677-1683), who was governor
during the rebellion, held the Apaches personally
responsible. He believed that they had long urged the
Pueblos to rebel, and their constant attacks had served to
weaken Spanish power. Spanish refugees of the Great Pueblo
Revolt were shadowed by Apaches along their entire retreat
to El Paso, and fear that they might attack was a major
factor in influencing the complete withdrawal of the
Europeans.41
Earlier, when the rebellious Pueblos had surrounded
Otermín and his followers at Santa Fe, one of the Pueblo
leaders met with the governor and asked for the release of
all captives held by the Spanish, including the Indian
leader's wife and children. The Pueblo chief claimed that
Apache Indians among the rebels had asked about their people
and that if Otermín refused to meet their demands the
attackers would declare war immediately. The native leader
also informed the Spanish governor that the rebels were
expecting reinforcements from the Taos, Picurís, and Teguas
nations.
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Otermín rejected these demands. He believed that no
Apaches were present, because they were then at war with the
Pueblos and would not, therefore, be cooperating with
them.42
In fact, there were at least a few Apaches among the
Pueblos, and they would have been interested in the release
of family members being held by the Spanish. Otermín was
correct, however, in his assumption that the Pueblo leader
made the Apache presence seem more ominous than it was. In
fact, a few days later, after the siege of Santa Fe began in
earnest, the Pueblos informed the Spanish that, having
received the expected pueblo reinforcements, none of the
Spanish could escape because aid from the Apaches had been
summoned and was expected at any moment.43 
As mentioned, a few Apaches participated in the attack
on Santa Fe. When the Spanish finally pushed the rebels out
of the villa, killing three hundred and taking forty-seven
captives, the captives informed the Spaniards that all of
the Pueblo tribes and Apaches had allied to push the Spanish
from New Mexico. Shortly after the battle, a Spanish friar
noted the bodies of various Pueblo tribes and Apaches among
the scattered dead, apparently validating the Indian
claim.44 The Pueblos no doubt hoped to increase the
desperation of the Spanish by exaggerating the extent of the
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forces organized against them, but the presence of at least
a few Apaches cannot be denied. 
Still, the Apache do not seem to have participated in
the rebellion in large numbers. They were, however, a
constant threat. The Spanish were wary of their nearby
presence, and almost all accounts express fear of potential
Apache attacks.
From the Apaches' point of view, the Pueblo revolt
would have predominantly positive effects. Most important,
it would remove the presence of Spanish slavers and result
in more Pueblo products being available for the Apaches.
Negatively, it would remove the major source of horses and
European goods. Whether the Apaches were major participants
in the revolt or not, they definitely had an interest in the
outcome. They were also doubtlessly looking for any
opportunity to snatch more horses or plunder from the
beleaguered Spanish, although such activity seems not to
have occurred.
Raiding Apaches were not always detrimental to the
Spaniards. In fact, shortly after the Pueblo Revolt, a body
of Tiwa and Piros traveled toward El Paso, intent on
assaulting the ranches in the area. Instead, they
encountered a band of Faraone Apaches who killed five of the
Pueblos and forced them to turn back.45 The Faraones, a name
derived from the Spanish word for "Pharaoh," were an Apache
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group that resided generally between the Río Pecos and Río
Grande. The name first appeared in 1675, but by the early
nineteenth century was replaced by the term Mescalero.46 
Once the Spanish retreated to El Paso, the Apache began
raids on them in that locale. The first major attack
occurred in January 1682. Apache raiders carried off two
hundred horses. Raids on El Paso increased significantly
after Spanish refugees from Santa Fe relocated there.
Increased activity may be explained by a greater population
and thus greater wealth in the area. Additionally, Apaches
who had raided Santa Fe and the northern settlements for
horses had to find a new source, and El Paso served
nicely.47
Governor Otermín planned an immediate campaign to
reestablish Spanish rule over the New Mexican pueblos.
Unfortunately, lack of manpower and supplies, combined with
constant threats from Apaches and other nearby tribes
delayed any action. The Mansos, Sumas, and Janos, tribes
native to the El Paso region, became increasingly restless
as the sudden increase in population in the area disrupted
their normal economic patterns.48
By November 1681, the region surrounding El Paso had
been sufficiently pacified and Otermín was ready to attempt
reconquest. Spaniards, numbering 146, and 112 Indian allies
headed north on November 6. Along the way they saw many
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signs of Apaches, both mounted and afoot. When the army
reached Senecú, the Spanish found the pueblo deserted. They
also found, as Otermín put it, "many signs of the apostates
having deserted the place from fear, being oppressed by the
heathen Apaches."49
After burning the deserted pueblo, the Spaniards
continued northward, seeing more signs of Apaches. They saw
indications that Apaches had driven herds from the interior
pueblos to their homelands. The Spanish found an abandoned
Apache camp in a canyon where the Apaches had apparently
been camped in ambush. Otermín assumed that Apaches from
this camp had sacked a nearby pueblo.50
Otermín and other Spaniards thought the reconquest
would be relatively easy. They believed that the Apaches
would ravage the Pueblos without Spanish protection and that
many Pueblos would welcome the Spanish back. They were quite
mistaken in these assumptions. In fact, Fray Francisco de
Ayeta, who accompanied Otermín's attempted reconquest, noted
that the Pueblos had in many cases asked the Apaches for
assistance and received it. In addition, continued Ayeta,
the Apaches had not destroyed a single pueblo or even
damaged one severely.51
The Apaches had even parleyed with the Pueblos,
spending months at dances, fiestas, and other
entertainments. In the end, however, the Apache refused to
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commit to peaceful relations and departed still at war.
Despite hostilities, the Pueblos had maintained themselves
successfully without Spanish aid.52
Several interesting points emerge from Otermín's
unsuccessful campaign. First of all, Otermín automatically
assumed that the abandoned pueblos he encountered resulted
from Apache raids. There is at least an equal chance that
the pueblos were abandoned to avoid the return of the
Spanish. The damage done by the Apaches could well have
occurred after the inhabitants had deserted.
The fact that Apache signs indicated the presence of
women and children demonstrates that these Apaches were not
a war party. Likewise, the Apache camp situated in the
canyon was most likely not there for an ambuscade. The
Indians had simply picked a safe, hidden refuge to encamp.
If they had families with them, the secure camp makes more
sense.
Otermín's campaign convinced him that reconquering New
Mexico could not be easily accomplished. As he admitted in a
letter to the viceroy, the damage caused by raiding Apaches
was less than he had expected or hoped. Accordingly, the
Pueblo Indians appeared determined to retain their
independence. Otermín recommended that the Spanish exiles
and loyal Pueblos be settled in the vicinity of El Paso as a
bulwark to protect Nueva Vizcaya. However, during his
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absence, the Apaches had raided El Paso and driven off two
hundred animals. This loss combined with those lost on the
campaign placed the Spanish in a difficult position.53
In 1682 Apaches from the plains were reportedly raiding
the frontiers of Sonora in conjunction with the more
westerly Apaches. These Apaches had normally been peaceful
when trading with the Spaniards at New Mexico, but,
apparently lacking this outlet for trade, joined their Gila
Apache kin to raid the Sonoran frontier for horses. The
Apaches coming from the plains were in great need of horses,
since they did not breed the animals themselves but relied
on the Spanish for their supply.54 
In August 1683, a group of Jumanos visited El Paso in
an effort to reestablish contact and trade with the Spanish.
They also requested aid against their Apache enemies. The
Jumanos and their allies even offered to donate supplies if
the Spaniards would assist them in a campaign against the
Apaches. Unfortunately, Otermín's term was about to expire
and he did not feel that the situation in El Paso was stable
enough to risk an expedition.55
When Domingo Jironza Petris de Cruzate arrived at El
Paso to assume the governorship, he wrote to the viceroy
that the Apaches were so active in their raids that the few
horses that remained in the settlement had to be tied to the
doors of the settler's huts at night in order to prevent
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them from being stolen. He later claimed to have subdued the
Apaches by leading a campaign to a ranchería, killing many
and taking twenty-two captives. The Apaches, he continued,
had been less troublesome since the campaign.56
The Jumanos soon returned, again seeking aid from the
Spaniards. In addition to requesting assistance and asking
for missionaries, the Jumanos also mentioned the presence of
other "Spaniards" to the east, undoubtedly French. The
threat of French moving into Spanish territory and the
opportunity to create an alliance with Quivira and Tejas
convinced Jironza to organize an expedition of twenty
volunteers led by Captain Juan Domínguez de Mendoza.57
Domínguez de Mendoza led his expedition to the junction
of the Pecos and Teyah Creek, where Juan Sabeata, the Jumano
leader, and a number of chiefs from other tribes held a
conference with him. The Indians begged the Spanish for help
against the Apaches. Domínguez de Mendoza reluctantly agreed
to wage war on the enemy tribe. A few days later, the
Spanish, accompanied by Jumanos and other allies, set off
for the plains.58
On numerous occasions, scouts reported that Apaches
were in the vicinity. Finally, the scouts reported sighting
an Apache ranchería. The Spanish leader sent additional
scouts to verify the location, but it turned out to be a
false alarm, although the scouts did find old tracks in the
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area. A short time later, Domínguez de Mendoza became
suspicious of Sabeata and dismissed him and his followers.
The commander felt that Sabeata had continuously delayed and
misled the Spanish. He later wrote that he believed that
Sabeata had plotted with other Indian nations to kill the
Spaniards.59 
During the journey, the Apaches made three raids on the
expedition, stealing horses in each case and wounding a
Spaniard on the third attack. Domínguez de Mendoza believed
that he lacked sufficient manpower and munitions to pursue
the raiders or to wage a large-scale war. Accordingly, he
decided to return to El Paso. Suspicions concerning the
loyalty of the Indian allies might also have contributed to
the Spanish commander's decision. The Spaniards did,
however, manage to kill more than four thousand buffaloes
during their trip and returned to El Paso with wagonloads of
pelts.60
Domínguez de Mendoza's expedition was a success
economically, but a failure as far as Indian relations were
concerned. He alienated Sabeata and the Jumanos. He might
even have increased the enmity of the plains Apaches toward
the Spanish. The Apaches who raided the expedition for
horses were not specifically identified, but the location of
the expedition indicates a group residing on the plains.
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In 1685 the viceroy appointed Fray Alonso de Posada to
write a report on New Mexico. Posada had gone to the
province for the first time in 1651 and assumed the position
of custodian of the New Mexican missions in 1660. Although
he had not been in New Mexico for nearly twenty years,
Posada's report gives a good indication of the situation as
the Spanish perceived it. As such, it is appropriate to
quote sections at length.61
Reporting on the Apaches, Posada wrote that
...there is a nation which they call the Apacha
which possesses and is owner of all the plains of
Cíbola. The Indians of this nation are so
arrogant, haughty and such boastful warriors that
they are the common enemy of all nations who live
below the northern region. They hold these others
as cowards. They have destroyed, ruined or driven
most of them from their lands. This nation
occupies and has its own lands and as such they
defend them, four hundred leagues from west to
east; from north to south, two hundred leagues,
and in some places more.                           
    Their central dwelling place is the plains of
Cíbola bounded on the east by the Quivera with
whom they have always had war, and have it now;
with the nation of the Texas who bound them on the
same side, with whom they also have always had
war. Although these two nations are extensive and
populous, the Apacha nation, which stretches along
the frontiers of the land within for two hundred
leagues, as has been noted, have always not only
held them within their own boundaries but on many
different occasions have invaded their lands....   
                                     
To the south, continued Posada, the Apaches had pushed
resident Indians, including the Jumanos, to the Río Grande
and beyond. The Apaches were at war with all of the tribes
in the vicinity of El Paso, even extending their raids to
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Sonora. For a distance of one hundred leagues to the west of
El Paso, the Apache had driven out or subdued the Indian
nations. In addition, a large number of Apaches lived in the
fertile pastures and meadows extending some fifty leagues
north of the provinces of Sonora and Sinaloa.
Posada located the Yutas (Utes) seventy leagues to the
north along the Colorado River. These natives were friendly
toward the Spanish and they alone, of all the nations
bordering the Apache, were "equal in manliness to the Apacha
with whom they war."  From the Ute country to the east, the
Apache nation continued until once again encountering the
Quivirans.
Posada concluded that
all the sierras that are within and those which
surround the province of New Mexico the Apacha
nation claims as its own. It has fought so much
with the Spaniards that they ordinarily go about
with their arms in hands. They have made many
attacks from prepared ambushes on Indian pueblos,
killing atrociously the warriors, carrying off the
women and children alive, considering them as
legitimate captives, laying waste usually the
irrigated fields of maize, running off day and
night horseherds of the Spaniards and inflicting
all the rest of the injuries which the force of
their fierce arrogance imposes. With special care
all of the Indians of this nation who live on the
eastern side of the provinces of New Mexico have
always maintained peace with the Spaniards to
trade and exchange their hides and chamois, but
protect on the other hand the very Indians who
live in the mountains surrounding New Mexico and
who war on the Spaniards.62
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From Posada's report it becomes apparent that the
Apaches were the dominant tribe of New Mexico. It is also
clear that, from Posada's perspective, they were expanding
their control at the expense of neighboring tribes. Only the
Ute (Yutas) seem to have been able to meet the ferocity of
the Apaches and to maintain their position and territory.
Finally, Posada reminds the reader that the Apaches living
to the east of New Mexico, out on the plains, had maintained
a continuous peace with the Spanish, if only to have a place
to trade.
Posada recommended that a presidio be established on
the Río de las Nueces, where plenty of pasturage and
farmland was available. One hundred soldiers and settlers
could easily maintain such a post, and Posada supported
relying on the Jumanos for support. They, he believed, would
willingly settle in the area, since it had once been theirs
before the Apaches had forced them out. The desire for
vengeance and the Jumano inclination toward Christianity
would compel them to remain loyal.63 As it turned out,
Posada's recommendation was never acted upon, partly because
the reconquest of New Mexico was considered a higher
priority.
The reconquest would not occur, however, until the
appointment of Diego de Vargas who arrived in El Paso in
1691. A step toward repairing relations with the Apaches had
119
occurred in September 1689 when the Apaches made peace with
the Spaniards at El Paso. The previously hostile natives
peacefully visited many of the neighboring pueblos. Father
Francisco de Vargas, custodian of the New Mexico missions,
encouraged missionaries to take advantage of the situation
to win the souls of the Apaches. The Apaches of the Organ
Mountains, thirty leagues north of El Paso, summoned Fray
Vargas to visit them and he stayed among them for two days.
Despite the fact that he was unprotected among numerous
Indians, they did him no harm.64
Near Parral, a group of Apaches captured some
missionaries. They later set them free without harming them,
having fed them from their own food stores.65 This cordial
peace was short lived, but it gave the Spanish hope that a
more permanent peace might be achieved. It also stabilized
the situation in the vicinity of El Paso at least
temporarily allowed the Spanish to strengthen their position
there. When Diego de Vargas finally arrived in El Paso in
February 1691, he was able to concentrate on the reconquest
of New Mexico, rather than subduing the natives around El
Paso.
Between 1609 and 1691, the Spanish went from attempting
to strengthen their hold in New Mexico to trying to keep a
foothold at El Paso. The Apaches went from being relatively
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peaceful and weak to being the most formidable natives in
the area. The Apaches of the plains most clearly made this
transition. The acquisition of the horse was a large part of
this conversion. With the horse the Apaches were able to
increase their range of their raids and trading expeditions.
It also increased their success in hunting. Spanish slave
raids forced the plains Apaches to raid their neighbors for
captives to supply the insatiable demands of the Spanish for
slaves. If the Apaches had not brought slaves to the
Spanish, the Europeans would surely have raided Apache
rancherías for captives.
When the Pueblos rebelled in 1680 and forced the
Spanish from New Mexico, the Apaches played only a
peripheral role. They were mainly concerned with plunder.
The plains Apaches in particular had no real stake in the
fortunes of the Spanish. In fact, the absence of Spaniards
in New Mexico was actually detrimental to these Apaches,
because it removed their primary source of horses and
European goods. Since the Apaches did not breed horses, they
had to find a new source once the Spanish retreated from New
Mexico. El Paso served as the new source.
The Apaches on the plains increased their dominance
during this period. Slowly they began to force competitors
from the plains and intimidated their neighbors through
raids. For example, their biggest rivals, the Jumanos, were
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effectively pushed out during this period. First, the
Apaches drove a wedge between the pueblos near Las Humañas
and the Jumanos, eventually destroying the pueblos
themselves as Spanish and Pueblo forces began staging
campaigns against the Apaches from there.
When the Spanish retreated to El Paso, the Jumanos
tried to reestablish trade relations and sought Spanish aid
against the Apaches. The Apaches were able to cut off the
Jumano-Spanish contact by forcing their way between the two
groups again and by raiding both. Once the Apaches had
removed their competitors from the El Paso region, they
became more interested in peace with the Spaniards.
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HIGH TIDE: THE APACHES DURING THE RECONQUEST
AND ITS AFTERMATH, 1691-1704
A decade after the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, the Apaches
had become the dominant tribe on the southern plains. As a
result of the revolt, the Apache acquired large herds of
horses that had been abandoned as the Spaniards fled
southward to El Paso. These animals served to strengthen
Apache control over a vast region that stretched north into
Nebraska, east to Quivira and the Caddo nations, south to
the Río Grande, and west to the area controlled by their
kinsmen--the Faraones.
Apache dominance was so pervasive that they had made
enemies of all their neighbors. Lacking trade outlets, the
plains Apaches welcomed the initial return of the Spaniards
to Santa Fe in 1692. The Apaches to the west of the Río
Grande were less happy with the Spaniards' return. For them,
the Spanish presence provided a haven for their Pueblo
enemies, while making it more difficult for the western
Apaches to reach the plains.
The architect of the reconquest was a new governor and
captain general of New Mexico with the formidable name of
Diego José de Vargas Zapata y Luján Ponce de León y 
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Contreras. His appointment as governor and captain-general
of New Mexico in 1688 was the culmination of a career in New
Spain that spanned nearly two decades.1 Upon his arrival at
El Paso in February 1691, the intrepid new governor intended
to carry out an immediate campaign that would restore crown
control of New Mexico, but he was unprepared for the dismal
state in which he found Spanish forces.
An immediate muster revealed that a majority of the
soldiers did not even possess leather jackets, helmets, or
swords. Counting Indian allies, there were only about three
hundred men capable of bearing arms. In the entire region
that bordered El Paso, Vargas reported fewer than two
hundred horses and mules to transport an army into New
Mexico.2
Despite his lack of manpower and provisions, as well as
his desire to begin the reconquest as soon as possible,
Vargas first turned his attention to renewed hostilities by
the Apaches. The peace that had been established in 1689
seems to have crumbled by the time Vargas assumed the
governorship. In early September 1691, he carried out a
short campaign near El Paso, capturing 130 and killing more
than 40 Apaches. The large numbers of captives indicates
that he must have caught the Indians off guard. The Indians
almost certainly were eastern Apaches.3 
This minor campaign with rather major results came in
the midst of the preparations for a more extended campaign
against the western Apaches. Juan Fernández de la Fuente,
captain of the presidio of San Felipe and Santiago de Janos,
had reported the hostility of Apaches in the Janos and El
Paso regions, and he wrote the viceroy requesting aid in
subduing them. The viceroy honored Fernández's request and
ordered Vargas to assist him in a joint campaign. Although
disappointed by having to delay the reconquest of New
Mexico, Vargas obediently led his contingent in the
campaign. He covered nearly five hundred leagues and by
November Indian hostility along the frontier had quieted.
This allowed Vargas once again to concentrate on the
reconquest.4
Despite the apparent success of Vargas's campaign,
Fernández had to launch another attack on the Apaches. He
defeated them in a battle in February 1692. Afterward, the
Apaches sued for peace. Fernández gave them gifts of
clothing, provided supplies for their captains and other
native leaders, and left them after exacting an agreement
that they would visit the Janos presidio. Fernández soon
heard rumors that the Apaches had formed a pact with all the
people of their nation, as well as with the Janos, Jocomas,
and Sumas. The intent of this alliance was to destroy El
Paso and all of its pueblos and then do the same to Janos.
Upon gathering this intelligence, Fernández mobilized
fifty well-armed soldiers and an unspecified number of
Indian allies and sent them, under the command of his
alférez (ensign) to investigate the rumors. Fernández's
suspicions were further aroused when, twenty days after the
peace was declared, no Apaches had shown up at Janos. The
alférez met with the Apaches, and they agreed to accompany
him to the presidio. On the morning they were to begin the
trip, however, the Apaches emerged from the hills in two
flanks and attacked one of the Spaniards drinking from a
water hole. The attackers then raised their war cry,
whereupon the soldiers struck back, killing several natives
and forcing them to retreat back into the mountains.5
Obviously, there was still significant unrest among the
Apaches. In fact, in March 1692 Vargas led an expedition
across the Hueco mountains to the east of El Paso in search
of salt licks and watering places of Apaches who had
continuously harassed the El Paso district. Vargas traveled
halfway to the Salado River during this successful campaign.
He later pursued and defeated Apaches in the Sierra de los
Organos, the Sierra Florida, and the Sierra Nevada to the
north and west of El Paso.6 
In August 1692, Vargas finally set off for New Mexico,
not even waiting for fifty reinforcements to arrive from
Mexico. His force of less than two hundred, including Indian
allies, arrived at Santa Fe in mid September. After a few
days of negotiations, the native inhabitants surrendered
without a fight. Vargas attempted the same process at Pecos,
but was unable to achieve its submission. The Pecos natives
had fled their pueblo and sent only a messenger to parley
with the Spaniards. Vargas returned to Santa Fe and then
headed toward the northern pueblos, accepting each pueblo's
submission as he passed through. He reached Taos in early
October, and, after accepting their surrender returned to
Santa Fe.7
Before he left the northern pueblos, however, Luis
Picurí, leader of Picurís pueblo as well as the Tewa and
Tanos, made a proposal to Vargas. Picurí suggested that
since the Pecos and Taos nations were friendly with the
Faraone Apaches, who frequently raided Picurís, the
Spaniards should assist him in making the two pueblos his
allies. If the negotiations failed, Picurí offered to assist
Vargas in defeating the two pueblos.8
On October 15, Vargas was able to report to the viceroy
that all the pueblos within a thirty-six league radius of
Santa Fe had given their submission. Two days later, Pecos,
impressed by Vargas's benevolence but also wary of his
growing alliances, sent its allegiance to Vargas, and over
the next few days many of the other holdouts surrendered. In
late October, the Spanish governor set out to subdue Acoma
and Zuñi. After convincing the natives at Acoma to submit,
Vargas and his army traveled toward Zuñi. On the way, a
group of Apaches stole sixteen head of cattle during a
stormy night. Because of the poor condition of his horses,
the weather, and the risk of failure, Vargas did not attempt
to retaliate.9
Vargas was successful in negotiating the surrender of
Zuñi. While there a Salinero Apache captain and eight to ten
supporters approached Vargas and informed the Spaniard that
his tribe was at peace with the Zuñi and desired peace with
the Spanish as well. Vargas replied that he would welcome
their friendship. As proof of their loyalty, the Salineros
should seek out and kill the Apaches who had stolen horses
from the Spaniards earlier. Vargas then continued on to Hopi
country, receiving the submission of most of the pueblos in
that vicinity as well.10
On his return to Zuñi, Vargas received distressing news
that Apaches near the location of his supplies were becoming
troublesome. He immediately secured his supplies and marched
his entire army toward El Paso. Nonetheless, Apaches
harassed Spanish forces throughout the entire journey. In
fact, the Zuñis had warned Vargas of the hostility of the
Apaches, and the day after he departed a runner came into
the Spanish camp to warn him that Apaches were following his
route. Upon hearing the news, Vargas ordered his men to be
on guard with arms in readiness and horses saddled. Despite
these precautions, a few days later and under the cover of
darkness, Apaches drove off fourteen horses and mortally
wounded another.11
As the entrada approached El Paso, it encountered a
party of Apaches who immediately scattered upon seeing the
armed Spaniards. Two of the Apaches were afoot. After fierce
resistance, one of the natives was killed and the other
captured. The captive Apache admitted that he and his
companions had entered El Paso and stolen two horses. After
a brief ceremony of baptism, the Apache was summarily
executed.12
Vargas learned that during his absence El Paso had been
raided twice by Apaches. The attackers carried off twenty
head of horses and cattle, which Vargas considered to be
light losses.13 During his successful reoccupation of New
Mexico, the only bloodshed resulted from Apache raids on his
return from Zuñi. The hostile Apaches were generally
referred to as Faraone Apaches.14
The Faraones are generally considered to be Mescalero
Apaches. However, until 1720 the term applied to most of the
hostile Apaches living in the region between the Pecos
Indians on the east to the area south of the Zuñis on the
west. After the 1720s the term came to be more restrictive.
It was used for those Apache bands living between the Pecos
River and the Río Grande, and from Santa Fe in the north to
the Conchos River in the south.15 
In all likelyhood, the term Faraone was generically
applied to any hostile Apache group that was not otherwise
specifically identified. As the Spanish became more familiar
with the area, many groups, especially those to the west of
the Río Grande became known by other names--the Salineros
encountered by Vargas being an example. Therefore, the
Faraone Apaches who attacked and harassed Vargas west of the
Rio Grande were most likely western Apaches. The Apaches who
raided El Paso, on the other hand, might well have been
Mescalero Apaches.
Almost all of the hostility blamed on Apaches up to
this time seems to have been the responsibility of the
western Apaches. Eastern Apaches may have been involved in a
few instances, especially those mentioned as living east of
the Hueco mountains, but plains Apaches do not seem to have
been involved at all. The Gila Apaches or other Western
groups seem to be the most aggressively hostile of the
Apaches living in the vicinity of El Paso during this time.
Many modern historians make the mistake of lumping all
"Apaches" together and considering them all guilty or
innocent as the case may be.
It must be remembered that the Apaches were a
widespread and diverse people. Each tribe, indeed, each
band, often acted independently. Therefore, to claim that
all Apaches were hostile because "some" Apaches raided El
Paso or some other location is faulty reasoning. The Spanish
tendency to use generic terms, like Faraone, which later
became more specific adds to the confusion. It is likely
that the hostile Faraones during Vargas's times had little
or no connection to the Faraones who later became identified
as the Mescaleros. It seems clear, therefore, that most
Apache aggression originated with tribes living west of the
Río Grande, and that those Apaches living to the east of the
river and on the plains were relatively peaceful by
comparison.
Having reconnoitered New Mexico, Vargas offered his
recommendations to the viceroy. He suggested that one
hundred settlers be located at Taos, the most distant of the
New Mexico pueblos and an entrance route for Apache raids.
The area was favorable for settlement, because of its broad
valleys and the many arroyos, woods, and fertile pastures
that were ideal for farming or ranching. Vargas reasoned
that one hundred settlers backed by a presidio would make it
impossible for Apaches to sweep through the area. A second
settlement of fifty families should be located on the Apache
frontier at Pecos. That area was surrounded by mountains and
subject to Apache ambushes, but sufficient Spanish presence
there would deny Apaches easy entry to Pueblo settlements. 
Another fifty families at Santa Ana would not only
block an additional entrance by Apaches but also help
protect the missionaries who ministered to the Keres and
Jémez tribes. One hundred more families should be settled at
the abandoned pueblo of Jémez, still another Apache
entrance. Senecú, on the other hand, should not be settled
because floods had damaged the land, and it was on a
frontier invested with Apache.16
Vargas also noted that an additional fifty soldiers at
El Paso would help keep the various Apache tribes in order.
He remarked that Apaches had robbed and killed in New Mexico
when that province had been at its peak strength, and now
the Apaches had both fortifications and artillery.17 Despite
the apparent strength of the Apaches, Vargas determined to
reduce them, not through military action, but by
persuasion.18
A short time later, Vargas seems to have changed his
mind. He remarked that even with fifty soldiers, he, or
anyone, would be at great risk traveling the 130 leagues
from El Paso to Santa Fe. The enemy could appear from any
direction and quickly surround unwary travelers. Besides the
Apaches, Vargas added, travelers had to be on guard against
rebel Pueblos who posed an additional threat.19
Vargas's recommendations were in accord with reality,
except perhaps his comment concerning Apache artillery.
Placing troops or settlers at Taos, Pecos, Santa Ana, and
Jémez would form a defensive cordon against Apaches who
surrounded Santa Fe. Senecú was obviously too isolated to be
easily incorporated into a defensive ring and was too
distant from Santa Fe or El Paso to be easily protected. As
Vargas indicated, the whole area between El Paso and Santa
Fe was filled with roaming, hostile Apaches.
Once Vargas had accomplished the submission of most
Pueblos in New Mexico, the next step was to settle the
reconquered areas. In October 1693 Vargas set out from El
Paso at the head of an entrada of eight hundred people,
including one hundred soldiers, seventy families, seventeen
friars, and a large number of Indian allies.20 On the
journey north, Vargas learned that many of the Pueblos who
had previously offered submission were in fact allied with
several groups of Apaches in order to resist Spanish
reoccupation. An exception was Juan de Ye, the Pecos
governor appointed by Vargas on the previous campaign, who
arrived in the Spanish camp and offered the services of his
warriors. The Pecos governor professed his support for the
Spanish but warned Vargas that the pueblos in the Santa Fe
area intended to betray the Europeans.21
Ye made good on his statement by gathering 140 warriors
to join the Spanish as they secured the Santa Fe area.
Vargas repaid this support by sending his second-in-command
with thirty men to Pecos when Ye reported a potential threat
from a large force of Tewas, Tanos, Picurís, and Apaches.
The threat never materialized, but the cooperation between
the Spanish and Pecos strengthened their bond.22 
In April 1694, Juan de Ye arrived in Santa Fe
accompanied by three plains Apaches. The Apaches claimed to
have been former friends of the Spaniards and sought to
renew the relationship now that the Europeans had returned.
Hoping to reestablish the profitable trade of the past, the
Apaches requested that Vargas send a company of Spaniards to
Pecos so that their people might be convinced of the
sincerity of the Spaniards. Vargas complied by sending a
small party of soldiers and colonists to Pecos where they
bought buffalo meat and chamois skins. The well-pleased
Apaches departed, promising to return for more trade by
October.23
A month later, however, the Apache captain of the
rancherías on the plains visited Santa Fe with eight other
Indians escorted by Juan de Ye. The Apache leader brought a
gift of three buffalo hides and a light tent for Vargas as a
show of good faith. The native captain reported that his
rancherías were fourteen days distant from Santa Fe, that
the buffalo herds were but ten days distant, and that
Quivira, which the Apaches were at war with, was twenty-five
to thirty days beyond the Apache rancherías.24
Vargas interrogated the Apache leader concerning the
presence of silver in the area. Pointing to a silver dish,
Vargas asked the native if he knew of the existence of such
material in his land. The Apache chief replied that within a
day's travel was a range of mountains. At the base of the
mountain range were some rocks of the same material. The
rocks were so heavy and hard that the Apaches had no way to
bring a piece of them for Vargas to examine. The native
asked for an iron ax to break off some of the "white iron"
and promised to bring Vargas a sample on his next visit.
Both the Apache leader and Juan de Ye then excused
themselves, pointing out that they must return home to plant
their corn fields. Vargas reminded the Apache to return to
Pecos when the corn was ready to harvest in order to
trade.25
During the interrogation, the Apache leader showed
interest in baptism. In fact, he informed Vargas that if the
Spanish would destroy the rebellious Pueblos, the Apaches
would settle in the abandoned pueblos and become Christians.
Vargas was favorably impressed with the demeanor of the
Apache captain and felt that his actions and deeds were
already that of a Christian. The Apache also showed
extensive knowledge of a large geographic area. He was aware
of the location of the Tejas, seven days from his ranchería.
He also had knowledge of the presence of Spaniards in Texas,
but admitted that he did not know if they were still there.
This was an obvious reference to Spanish expeditions sent in
search of La Salle's colony, or perhaps a reference to La
Salle's expedition itself, since the Apaches often referred
to the French as "Spaniards."26
The mention of the silver rocks seems specious,
however. If the source had been so near to Santa Fe, Vargas
would no doubt have sent an expedition to investigate, but
apparently he did not do so.27 Furthermore, the Apaches did
not bring samples or even mention it during their return
visit in October. The promise to settle in pueblos and
become Christians also seems far-fetched. It was probably
nothing more than an Apache tactic designed to win Spanish
support and to encourage Spanish-Pueblo hostility. It is
also worthy of mention that the Apache captain remarked on
his need to return home to plant maize. Obviously, these
plains Apaches were involved in at least minimal farming.28
By June 1694, provisions at Santa Fe were running low,
and Vargas resolved to lead an expedition against the
rebellious pueblos to the north and raid them for supplies.
The Spanish force eventually moved north of Taos but found
the area abandoned. It did encounter a group of Apaches from
the plains who had been trading with the Pueblos. These
Apaches greeted the Spaniards with friendly handshakes and
informed them that the Taos Indians had fled upon seeing the
Europeans approach. The Apache captain then picked up a
large cross brought by the Spanish, held it up in sight of
the entrance to a wooded canyon where the Taos natives had
fled. He shouted to their governor that he could safely come
and confer with him and the Spanish. The Apaches then
accompanied Vargas to confer with the governor. The meeting,
however, was not cordial. Nevertheless, Juan de Ye, who
considered the Taos governor a friend, offered to accompany
him to his pueblo on behalf of the Spaniards. The governor
accepted, but the Spaniards never again heard from Ye. In
all likelihood, their Indian emissary was killed at Taos.29
In this encounter, the plains Apaches by acting as
intermediaries between the Spanish and the Pueblos, once
again proved themselves to be friendly. Although rumors
abounded concerning conspiracies involving the Apaches, they
proved to be false. Later, when the Taos natives refused to
produce their governor or Juan de Ye, Vargas sacked the
pueblo before returning to Santa Fe.30 
In late August 1694, Pecos messengers reported to
Vargas at Santa Fe that the plains Apaches had once again
arrived at their pueblo. Vargas quickly sent a group of
Spaniards to trade with the Apaches. The trade venture was
no doubt successful as the Apaches promised to return at the
end of the rainy season. The Europeans were impressed by the
Apaches from the plains, remarking that they were better
behaved, more trusting as friends, and made better trading
partners than did converted Pueblo natives.31
Although the plains Apaches had reached some
accommodation with the Spaniards during the 1690s, they
continued to assert their dominance over other Indians. They
ranged as far north as the Loup River in present-day
Nebraska and they raided both Quivira and the Tejas to the
east. In 1692 the plains Apaches made a major assault on a
Wichita village, killing many men, burning their village,
and taking the captives to New Mexico to trade. Two years
later, when Apaches brought a large group of captives to New
Mexico, the Spanish refused to buy them. The Apaches then
proceeded to behead the children before the eyes of
horrified Spaniards.32
The sources refer to these Apaches as "Navaho."  A trip
to the plains would have been a long journey for the Navaho
from Arizona, but there are several records from the 1690s
and earlier testifying to their presence. In addition, the
beheading of unpurchased children seems uncharacteristic of
plains Apaches, but not of Navajos, whom the Spaniards often
portrayed unfavorably. The Navajo forays to the plains were
no doubt welcomed by the plains Apaches, who probably joined
and guided their western kinsmen in raids against their
enemies.
At this juncture, most hostilities blamed on Apache
nations were attributed to those residing west of the Río
Grande. The plains Apaches, on the other hand, maintained
amicable relations with the Spanish, keeping alive a
vigorous trade and sometimes acting as middlemen between the
Spanish and still rebellious Pueblos. In 1695, however, an
event occurred that would have resounding effects on the
Apaches of the plains for years to come. Apaches de los
Chipaynes, who arrived from the east to trade at Picurís, a
few miles south of Taos, reported that some light-haired
white men had defeated a large nation of Conejeros Apaches
who lived even further to the east. The Spanish immediately
assumed that these white men were French.33
In September 1695, Apaches visiting Picurís reported
large numbers of Frenchmen approaching the plains of Cíbola.
The French were attacking the Apaches and forcing them to
retreat before the onslaught. Upon hearing these disturbing
reports, Vargas ordered that the Apaches be closely
interrogated. He wanted to know if the Apaches had actually
seen the Frenchmen themselves, how far away they were, how
long it would take for them to travel to the pueblos,
whether they seemed to be establishing a permanent presence
in the area where they were sighted, and various other
pieces of pertinent information.34
Upon being questioned, the Apaches admitted that they
themselves had not seen the "white Spaniards."  News of the
French came to them from people seven nations beyond their
home, a great distance from New Mexico. Those nations
reported that the Frenchmen made intermittent raids on the
nation of Quivira and others in that region. Finally, the
Apaches remarked that they had obtained this information
through natives who were enemies and slaves of the
Apaches.35 This intelligence, which seemed to downplay the
French threat to New Mexico, did not comfort Vargas. He
immediately sent a request to the viceroy for additional
weapons and supplies.36
Renewed Pueblo unrest, which culminated in a sizable
revolt in 1696, diverted attention from the French threat,
at least temporarily. After campaigns to subdue various
rebellious pueblos, Vargas headed north to Taos and Picurís.
Upon attaining the submission of Taos, the entrada continued
to Picurís, only to find that the natives there had fled to
the buffalo plains, accompanied by Apaches, Tewas, and
Tanos. The Spanish pursued the fugitives and came across a
deserted Apache camp of thirty-one lodges. The site had been
abandoned in such haste that the trail of fleeing natives
was strewn with debris. Overtaking the escapees, the Spanish
managed to capture eighty men, women, and children. The rest
of the Picurís continued their flight eastward with the
Apaches, where they became slaves of the Cuartelejo
Apaches.37
While Vargas was busy subduing the rebellious pueblos,
other Spaniards had been marching across the Texas
wilderness in search of the French colony of Robert
Cavelier, Sieur de La Salle. La Salle's short-lived colony
on the Gulf Coast of Texas caused the Spaniards to take new
interest in Texas. Starting in 1686, five sea and six land
expeditions set out to locate La Salle's seemingly elusive
colony. Three years later, the remnants of it were
discovered. As a result of these endeavors, the Spanish
focused their attention on the Tejas Indians of East
Texas.38
In 1690 Alonso de León led an expedition to establish 
Mission San Francisco de los Tejas among the Tejas Indians.
Father Damián Massanet, who had recommended the founding of
the missions in East Texas, noted that the Indians had two
trade routes that would ease access to the area. He also
observed, however, that one road was subject to Apache
raids. The Apaches did not raid the more easterly, lower
route because of its distance and the thick woods
surrounding it. Massanet claimed that the Apaches who lived
in an east-to-west running mountain range were at war with
all other nations except the Salineros.39 Another
missionary, Father Casañas de Jesús María, noted that the
Sadammos were enemies of the Hasinai. This large nation,
"known to others as the Apaches," lived in the territory to
the west of the Yojuanes, a Tonkawan tribe, "far to the west
of Texas."  The missionary's description of the Sadammos
fits with what is known of the Apaches. He also noted that
these natives had a great abundance of iron among them and
were enemies of all nations friendly to the Hasinai.40
Father Francisco Hidalgo recorded that in August 1692
Spanish soldiers accompanied the Tejas in an expedition
against the Apaches. The party traveled west until they
reached the enemy's territory. There, they were ambushed one
night and only Spanish firearms prevented the total
annihilation of the defenders. This failed campaign was
followed by a more successful venture. The latter operation
resulted in the deaths of 136 Apaches.41 
The statements of Massanet and Jesús María are good
indicators of the level of knowledge possessed by the
Spanish in Texas concerning the Apaches. Most of the
information recorded by the missionaries was no doubt based
on information gleaned from the Tejas and Hasinai, combined
with their own limited knowledge of the natives. Both of
their descriptions show a lack of perception concerning the
actual state of the Apache nations at the time. Furthermore,
Massanet also links the plains Apaches, who raided the Tejas
but were peaceful toward the Spanish in New Mexico, with the
Faraone Apaches, who were at war with the Spanish in New
Mexico, lived in the mountains and probably had no contact
at this time with the Tejas. The two Apache groups were
independent of each other, but Massanet, like many other
Spaniards, tended to vilify all Apaches.
When Alonso de León found no French settlements and
Spanish missionaries soon encountered hostility from the
Hasinai, the priests withdrew and abandoned the Texas
missions in 1693. One of the soldiers, José de Urrutia was
injured and chose to remain among the Indians. During his
seven-year stay with the natives, Urrutia became their
"capitán grande" and led large parties of allied Indians in
raids against the Apaches. He later rejoined his countrymen
in 1700.42 Urrutia's activities, along with the campaigns
recorded by Father Hidalgo, did not bode well for future
Spanish-Apache relations in Texas.
Meanwhile, in New Mexico Pedro Rodríguez Cubero assumed
the governorship from 1697 to 1703. During Cubero's
administration, the situation in New Mexico improved despite
Cubero's apparent lack of activity. More soldiers and
settlers arrived, strengthening the colony. The Pueblos
became more submissive, primarily because of the increased
hostility of the Apaches. Faced with belligerent raiding
Apaches, many Pueblos were forced to seek the protection of
Spanish arms.43
Vargas blamed increased Apache attacks on the
inactivity of Governor Cubero. In a letter to his son-in-
law, Vargas claimed that at various times the Apaches had
stolen more than 460 horses and mules. They had also caused
many injuries and deaths among the Spanish. In spite of
this, the governor had not sent out soldiers to punish
them.44
Vargas's claim was a bit exaggerated, for in fact,
Cubero planned several expeditions in 1701. Unfortunately
for the hapless governor, an expedition against the Hopi was
a failure, a second campaign against the Navajo was cut
short, and a third expedition planned against the Faraones
was canceled. To compound Cubero's problems, constant rumors
filtered into New Mexico of Frenchmen approaching from the
plains.45
In 1697 French and Pawnee severely defeated a "Navaho"
party on the plains. The "Navahos" retaliated in the
following year by destroying three Pawnee rancherías and a
fortified village. In 1699 "Navahos" arrived in Pecos with
Pawnee slaves, as well as French carbines, cannon,
swordbelts, jewels, waistcoats, shoes, and brass kettles to
trade. An Apache from the plains reported in 1700 that a
French force had destroyed a pueblo of Jumanos.46
Obviously the French were emerging as a new force on
the plains, and the Apaches were going to have to adjust to
their presence. The Navajo raids onto the plains were coming
to an end along with the seventeenth century. Increased
Spanish settlement along the Río Grande made it more
difficult for Navajo raiding parties to traverse the pathway
to the plains. In addition, in the early eighteenth century,
both Utes and Comanches began making inroads into Navajo
territory. The Spanish also began to make increasing numbers
of campaigns against the Navajos in the first two decades of
the new century. Later, the Navajos were convinced that
Spanish peace and protection were more valuable than warfare
and raiding. The Navajo capitulation had a negative effect
on the plains Apaches. The absence of Navajo treks to the
plains left the Apaches alone to face the growing menace of
French hostility and musket-armed enemies who were seeking
vengeance for previous transgressions. The decline of the
Apaches was at hand.
In 1703 Vargas reassumed the governorship. He arrived
in Santa Fe in November 1703 and took stock of the
situation. After criticizing the work of his predecessor,
Vargas turned his attention to improving the situation.
Settlers from the Río Abajo region asked him to lead a
punitive expedition against the Faraone Apaches who had been
crossing the Sandia and Manzanos Mountains to raid them and
steal livestock. In March 1704 Vargas himself led fifty
officers and men from Santa Fe. They were met at Bernalillo
by a detachment of Indian allies. Vargas's scouts reported
that the Faraones had been sighted near Taxique. The
governor sped to intercept the enemy east of the Manzanos
mountains. The campaign, however, ended at this point.
Vargas became ill and returned to Bernalillo where he died a
few days later on April 8, 1704.47
The death of Vargas concludes a chapter in Apache
history. To this point, the Apaches had been the dominant
tribe on the southern plains, and indeed in the Southwest.
With easy access to horses through raid or trade, and with
some access to European tools, the Apache quickly asserted
their power. They raided and terrified their neighbors,
dragging captives back to New Mexico to sell or trade as
slaves to the insatiable Spanish. The horse gave them
superior maneuverability, range, and power, compared to
their enemies.
Western Apaches proved to be hostile toward the
Spaniards, especially because they lacked other tribes to
raid. These Apaches had few easily accessible targets except
the Pueblos, who generally appealed to the Spanish for
assistance or protection. That dependency spawned trouble
between the western Apaches and the Spanish. At times,
western Apaches and Navajos made the long journey to the
plains to raid more vulnerable targets. There, they were
often joined by their eastern kinsmen, who no doubt welcomed
the extra manpower in battles against their enemies.
With or without their western kin, the Apaches living
east of the Río Grande and on the plains asserted their
authority over their non-Apache neighbors. They were known
and feared by almost all of the tribes living along the
periphery of the southern plains. With the Spanish, however,
the plains Apaches maintained a cordial relationship. They
needed a convenient place to dispose of their spoils and
captives.
By 1700 the cooperative raids of eastern and western
Apaches were coming to a close, at least in northern New
Mexico. In southern New Mexico, the Faraones continued to
straddle the Río Grande and kept the avenue to the plains
open. The lack of extensive settlement between El Paso and
Albuquerque (1706) allowed the Faraones to dominate the
area. They were able to attack passing caravans from their
mountain haunts, raid nearby pueblos and loosely guarded
livestock herds, and travel to the plains to hunt the
buffalo or plunder enemy tribes.
Thus, the eastern Apaches had reached the peak of their
power during the 1690s and early 1700s. That power would be
short-lived, however. The presence of French traders among
the traditional enemies of the Apaches and the loss of
contact with their western kinsmen spelled disaster. The
French, unlike the Spanish, sold or traded guns to their
native customers. As a consequence, the eastern Apaches
found their enemies better armed than themselves. They also
found themselves virtually isolated. Having made enemies of
all their neighbors, these Apaches were surrounded by
hostile forces. Their relationship with the Pueblos and
Spanish became strained when they were unable to continue
their previous supply of slaves and trade goods. Unable to
trade for or buy the supplies they desperately needed, the
eastern Apaches sought alternative methods of obtaining
them. In addition, Comanches, a new tribe from the north
would soon challenge Apache dominance on the plains.
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CHAPTER 5
TURNING THE TIDE: THE DECLINE OF THE NORTHERN
PLAINS APACHES, 1704-1727 
The Apaches living to the north of Santa Fe were at one
time the most powerful tribe on the southern plains, if not
the entire plains. By the beginning of the eighteenth
century, however, new forces were developing that would
break their power and cause their downfall in the short span
of a quarter of a century. To the northwest, the powerful
Comanche nation, allied with their cousins the Utes began to
make inroads into land traditionally held by the Apaches. To
the east, traditional enemies of the Apaches gained access
to guns through trade with the French. Firearms helped
offset the horse, which had given the Apaches a military
advantage. To the southwest, the Faraones, themselves an
Apache group, harassed the more northerly Apache tribes.
Finally, to the south, the growing Spanish presence along
the Río Grande eventually split the plains Apaches from
their kinsmen and intermittent allies, isolating them still
further. The downfall began with the death of Diego de
Vargas.
Before he died, Diego de Vargas designated his
lieutenant, Juan Páez Hurtado, as interim governor of New
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Mexico. Hurtado spent most of his tenure as acting governor
investigating a rumored alliance between the Navajos, Utes,
and several Apache bands. Although testimony of several
Pueblos indicated a conspiracy, no coordinated attacks
occurred. The Faraone Apaches, however, continued to cause
problems. In July 1704, just a few months after Vargas's
death, Hurtado sent a force of 44 soldiers and 110 Indian
auxiliaries into the Sandía Mountains to finish the campaign
begun by Vargas.1
The newly appointed governor, Francisco Cuervo y
Valdés, arrived to assume his post in early 1705, and he
immediately turned his attention to the Indian problems. He
initiated several campaigns against the western Apaches and
Navajos and had some success in quelling their hostility.2
More important for this study, however, was the expedition
he dispatched in 1706 to recover the Picurís who had fled to
the plains in 1696.
For several years the fugitive Picurís had been
requesting aid from the Spanish, explaining that they had
become slaves of the Apaches to whom they had fled. The
latest request came from three emissaries who had arrived in
Taos in the company of ten tents of Apache traders. Earlier,
constant harassment by Apaches in the vicinity of Santa Fe
had prevented sending assistance to the Picurís, but having
temporarily silenced the western Apaches and Navajo, Cuervo
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thought such an expedition might be useful in restoring the
natives to their homes.3 
Command of the expedition fell upon Juan de Ulibarrí.
Ulibarrí's expedition substantially increased the Spaniards'
knowledge of Apaches living to the northeast of Santa Fe
immensely.4 He departed Santa Fe in July 1706 with twenty
soldiers, twelve militia, and one hundred Indian allies
recruited from various pueblos. When the Spaniards arrived
at Picurís, the grateful natives loaded the Spaniards with
supplies, woolen blankets, and horses to be used by their
kinsmen on the return journey. At Taos on the following day,
Ulibarrí heard rumors that the Utes and Comanches, were
planning an attack. This is the first recorded mention of
the latter tribe, which would soon play such an important
role in Apache and Spanish history. Ulibarrí delayed
departure several days, but when no assault materialized, he
continued on his way.
After crossing (and naming) numerous ridges, valleys,
and rivers, Ulibarrí's company encountered the first Apache
rancherías about forty miles east northeast of Taos.
Ulibarrí mentions three groups; the Conejeros, the Achos,
and the Río Colorados.5 These Apaches, some of whom the
Spanish had encountered trading at Taos, informed the
Spanish commander, as they had at Taos, that they were happy
to have the Spanish visit their territory and would not
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injure them. They then warned that other Apache nations to
the east, the Penxayes, Flechas de Palo, Lemitas, and
Trementinas might not be so friendly. They were, the
friendly natives reported, "very bad thieves" and had done
damage even to them.6 Ulibarrí thanked the natives for their
information and advice and rewarded them with gifts.
Armed with this knowledge, Ulibarrí altered his course
to a more northerly route. Two days and sixteen leagues
later, the Spanish encountered a second group of Apaches.
Small parties of these Indians of "La Xicarilla, Flechas de
Palo, and Carlanas tribes" came down from the Sierra Blanca
under individual chiefs.7 They all deferred, however, to a
lame man, their head chief, whom they called Ysdalnisdael.
Spaniards later called this man El Cojo, or the Lame one. 
These natives demonstrated great friendship toward the
Spanish. They stated that in the name of all of their tribe
and Chief Ucase they had come to express their pleasure that
white men entered their land without causing them harm. They
told Ulibarrí that upon his return he would find them
gathered in the rancherías of the Jicarillas, and they also
promised that if he would visit them there they would give
him raisins, which they reserved for their most worthy
guests. The natives emphasized that they had not stolen
anything and were good people who kept busy sowing and
harvesting their crops of corn, beans, and pumpkins.
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Ulibarrí took advantage of the Indians' good nature by
dropping off some worn-out horses with them that he intended
to pick up on his return. Before he left the natives, he
distributed gifts among them.
Continuing on, the expedition next encountered a river
bank planted by the Penxayes. These natives approached the
Spaniards fearfully, but once Ulibarrí convinced them that
they were not endangered and ordered that no harm be done to
the native fields, the Penxayes welcomed the Europeans. The
entrada next encountered Penxaye stragglers who informed the
Spanish that they were gathering to defend themselves from
an expected Ute-Comanche attack.
From this point, near present-day Pueblo, Colorado, the
party curved toward the east. The next few days were spent
traveling across the dry plains of eastern Colorado. Even
the Pueblo guides became lost on the vast expanse of flat
grassland. It was mainly by accident that the scouts from
the expedition wandered into the first of the rancherías of
El Cuartelejo, called Tachichichi. After visiting a short
while, the leader of the scouting party returned to the main
party, accompanied by the Apache chief and several natives.
The other scouts stayed at the ranchería where they were
treated to entertainments and feasts. Ulibarrí welcomed the
Apache chief and his entourage similarly at the main camp.
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From these natives, Ulibarrí learned that four days
earlier they had killed a white man and his female companion
whom they now assumed to be French. The Indians had taken a
gun, some powder, a kettle, and a red-lined cap from the
man, which they promised to show the Spanish when they
arrived at the main Apache ranchería. On the following day,
the main body of Spaniards marched into Tachichichi where
the Apaches came out to meet them with buffalo meat, corn,
and great jubilation. There, the Spanish received a
delegation of Apaches and three Picurís from the main
ranchería of El Cuartelejo. The Picurís assured the
Spaniards that both they and the Apaches were pleased with
Ulibarrí's presence and that the Spaniards would be welcomed
when they arrived at the main encampment.
The rest of the day was spent discussing the Apaches'
enmity toward the Pawnees and Jumanos. Ulibarrí no doubt
guided the discussions along these lines to avoid the
uncomfortable discussion of the Spaniards' mission to rescue
the Picurís, which the Apaches might not concede to
willingly. By emphasizing the enemy threat to the Cuartelejo
Apaches, Ulibarrí could hint that it would be in the
Apaches' best interest to maintain peaceful, friendly
relations with the Spanish.
The next day the Spanish set out for the main
settlements of El Cuartelejo. They were met outside the
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villages by many Apache chiefs. These native leaders
welcomed the Spanish unarmed and with merriment. They
presented the entrada with more buffalo meat, corn, tamales,
plums, and other foods. The chiefs then led the Spanish to a
hill where the Apaches had erected a large cross. After a
brief ceremony, the Spaniards took up the cross and carried
it into the Indian settlements where they were greeted by
many of the fugitive Picurís they had come to rescue. After
taking official possession of the "new province of San Luís
and the great settlement of Santa [sic] Domingo of El
Cuartelejo," Ulibarrí distributed gifts and assured the
natives of the good intentions of the Spaniards. He then
explained that their purpose was the return of the fugitive
Picurís to their home in New Mexico. The Spanish captain
then chastised the Apaches for having badly used the
Picurís, enslaving them when they had sought protection. He
followed with a warning to the Apaches that any resistance
to their goal would result in punishment.
The Apaches announced a willingness to return all of
the Pueblos, not just those present but also those scattered
throughout the rest of the rancherías. The plainsmen then
suggested that Spaniards join them in attacking their Pawnee
enemies as a show of good faith. Ulibarrí offered a series
of excuses to avoid the proposed campaign but promised that
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he or other Spaniards would return to assist the natives at
a later date.
The Apaches then presented the gun they had taken from
the suspected Frenchman to the Spaniards, who inspected it
with great interest. When a Frenchman among Ulibarrí's force
stated that he recognized the gun and that it belonged to
his kinsmen, the Apaches became wary. They immediately
changed their story and informed the Spaniards that the
gunbearer was not a "Spaniard," but a well-known Pawnee
chief. It is apparent that the Apaches could not distinguish
between Spaniard and Frenchman, especially within the
Spanish ranks. They probably were confused by the
Frenchman's remarks and interpreted them to mean that
Ulibarrí's men claimed their victim was a Spaniard. Hence,
they were quick to alter their story to prevent any revenge
the Spanish might seek for the murder of one of their
people.
Ulibarrí next set about gathering the scattered Picurís
by sending out three groups to collect them. One of the
rancherías was forty leagues distant indicating that the
Cuartelejo Apaches controlled a vast expanse of the plains. 
There has been much debate concerning the location of
El Cuartelejo. Discussion centers on two possible locations;
Otero or Kiowa county in eastern Colorado, or Scott county
in western Kansas. Since Ulibarrí noted that the rancherías
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of El Cuartelejo were scattered over an area of at least
forty leagues (just over one hundred miles) both locations
could have been home to Cuartelejo Apaches.8
When the three groups returned with their fugitives,
Ulibarrí could claim to have rescued sixty-two Picurís from
the slavery and "barbarity of the Apaches."  He gave the
staff of command and the title "Captain-Major of all of
Apachería" to a "young Indian of fine body and countenance,"
called Yndatiyuhe, and charged him with the care of a cross
erected in the plaza of the ranchería. The Spanish
expedition then took its leave and began the return trip to
Santa Fe.
On the march, the party stopped at the ranchería of El
Cojo to pick up their horses. The Apaches celebrated the
return of the Spaniards and returned the beasts. They then
informed Ulibarrí that in his absence the Utes and Comanches
had attacked two Apache rancherías, one of the Carlanas and
Sierra Blanca tribe and the other of the Penxayes. The
Spanish continued on their way, and after observing another
celebration at Picurís, during which the natives rejoiced
over the return of their kinsmen, reached Santa Fe.
Ulibarrí's expedition is significant for a number of
reasons. First, the multitude of Apache tribal names is
indicative of the problem of identifying specific Apache
groups. In his diary, Ulibarrí mentions no less than nine
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"tribes."  Some, such as the Achos and Conejeros were names
familiar to the Spanish. Others, such as the Penxayes,
Lemitas, and Flechas de Palo, were new names appearing for
the first time in Ulibarrí's diary. Many of the names, which
might have had some significance for Ulibarrí and his
contemporaries are now simply tantalizing or confusing. In
fact, almost all of them would eventually disappear and be
replaced by names such as Jicarillas, Mescaleros, or Lipans.
Unfortunately, there is often no direct link between the
older names and the currently existing nomenclature.
Second, the expedition shows that most Apaches living
to the northeast of Santa Fe were on friendly terms with the
Spanish. Many tribes emphasized that they were honest and
friendly, but added that their Apache neighbors were less
so. These statements lead to two possible conclusions:  that
the Apaches were actually involved in raids on Spanish
settlements but wanted to cast any Spanish suspicions on
their neighbors and hence away from themselves; or, that the
Apaches were truly innocent but knew from past experience
that the Spanish were always looking for an excuse to attack
and take slaves. Therefore, the Apaches wanted it known up
front that they were guiltless and if some outrage had
occurred, it must have been by someone else.
Regardless, the Apaches were genuinely pleased by
Spanish presence because of the protection it offered
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against enemy attacks. By assisting the Spanish, the Apaches
no doubt hoped to win their aid against the Comanche-Ute or
the French- Pawnee alliances that were just beginning to
threaten their position on the plains.
Third, the campaign reveals that, at least in 1706, the
Apaches occupied a large area of the southern plains. They
controlled the plains from as far north as eastern Colorado
and western Kansas, as well as the plains of Texas in the
south. The Apache tribes encountered by Ulibarrí were also
extensively involved in agriculture, growing a variety of
crops.
Finally, Ulibarrí noted that the Apaches of El
Cuartelejo appeared favorably disposed toward Christianity.
During his visit, he had noticed numerous crosses,
medallions, and rosaries. When Ulibarrí asked about them,
the Apaches replied that when they were in battle and became
fatigued, the ornaments reminded them of the "great Captain
of the Spaniards who is in the heaven," and they become
refreshed. In religious ceremonies held during the
Europeans' stay at El Cuartelejo, the Apaches acted
reverently and even mimicked the actions of Spaniards.
Overall, the governor of New Mexico was favorably impressed
by Ulibarrí's report and held high hopes of extending
Spanish influence to the region.9
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Ulibarrí's promise to return and aid the Cuartelejos
against their enemies was delayed by renewed Indian problems
in New Mexico. The Utes and Comanches, although not openly
hostile toward the Spanish, were seen as a potential threat
because of their increased attacks upon the Apaches with
whom the Spanish were trying to forge a peace. More directly
threatening, however, was renewed warfare with the Navajos.
The Faraones also increased their activities in the years
immediately following Ulibarrí's return. These Indians,
located in the Sandía Mountains, proved most troublesome.
The Pecos natives, who were generally on friendly terms with
the Faraones, referred to those living in the Sandías as
"thieving Indian pirates."10
When Governor Juan Ignacio Flores Mogollón arrived in
1712, he ordered that trade with non-Christian Indians be
stopped. The governor believed that trade with the Utes,
Comanches, and Apaches encouraged their depredations. His
order included the Apaches of La Jicarilla and El
Cuartelejo. Flores Mogollón felt that hostile natives used
the pretext of trade to enter the fringes of settled areas,
then used their proximity to steal as they departed. He
desired to keep the raiders as far from the settlements as
possible.11
The policy was a failure, especially among the
Faraones, who, in many cases, already resided close enough
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to stage raids on the Spanish. In the summer of 1714, an
expedition attacked Faraones in the Sandía Mountains. As a
result these natives sued for peace at both Pecos and
Isleta.12
The peace was short-lived, however. Within a few
months, the Faraones under the pretense of peace were
entering Isleta and committing depredations. To address the
problem, Flores Mogollón held a council in the summer of
1715. In order to identify the guilty parties and discuss
the habits of the Faraones, Flores Mogollón invited don
Gerónimo Ylo, the lieutenant-governor of Taos, and don
Lorenzo, the lieutenant-governor of Picurís, to attend,
because both pueblos had been victimized by Faraone Apaches
for years.13
Don Gerónimo identified the raiders as the Chipaynes or
Lemitas, both of whom were known to the Spaniards as
Faraones. He noted that these troublemakers often mingled
with peaceful plains Apaches at the trade fairs and then
committed depredations upon their departure. The Indian
leader further suggested that the Pecos and Queres be
prohibited from joining Spanish campaigns because of their
close relationship with the Faraones. He suggested that
Jicarillas, who had been victimized by the Faraones and had
offered their assistance, be used instead. Finally, don
Gerónimo suggested that the campaign be scheduled to arrive
177
at the Faraone rancherías at mid August, a time when when
they would be engrossed in harvesting their crops.14
Don Lorenzo, on the other hand, identified the raiders
as Trementinas or Lemitas. He reported that it was ten days
march from Picurís to their first ranchería, composed of
"thirty houses of wood entirely smeared with clay outside." 
Based on information gathered from the Pueblo leaders and
other sources, Governor Flores Mogollón ordered Juan Páez
Hurtado to gather a force in Picurís to chastise the
Faraones.15
Because of various delays, the expedition did not
depart until August 30, 1715, almost a month later than the
Pueblo leaders had suggested. Along the way, thirty
Jicarillas and one Cuartelejo Apache apparently joined the
expedition.16 The expedition itself, however, proved a
failure. It discovered numerous tracks of Apaches and their
horses but no live natives. They had already left for the
buffalo plains. Rather than accept blame for missing the
Faraones because the expedition was a month late, Hurtado
and the Spaniards blamed the Pecos, arguing that they must
have alerted the Faraones when the latter came to Pecos to
trade.17
Hurtado's expedition established that the Lemitas,
Trementinas, and Chipaynes were the same or at least closely
related bands of Apaches. They were included in the hodge-
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podge conglomerate that the Spanish called the Faraones, and
they were hostile toward the Jicarilla Apaches living to the
northeast of Santa Fe. It is also noteworthy that the
Jicarillas, through don Gerónimo, offered to give their
assistance in the campaign. However, it seems that the
Indian leader overstated the case when he claimed that "all"
of the Jicarilla, "who are many," would be willing to join
the expedition.18 Thirty seems to be a poor showing at best.
For the next several years, the Utes and Comanches far
overshadowed the Faraones in their depredations on New
Mexico. Hostilities began in 1716 after a Spanish force, led
by Cristóbal de la Serna, attacked a Comanche and Ute camp
about one hundred miles northwest of Santa Fe. During the
next three years, the Comanches and Utes increased their
attacks on pueblos and Spanish settlements in northern New
Mexico. Apaches living north of Santa Fe and out on the
plains, however, were their main targets.19
The increased intensity of attacks on New Mexico led
Governor Antonio Valverde Cosío to order a war council to
discuss the matter. Coming out of the council was a decision
to launch an immediate campaign against the Comanche and Ute
nations. Most members of the council agreed. A month later,
on September 15, 1719, the expedition, under the direct
command of Governor Valverde set out to punish the Comanches
and Utes.20 
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Before he departed, Valverde received a dispatch from
Viceroy Marqués de Valero, directing him to "employ with the
greatest efficiency all his care to allure and entertain"
the Apaches. Valero hoped that the Jicarillas would become a
barrier to French designs in the area. He had been
encouraged in this opinion by a missionary stationed at
Taos. Fray Juan de la Cruz had written the viceroy informing
him that the Jicarillas, or at least a portion of them, had
come to him to request baptism. Having investigated their
requests, the friar concluded that they earnestly desired
conversion.21
Valverde left Santa Fe with sixty presidial soldiers
and marched to Taos. There he picked up an additional 45
settlers and 465 native allies. The expanded expedition
departed Taos on the twentieth and marched east. Two days
later, it encountered the Jicarilla Apaches. The first of
the Jicarillas welcomed the Spanish and complained bitterly
of Ute and Comanche assaults they had suffered. However, the
Apaches were greatly pleased when Valverde announced to them
the purpose of the expedition.22
Numerous groups of Apaches approached the Spaniards
over the next several days as the expedition slowly
progressed through their rancherías. Chief Carlana of the
Sierra Blanca arrived to report that he and half of his
tribe had come to request the help of the Jicarilla Apaches
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against the Comanches and Utes. The rest of his tribe had
traveled to the land of Chief Flaco for safety. No other
information is known concerning this latter chief, but he
and his people obviously lived further out into the plains,
safe from Comanche inroads. Importantly, Carlana offered the
services of his people to act as guides for the Spanish.23
The Spanish next traveled through the rancherías of El
Cojo, which Ulibarrí had encountered in 1706. El Cojo was
absent having traveled to the Navajo province where he no
doubt sought their aid against Comanche and Ute invaders.
The chief's two sons informed Valverde that a year earlier
the Comanches and their Ute allies had killed sixty
Jicarilla, carried off sixty-four women and children as
captives, destroyed a tower, and eradicated their corn
supply.24
Valverde spent about a week traveling slowly through
the Jicarilla rancherías, listening to grievances, and
offering encouragement. When he departed to continue his
expedition, nearly one hundred Jicarillas, including Captain
Carlana, accompanied him. For almost a month the party
followed their Jicarilla trackers, encountering large
abandoned camps of Comanches and remnants of plundered
Apache rancherías, but never overtook the enemy. With winter
closing in, Valverde held a war council. He, as governor,
was willing to continue on to El Cuartelejo, approximately
181
four or five days distant, but he would leave the decision
up to the members of the expedition. The rank and file
decided unanimously to return to avoid losing horses in the
upcoming snows. Valverde accepted the decision but ordered a
buffalo hunt to replenish their provisions before returning
to New Mexico.
On the night that the council was held, ten Apaches
from El Cuartelejo entered the Spanish camp to inform the
governor that their people were coming to visit him.
Valverde decided to delay his departure and await the
Cuartelejos's arrival. A week later, more than one thousand
Cuartelejos, Palomas, and Calchufines arrived with two
hundred tents. Among the new arrivals was a Paloma chief
recovering from a gunshot wound. Valverde learned that the
native had received the wound in a battle with the French,
Pawnees, and Jumanos, east of El Cuartelejo.25 The Paloma
continued that the French had established "two large
pueblos, each of which is as large as that of Taos," where
they were arming and training the Pawnees and Jumanos and
each day advancing more into the Apache lands. Having gained
as much information as possible from the Cuartelejos,
Valverde distributed gifts and returned to Santa Fe.26
Several important pieces of information are gained from
Valverde's expedition of 1719. It shows that the Apaches to
the north of Santa Fe were on good terms with the Spanish.
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The Jicarilla Apaches were involved in extensive, irrigated
agriculture. All of the Apaches, from the Jicarillas to the
Cuartelejos and Palomas were suffering increasing assaults
from the Utes and Comanches and/or the French and Pawnees.
As a result of these attacks, the Apaches were retreating on
almost all fronts, many of them moving into the area of La
Jicarilla. Finally, the Jicarilla Apaches seemed religiously
oriented. They venerated the holy cross and appeared
receptive to conversion.
Valverde quickly sent a report of his expedition and
its results to viceroy Valero. He concluded that the French
settlements were approximately two hundred leagues from
Santa Fe, but that the French appeared to be advancing. The
governor also indicated that he would continue explorations
until contact was made with the French. Finally, he noted
the lack of munitions and manpower in New Mexico to counter
any emergency that might occur.27
Valero also received a letter from the auditor of war,
Juan Manuel de Oliván Rebolledo. Oliván, having seen
Valverde's reports, recommended that a presidio of twenty to
twenty-five soldiers be established at El Cuartelejo. Two or
three missionaries should also be stationed there to
"instruct the Apaches and establish a perpetual alliance
with those who are in their nation very numerous."  These
Apaches should be encouraged congregate and farm at the
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presidio and farm. Their large numbers would provide
sufficient auxiliary forces to counter the French advance.
To strengthen the Spanish position further, Oliván suggested
that peace should be made with the Apaches in Texas to
create a solid defensive cordon against the French.28
The viceroy agreed with Oliván's suggestion, but
Valverde vehemently protested. The New Mexican governor felt
that El Cuartelejo was too isolated for a presidio. There
were numerous Indian tribes in that area and not all of them
were friendly toward the Spanish. In addition, the
Cuartelejo Apaches did not reside there year round. They
gathered there to plant and harvest their crops and then
scattered over the surrounding plains. In addition, the area
had insufficient water and wood for a permanent settlement.
Finally, Valverde argued, El Cuartelejo was too far from
Santa Fe to be supported, should that be necessary. Instead,
he recommended that a presidio should be established at La
Jicarilla.29
A war council called by Valverde confirmed his
conclusions. Several members of the council noted that
fifty, not twenty-five soldiers, would increase the success
of a presidio at La Jicarilla. The extra soldiers were
necessary because of the attacks of the Utes and Comanches,
as well as the Faraones from the east. The extra soldiers
184
would allow for sallies and reconnaissances to be made
against hostile natives.30
While Governor Valverde was arguing to position the
proposed presidio at La Jicarilla, he was also organizing an
expedition to seek out the French to the east. This
expedition would be led by his lieutenant-governor, Pedro de
Villasur. Villasur's experience was questionable, but he
would be accompanied two seasoned scouts. One was José
Naranjo, an able scout and interpreter who had served under
Diego de Vargas and accompanied both Ulibarrí's and
Valverde's campaigns to El Cuartelejo. The other was a
Frenchman, Jean L'Archevêque, a survivor of the La Salle
expedition (and one of La Salle's assassins) who had been
captured in Texas, taken to Mexico for interrogation,
imprisoned in Spain, and eventually returned to New Spain as
a Spanish subject. He had joined Diego de Vargas in the
reconquest of New Mexico, settled and married in Santa Fe,
and participated in the Ulibarrí and Valverde expeditions.31
Forty-two soldiers, sixty Pueblos, three civilians and
a priest made up Villasur's army. The little army was well
provisioned with maize, short swords, knives, sombreros, and
tobacco for use in persuading Apaches to join the
expedition. L'Archevêque contributed ten horses and six pack
mules for the occasion.32 
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Villasur followed the same basic route that Valverde
had followed the previous year. He traveled through La
Jicarilla where he picked up at least a few Carlanas as
guides and distributed the gifts he had brought. The Carlana
guides rafted the Spanish and their provisions across a
river in their country, but it is uncertain if any Apaches
accompanied the expedition farther than El Cuartelejo.33
After two months of travel, Villasur reached the
junction of the South Platte and the North Platte Rivers.
Near there the party was nearly wiped out by Pawnee Indians
with alleged French assistance. Only a dozen Spaniards
survived, most seriously wounded, and among the dead were
the much-traveled Jean L'Archevêque and José Naranjo.
Fortunately, the survivors reached the camps of friendly
Apaches at El Cuartelejo. The Apaches grieved over the
defeat with the Spanish and kept them in their care for two
days sharing their meager provisions with them and promising
to help the Spaniards avenge their dead. The survivors
straggled back to Santa Fe a few weeks later.34
The Villasur massacre had dire results for the Apaches
living to the north of New Mexico. Those living in the
vicinity of El Cuartelejo were left with little support
against the growing threat of the Comanches, Utes, Pawnees,
and French. They would have a brief opportunity to salvage
their situation when the French entered their area and
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offered peace, but events would prevent the Apaches from
taking advantage of the proposal.
The Apaches at La Jicarilla suffered as well. The
proposed construction of a presidio there never occurred.
The viceroy, upon hearing of the Villasur disaster, ordered
that the presidio be constructed immediately.35 Valverde,
however, balked at the suggestion.
Valverde rushed his response to Valero back to Mexico
City. With the loss of Villasur's company, almost one-third
of the Santa Fe garrison had perished. It would be
impossible to spare twenty-five soldiers for a presidio at
La Jicarilla. Besides that, he continued, before sending
them to "that desert," a strong house should be constructed
for them to shelter their families, offer them refuge, and
store their supplies. Keeping the new presidio supplied
would also be problematic. There were twenty leagues of
mountainous terrain between Santa Fe and La Jicarilla and
for five months out of the year, snows made the roads
impassable. This would leave the garrison at the mercy of a
great multitude of untrustworthy Apaches. If they should
rebel, the Apaches could easily muster a force of two to
three thousand warriors in a week destroy the presidio, and
endanger the remainder of New Mexico.36
Several interesting facts come to light in Valverde's
message:  La Jicarilla had become a "desert;" the Apaches
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had become "untrustworthy;" and the area had become an
isolated death trap for five months of the year. Obviously,
Valverde was afraid to weaken his faltering hold on Santa Fe
any more than necessary, and he felt that spreading troops
too thinly would prove disastrous. As far as the
untrustworthiness of the Apaches, which Valverde stated he
had personally experienced, he must have been referring to
the Faraones. Almost every statement he had made up to this
point concerning the Apaches to the north of Santa Fe had
been glowing with praise. 
Valverde's protests won him some concessions. Oliván
suggested increasing the size of the proposed garrison at La
Jicarilla and sending married men with a trade in order to
assure the independence and success of the venture. A
commander should be chosen from Mexico, since Valverde had
stated the lack of qualified leaders in New Mexico. A war
council in Mexico unanimously agreed to increase the
proposed garrison to fifty men, recruited from wherever
Valverde saw fit. It also agreed to the construction of a
strong house for the men and their families, a place for
their horses, and the stockpiling of provisions to assure
their survival through the winter.37
These concessions, however, were not satisfactory for
Valverde, since he had neither the manpower nor the supplies
to carry out the orders. Fortunately for him, but
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unfortunately for the Jicarilla Apaches, Mexico soon cooled
to the idea of a presidio. Spain signed a treaty with France
in the summer of 1721, and peace with its European rival
lessened the perceived threat to Spanish holdings on the
frontier, making an Apache barrier less urgent.38
Although the Spanish cooled interest in establishing a
presidio among the Jicarillas, the Apaches did not.
Continued Comanche and Ute raids encouraged Captain Carlana
and a delegation of Apaches to visit Santa Fe in November
1723. The emisssaries met with the governor, Juan Domingo de
Bustamante, and informed him that they had recently suffered
a devastating attack from the Comanches. It was clear to the
delegates that their only chance for survival was to throw
themselves on the mercy of the Spaniards. As a consequence,
the Apaches expressed willingness to settle peacefully in
pueblos like the Christian Indians, seek holy baptism for
themselves and their people, and accept priests to instruct
them as well as an alcalde mayor to govern them. All this
they agreed to in exchange for the protection of Spanish
arms. The Apaches then asked Bustamante to accompany them to
the valley of La Jicarilla, survey the situation, and choose
the most advantageous sites for them to locate their
pueblos. They were especially anxious to relocate as quickly
as possible so that they might begin planting crops.39
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Bustamante was in the midst of organizing a campaign
against the troublesome Faraones, but decided to convene a
council of war to discuss this tempting proposal of the
Apaches. The council members unanimously agreed to avail
themselves of the opportunity offered to them. It was hoped
that the conversion and settlement of the Jicarilla Apaches
might have a favorable impact on the more widely scattered
bands of Apaches and convince them of the advantages of
settlement and conversion. Additionally, the valley of
Jicarilla was an important entrance into Santa Fe and a
settlement of peaceful Apaches there would serve as a
bulwark against French invasion (and although they did not
say it, Comanche invasion as well). The council recommended
that Bustamante cancel the campaign against the Faraones and
instead lead fifty soldiers to La Jicarilla, gather the
natives together, and determine the validity of the
delegation's proposal. If all seemed in accord, Bustamante
should begin assigning locations for their pueblos.40
Wasting no time, Bustamante assembled a presidial force
of fifty soldiers and a week later departed for La
Jicarilla. He visited the rancherías of three prominent
chiefs. First, he traveled to that of Captain Carlana, who
met him accompanied by six other captains and fifty
warriors. After being escorted to their camp and then
assured that all the Apaches welcomed the Spaniards and
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conversion to their faith, the governor continued on to the
ranchería of Captain Churlique. There he received a similar
reception. Finally, he visited the ranchería of Captain Cojo
where he was similarly assured of the fealty of these
natives. The Apaches impressed on the governor that more of
their people from widely scattered rancherías would join
them in the spring. Bustamante took formal possession of the
valley for Spain and placed it and all of its rancherías
under royal protection.41
After returning to Santa Fe, Bustamante informed the
viceroy of his actions. He recommended that a presidio of
fifty soldiers be constructed at La Jicarilla, as had been
suggested earlier under Valverde's term. Such a
fortification would lend security to the Jicarillas, as well
as to the missionaries stationed among them, and hasten
their settlement and conversion.42
The immediate response concerning Bustamante's
suggestions appeared favorable. Oliván wrote to the new
viceroy, the Marqués de Casafuerte, in July, outlining in
some detail the background of the proposed presidio and how
it might be manned. The viceroy, however, hesitated to
approve the plan.43
While officials in Mexico debated the issue, the
Comanches once again swooped through the rancherías of La
Jicarilla. In early 1724, Comanches forced the Jicarillas to
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"give up half their women and children, and then they burned
several villages, killing all but sixty-nine men, two women,
and three boys."  Bustamante authorized Juan Páez Hurtado to
lead one hundred men in an effort to chastise the Comanches.
Either Hurtado's campaign or a later one led by Bustamante,
managed to recover sixty-four of the Jicarilla and return
them to their homes.44
Despite Bustamante's success in recovering some of
their people, the Jicarillas told him that since they could
not be protected in their own land, they were going to join
the Navajos. The fiscal (legal adviser) in Mexico City
advised that the Jicarilla not be allowed to "escape" to the
Navajos, but instead they be relocated to a place closer to
the Christianized pueblos. He even suggested using funds
from the royal treasury for the first year or two to
maintain them.45
Still Casafuerte delayed, eventually gathering all
pertinent information and delivering it to Pedro de Rivera
who was about to begin his inspection tour of the frontier
posts of New Spain. Rivera did not reach Santa Fe until June
1726 and his assessment of the situation was sent to
Casafuerte from El Paso in September 1726. The inspector
argued against the establishment of a presidio at La
Jicarilla. If, he stated, the main goal of the presidio was
to aid in the conversion of the Apaches, then they could as
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easily be converted at Taos. If the main goal of a presidio
was to expand the empire, then it was pointless to establish
it. There were many places behind the frontier that were at
least as fertile as La Jicarilla, and they were yet to be
settled. Why then should the government foot the expenses of
building and manning a presidio at La Jicarilla when
travelers could not safely pass from El Paso to Santa Fe
without an armed escort?  Funds would be much more
efficiently used to settle or protect areas already
nominally under Spanish control than using them to
overextend the frontiers. Thus, no presidio should be
constructed for the Jicarilla. They should instead be
relocated at Taos.46
The fiscal, Oliván, and the viceroy all agreed with
Rivera's recommendation. In April 1727 the viceroy closed
the file on the issue of a presidio at La Jicarilla.
Bustamante was ordered to carry out Rivera's suggestion of
relocating the Jicarilla to the vicinity of Taos.47 Spain's
failure to establish a presidio at La Jicarilla ended the
chance for the Jicarilla Apaches to withstand the onslaught
of the Comanches and retain possession of their homelands. 
There still remained one possibility, however slight,
for the Apaches north of Santa Fe to salvage their position-
-an alliance with the French. In December 1718 Jean-Baptiste
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Bénard de La Harpe departed New Orleans to travel up the Red
River to establish a trading post among the Nassonites near
present Texarkana. After founding a small trading post there
and establishing sporadic contact with the Spanish missions
in East Texas, La Harpe received news that Spain and France
were again at war. Having lost, at least temporarily his
chance to establish trade with the Spanish, La Harpe decided
to extend French influence to the west and explore farther
up the Red River.48
La Harpe's lieutenant, Sieur Du Rivage, encountered a
large party of mixed tribes who reported to the French that
they had just returned from a battle with the "Cancy."  The
friendly natives explained that the Cancy composed a very
populous village on the banks of the Red River some sixty
leagues from their present location. They also enticed the
French by stating that the Spanish were established at the
Cancy village and were working at "taking very heavy
material from the earth."49
The friendly natives were a conglomerate of Caddoan
tribes and Tonkawas. The Cancy were Apaches, most likely
Lipans. While these Apaches no doubt had contact and trade
with the Spaniards, there is no indication of a Spanish
outpost located at the described location. The French also
learned that the Cancy fought with bows and arrows, because
the Spanish forbade trading firearms. They possessed,
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however, swords, suits, hats, and some woven materials. Most
importantly, however, was the fact that the Cancy had horses
and controlled their distribution. Other nations could only
obtain the animal through the Apaches.50
La Harpe also recorded another important piece of
information. He learned of a numerous nation known as the
Padoucas who resided far to the north and northwest of the
Arkansas. The Spanish were allies with some, but not all of
these Indians. The Padoucas were frequently attacked by the
Pawnees and were also enemies of the Caddoan tribes, with
whom La Harpe was meeting.51
There has been significant debate concerning the
identity of the Padoucas. Many scholars insist that they
were Comanches, while others insist that they were Apaches.
In all likelihood, Frank R. Secoy is correct in his theory
that prior to 1750, Padoucas referred to Apaches, while
after 1750 the term related to Comanches who had moved into
the area formerly occupied by Apaches.52 
There is little doubt that the Padoucas of La Harpe's
time were El Cuartelejo Apaches. The area they lived in was
identical to that described by Ulibarrí in 1706, and they
lived in widely scattered villages. Some of the villages had
substantial structures apparently modeled after pueblo
architecture. These structures were leftover influence from
the Pueblos who had once lived among the Apaches. Their
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material culture was almost exactly identical to that of the
Apaches, and they farmed. Their war with the Pawnees was
well documented by Spanish sources, and a statement that
they were not all known by the Spaniards also fits data
concerning El Cuartelejo. It will be remembered that
Valverde, in his expedition to the Cuartelejos, met with
only a portion of them and then departed before the bulk of
the natives could meet with him to express any allegiance.53
A final note of interest concerning La Harpe's journey
is that the Frenchman recorded that the Indians with whom he
was meeting rarely traveled to the headwaters of the
Arkansas River, because the Cancy passed that way to battle
with the Padoucas. This statement of inter-Apache warfare at
first seems to cast doubt on the identity of the Padoucas as
Apaches. Since Apache-Comanche warfare was well under way by
this time, perhaps one could argue that the Padoucas were
Comanches. But, most likely, the warfare between the Cancy
(Lipans) and the Padoucas (Cuartelejos) was an offshoot of
the clash between the Jicarillas (allies of the Cuartelejos)
and the Faraones (close relatives of the Lipans).
Noting the seeming power of the Padoucas, La Harpe
observed that whoever controlled trade with them would
control the central plains. Shortly after La Harpe's
expedition, the French learned, through their Indian allies,
of Villasur's defeat. Pierre Dugué de Boisbriant, the French
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commandant in Illinois, recorded news from the western
frontier. He was informed by natives in November 1720 that a
large force of Spanish and Padoucas had entered their
country to establish a post on the Missouri. A force of 60
Spaniards and 150 Padoucas had approached to within fifteen
leagues of the Otoptatas who met with the Spanish pretending
to be Pani-mahas. The Padoucas fled during the night, and
the Otoptatas performed a dance for the Spanish. In the
midst of the ceremony, the Otoptatas attacked the Spanish
and all but two of the Spaniards were killed.54
While not the most accurate account of the Villasur
massacre, the native rendition did frighten the French into
activity. They feared the loss of potential trade on the
central plains and they also realized that peace must be
made between their Indian allies and the Padoucas. In order
to achieve this, French authorities called noted Indian
authority and trader Etienne Véniard de Bourgmont out of
retirement in Paris.55
On his trip to the Padoucas, Bourgmont first stopped at
the main village of the Kansas. Here he parleyed with the
natives and sent messages to other tribes of his intentions
to reach the Padoucas. When he departed, the Kansas and
other tribes accompanied him with a sizable entourage of 300
warriors, 2 head chiefs, 14 war chiefs, 300 women, 500
children, and more than 300 dogs dragging freight on
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travois. The sheer bulk of the expedition and the fact that
most of the natives were afoot slowed progress to a crawl.
In addition, a few days after departing the Kansa village,
Bourgmont became too ill to continue.56
Rather than delay or cancel the expedition, Bourgmont
sent a French civilian named François Gaillard along with
two freed Apache slaves and a pair of Kansa Indians to the
Padouca. Gaillard was to travel ahead to the Padouca,
distribute a few gifts among them, explain Bourgmont's
peaceful mission, and try to convince some of the Padouca
chiefs to accompany him back to a  meeting with Bourgmont. A
few weeks later, Gaillard's party encountered a Padouca
hunting party. After a few tense moments between the Kansas
and Apaches who were traditional enemies, the former Apache
slaves explained Gaillard's mission and the tensions eased.
The small party was taken to the Padouca village and
received warmly. Gaillard quickly set about paving the way
for Bourgmont. He led a small party of Apaches to meet with
a Kansa hunting party, and then led a party of Kansas to
meet with the Apaches. Both groups of traditional enemies
treated each other cordially. Gaillard convinced the Kansas
to return home so that they could inform Bourgmont of his
progress. He stayed behind to visit other Padouca
villages.57
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Upon hearing this news, Bourgmont decided to relaunch
his campaign even though he was not fully recovered. He
arrived at the Kansa village a few days ahead of Gaillard,
who was bringing six hundred warriors and their families
from eight Apache villages. After ceremonial greetings and
speeches, Bourgmont spent the next several days gathering
representatives from the French allies. When the council was
held, Missouris, Otos, Kansas, Iowas, Osages, and Pawnees
attended along with the French and Padoucas. Once the
attendees had assembled, Bourgmont gave a speech announcing
his intention to establish peaceful relations between all
the attendant tribes. The French allies stood up and shouted
their approval of the proposal, and afterward the Apache
chief invited the attendees to visit his people.58
Less than a week later, Bourgmont led a column of
seventeen Frenchmen and nineteen Indians from the Kansa,
Missouri, Oto and Iowa tribes. The troop marched some 250
miles to the southwest. Somewhere in central Kansas, in the
vicinity of Ellsworth, the French party reached a large
Padouca encampment. The next several days were spent
exchanging gifts, speaking, and feasting. The French
expressed their desire to establish peaceful relations
between themselves and the attending nations. The Padouca
accepted Bourgmont's peace overtures and promised to
maintain the peace not only with the French but with their
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former enemies as well. The Padouca chief invited the French
to accompany them to visit the Spanish who were only twelve
days distant from their village, but the French begged off
because of the lateness of the season.59
During their visit to the Padouca, the French recorded
several interesting facts. The Padouca ranged over an area
of 200 leagues (more than 500 miles). The had numerous
villages and engaged in agriculture. At the camp where
Bourgmont met them, there were 140 structures housing 800
warriors, 1500 women, and 2000 children.60 This was
obviously not a permanent population. The number of
inhabitants was greatly expanded because of the importance
of the occasion. The head chief who addressed the French
claimed that he controlled twelve villages and could muster
2000 warriors.61
Finally, the Padouca noted their relationship with the
Spanish. Some of the Padouca villages were near to the
Spanish, and the Spanish visited them each spring to trade--
bringing horses, awls, knives, and axes. All of the items,
they claimed, were of inferior quality to those brought by
the French, indicating thet the Padouca were more impressed
by the quality and variety of goods offered by the French.
Some Padouca villages were more remote from the Spanish and
still used flint knives. They would no doubt be extremely
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interested in developing a trade relationship with the
French.62
The promising beginning started by Bourgmont did not
last long. The Apaches almost immediately tried to use their
new- found allies against the Comanches. They and a few
French traders surprised a Comanche hunting camp and scored
a small victory, but for the next three years the Comanche
were relentless in their attacks on Apache rancherías. In
1726 the Comanches even chased a band of Palomas and
Calchufines into Santa Fe.63
Political events eventually cut off French contact with
the Apaches. Bourgmont returned to France in 1725, and his
work did not survive long in his absence. The trading post
he had established was abandoned in 1729 and replaced by a
new post near the Kansa villages. French traders increased
the supply of guns to the Pawnees and Kansas in order to
encourage the taking of Apache captives to trade with the
French. In addition, French traders who made trips to visit
the Padoucas quickly realized that they were being eclipsed
by the Comanches and thus began to shift their attention
toward making peace with them.64
The Spanish in New Mexico began receiving sporadic news
of the French at El Cuartelejo. Governor Bustamante wrote to
the viceroy in April 1727 to inform him that Jicarillas at
Taos had reported that Frenchmen were aiding the Cuartelejos
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against the Comanches. When Apaches brought Comanche
prisoners to Santa Fe, the Comanches were interrogated and
informed the Spanish that there had been white men among the
Apaches who had captured them. The description of the white
men convinced the Spaniards that they were French.65
In 1726 the French were reportedly three days march
from La Jicarilla. They were leading a great force of
Palomas, Cuartelejos and Sierra Blancas against the
Comanches, trying to drive them from the area.66 The reports
of French among the Cuartelejos obviously refers to the
traders visiting the area as a result of Bourgmont's
journey. The viceroy, upon receiving these reports took
little action, apparently having come to the conclusion that
the French were more interested in trade than in conquest.
In addition, reports that they were attacking the Comanche
might have been viewed with favor by the Spaniards in New
Mexico. In any case Casafuerte requested that Bustamante
keep him updated on new developments.67
The break between the French and the Apaches in
approximately 1727 brings another period of Apache history
to a close. From this point on, the Apaches north of Santa
Fe were more or less left in a defensive state, trying
desperately to save their crumbling society. More and more
they became dependent on the Spanish to protect them, and
202
increasingly they assisted the Spaniards in an effort to
regain their former status. 
The Apaches living to the east and south of Santa Fe
had a slower decline because of their insulated position.
They were protected from the Comanche onslaught by their
more northerly kinsmen, and the Caddoans who bordered them
on the east were less interested in expanding out onto the
plains. But, eventually they too faced the pressures that
had overwhelmed their cousins and they too would eventually
be forced to seek protection and aid from the Spanish.
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CHAPTER 6
TURNING THE TIDE: THE DECLINE OF THE
SOUTHERN PLAINS APACHES, 1711-1749
While the Apaches north of New Mexico were suffering
increased attacks on all sides, those living to the south
suffered less oppression. The Faraones straddled the Río
Grande between Santa Fe and El Paso and continuously
harassed caravans and travelers passing along the trails.
Farther to the east, in the vicinity of San Antonio, were
Apaches who would eventually become known as the Lipans.1 In
the 1600s and early 1700s, the Spanish made no real
distinction between the Faraones and Lipans, or other bands
living in the area of the southern plains. Instead, they
referred to all groups as simply Apaches.
In 1711 Faraone Apaches identified as Chipaynes arrived
in Pecos to trade. After they had departed, it was
discovered that many of the captives sold by the Faraones
were Christianized natives from the Río Grande missions of
Coahuila rather than heathen plains natives.2 Obviously
these Indians controlled a large expanse of the southern
plains and West Texas.
In 1713 soldiers from Santa Fe were attacked while
escorting travelers to El Paso. The governor of New Mexico 
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feared a larger uprising that might isolate Santa Fe, but
the soldiers assured him that the raiders were a small party
operating out of the Sandía Mountains. The governor
responded in the following year by mounting an expedition of
thirty-six soldiers, eleven residents from Albuquerque, and
321 Pueblo allies to punish the Faraones, but the force
failed to make contact.3
Farther to the east, the French began making inroads
into Texas. Several early expeditions from Louisiana into
East Texas were carried out by the intrepid French trader,
Louis Juchereau de St. Denis. St. Denis, after failing to
locate Spaniards among the Tejas Indians, decided to push on
toward the Río Grande and Presidio San Juan Bautista.
Twenty-six Tejas Indians and three Frenchmen accompanied St.
Denis. On the Colorado River the party was attacked by two
hundred Apaches. After a battle of several hours, the
attackers were driven off with only slight losses to the
traders. The Tejas assured St. Denis that they would suffer
no more attacks from the Apaches, and all but four returned
to East Texas. True to their prediction, St. Denis reached
San Juan Bautista without incident in July 1714.4
At the Spanish presidio, St. Denis was arrested. He
spent almost two years explaining his presence to various
Spanish officials ending with the viceroy himself. He
eventually managed to convince the Spanish that he could be
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useful to them, and they employed him as commissary officer
on the entrada to reestablish a Spanish presence among the
Tejas. The expedition, under the leadership of Domingo
Ramón, departed San Juan Bautista in April 1716 and arrived
safely among the Tejas two months later.5
St. Denis acted as interpreter and helped smooth
relations between Spanish and Tejas. The Frenchman soon
departed for Louisiana to take care of personal business,
leaving Ramón to supervise the building of the missions. By
the end of 1716, St. Denis was back in East Texas having
gathered merchandise for a second trip to the Río Grande.6
St. Denis and Ramón left East Texas in early 1717 with
a caravan and an escort of soldiers. Shortly after crossing
the Colorado River, the party was assaulted by sixty to
seventy mounted Apaches. The soldiers managed to drive off
the attackers, but not before they made off with fifteen
loaded mules, twenty-seven other animals, and a female
mulatto driver who had been bringing up the rear.7
It is obvious that Apaches constantly raided the trade
routes between East Texas and the Río Grande. St. Denis, a
contemporary expert on Indian relations, commented on the
belligerency of the Apaches once he reached San Juan
Bautista. Most Texas Indians, he remarked, could be pacified
by a person knowledgeable of their language and conversant
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with them. The Apaches, however, were a different case. It
would be more costly to reduce them.8
While St. Denis was assisting the Spanish in their
reoccupation of East Texas, Father Antonio de San
Buenaventura y Olivares worked feverishly in an attempt to
gain permission to establish a mission on the San Antonio
River. Because the proposed site bordered on Apachería,
Olivares requested ten soldiers to accompany the mission. A
council in Mexico agreed with the friar's recommendations
and Martín de Alarcón was appointed governor of Texas and
given the responsibility of establishing the mission.9
Alarcón began gathering troops and supplies for the San
Antonio venture, but it would be 1718 before he was ready to
depart. In April he set out from San Juan Bautista with
seventy-two persons, seven droves of pack mules, and large
herds of cattle, goats, and horses. A few weeks later, the
party arrived at their destination and founded a mission, a
presidio, and a villa over the next several weeks.10 San
Antonio would quickly become the focal point of Spanish-
Apache relations in Texas.
Alarcón's instructions ordered him to be wary of the
Apaches and organize local Indians in a defensive alliance
against them.11 Although mindful of the hostility of certain
Apaches, namely the Faraones, the Spanish were also aware
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that other Apaches could be dealt with peacably--for
example, the Jicarilla and Cuartelejo Apaches in New Mexico.
In attempting to address the Apaches on the northern
frontier, Viceroy Baltisar de Zúñiga y Guzmán, Marqués de
Valero, noted that they were a numerous and warlike tribe
with a territory that stretched from the headwaters of the
Missouri and Red Rivers to the north, to the mountains of
New Mexico on the west, and to the frontier of Gran Quivira
to the east. An alliance with them would create a defense
cordon along the northern outposts of New Spain.12
Juan Oliván de Rebolledo, a member of the Junat General
in Mexico City, suggested that friendly Apaches in New
Mexico be told of Spanish settlements at San Antonio and
along the Río Grande, lest they confuse them for French
outposts. He further suggested that Apaches be informed of a
simple way to distinguish between the Spanish and French. 
The former carried rosaries; the latter did not. He further
recommended giving the peaceful Apaches rosaries to wear so
that the Spanish might identify them as allies.13
At least in the early stages, therefore, the Spanish in
Texas hoped to convert the Apaches into allies. This failed,
perhaps because the Spanish had befriended the Tejas who
were enemies of the Apaches, or perhaps because the Apaches
confused the Spanish in Texas for Frenchmen who had been
arming their enemies to the east. In any event, Apaches in
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Texas never developed the cordial relations with Spaniards
that their more northerly kinsmen achieved in New Mexico.
Meanwhile, the French continued their activities to the
east. St. Denis had been arrested yet again upon his arrival
at San Juan Bautista, and transported to Mexico City. He
eventually managed to escape from the capital and returned
to Louisiana in 1719.14 Having failed to establish a
profitable trade with the Spanish along the Río Grande, the
French turned their attention toward New Mexico. As noted in
the previous chapter, Benard de La Harpe encountered
Apaches, probably Lipans along the Red River. These natives
are no doubt the same ones who raided the area around San
Antonio.
La Harpe's explorations combined with the seizure of
Los Adaes by a small French force in 1719, caused the
Spanish to reinforce the garrison at San Antonio with
eighty-four soldiers. Alarcón was replaced as governor by
the Marqués de San Miguel de Aguayo, who began making
preparations for a vigorous campaign through Texas and into
Louisiana. France and Spain negotiated a truce, however,
even before the new governor crossed the Río Grande.
Aguayo's planned campaign of conquest rapidly changed to one
of reoccupation and fortification. The expedition resulted
in the establishment of a presidio at Matagorda Bay, the
site of La Salle's colony, and the reoccupation of the East
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Texas missions. Additionally two presidios were constructed
in East Texas to strengthen Spanish presence there.15
When Aguayo returned to San Antonio, he realized how
exposed that settlement was to Apache raids. Although he
himself had not encountered Apaches, San Antonio had
suffered depredations. Prior to Aguayo's arrival in San
Antonio en route to East Texas, Apaches had attacked supply
trains traveling from Coahuila to San Antonio. In fact, one
train had been attacked just two days before he reached
Béxar. The Apaches signaled their hostile intent by tying
red cloth onto arrows stuck in the ground near San Antonio.
Armed with this information, Aguayo drafted plans and
ordered the construction of a new fortress with four
bastions, proportioned for a garrison of fifty-four men. He
also sent several detachments of soldiers to patrol the
vicinity of the presidio and missions in an effort to
capture some Apaches and convince them through kind
treatment that the Spanish wanted peace.16
Shortly after Aguayo returned to Coahuila in 1722,
Nicolás Flores was given command of the presidio at San
Antonio. For more than a year after Flores assumed command,
no horses were stolen from Béxar. Missionaries used this
time by attempting to Christianize the Apaches. Their work
was unsuccessful, however, and in 1723 the Apaches raided
the presidio's horse herd and carried off eighty animals.
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Flores immediately set out in pursuit, but after twelve
hours returned to San Antonio to organize a concerted
campaign against the thieves.17
Two days after the theft, Flores departed San Antonio
at the head of thirty soldiers and thirty mission Indians.
After traveling a distance of 130 leagues, the Spaniards
encountered a ranchería of two hundred Apaches. The Apaches
rode out to meet the Spaniards, and a six-hour battle
ensued. Thirty-four Apaches, including their chief were
killed, twenty women and children were captured, and 120
horses and mules were recovered. A quantity of saddles,
bridles, knives, spears, and other items stolen from the
Spanish was also recovered. The triumphant Spaniards then
marched back to San Antonio with their captives.18 
Flores's victory was soon tainted by controversy that
surrounded the entrada. Fray Joseph González, a friar at
Mission Valero, claimed that Flores had attacked an innocent
band of Apaches. Indians from the mission had been supplied
as allies in an effort to bring in Apaches for conversion.
Instead, Flores's victims were potential neophytes who had
been killed or captured while trying to escape. This
conflict between the military and the missionaries was a
problem that would hamper Spaniard's relations with Apaches
in Texas for many years.19
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Regardless of his motives for the attack, Flores used
the opportunity to interrogate the captives. From them he
learned that five Apache captains had been involved in the
raid. Each had sent a dozen of his men to raid the horse
herd. They then brought the plunder back to the main Apache
camp where it was distributed before the camp broke up. The
captives claimed that they planted corn and beans near where
the Spaniards lived and that they were all subjects of a
"great captain."  Without his permission, no one could do
anything. When asked about their hostility toward the
Spanish at San Antonio, one informant replied that the
Apaches stole horses and other items in order to trade with
"other Spaniards" to the north.20
The Spanish immediately assumed that the "other
Spaniards" were the dreaded French, then making inroads
across the northern plains. But in fact, the "other
Spaniards" were the Spanish in New Mexico. Flores traveled
for more than three hundred miles before he reached the
Apache ranchería. Because he took an indirect route, he was
probably slightly more than two hundred miles from San
Antonio. It is apparent, therefore, that their home was
still further to the north. The fact that they lived near
the Spaniards and planted crops suggested that they were
Apaches known as Jicarillas or Faraones to the New Mexicans.
As noted earlier, Faraones often brought slaves captured
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from Coahuila to trade at Pecos. San Antonio would have been
an even closer source of plunder.
The captives also informed Flores that the Apaches were
interested in negotiating a peace with the Spanish. The
captain, not willing to miss the opportunity, agreed to send
a forty-year-old female captive, one of the main informants,
as an ambassador to her people. Flores promised that if the
chiefs would come in and make peace, he would release the
captives. He then freed the woman, giving her a horse and
loading her with gifts.
The woman returned three weeks later with a chief, his
wife, and three other Apaches. According to Flores, he rode
out to meet the natives and the chief handed him a gold-
tipped baton, saying "Dios! Dios!"  The chief informed the
Spaniards that when the woman had arrived at his camp with
word that the Spanish desired peace, couriers had been sent
out to the other chiefs. The Indian leaders met and decided
that he should go and see if the woman had told the truth
and to discern the veracity of the peace offering. If he
deemed that it was acceptable, he was to return and inform
the other chiefs so that they might all travel to San
Antonio to make peace. After three days of dining,
entertaining, and discussion, the Apaches departed,
promising that the five chiefs would return to make peace.21
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This promising beginning, however, had little direct
result, and further inspection indicates that Flores might
have overstated his case. Other sources state that a lack of
interpreter limited the exchange of information. The Apache
chief's possession of a baton, as well as his religious
greeting, suggests that he had had previous contact with
Spaniards. Father González also examined the visitors and no
doubt gave them conflicting promises.
In any case, shortly after the visitors departed,
rumors began to flow through San Antonio concerning the
motives of the Apaches. According to these reports,
Flores's campaign had so aroused the Apache that they were
gathering a massive force to attack the Spanish. When they
received Flores's peace offering, they decided to wait until
their people could be rescued before attacking. The promise
of peace had been nothing more than a ruse to acquire the
release of the captives.22
It was two months before the Apaches returned. A party
of thirty arrived in San Antonio in late December 1723, and
it was welcomed by Father González. The friar invited them
into the mission and proposed returning the captives to them
as a show of good faith. But Flores, perhaps wary of the
rumors that had been floating around the settlement, refused
to turn them over until all five chiefs came in and made
peace. This disagreement embroiled the commander and the
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priest in an argument. In the midst of this, the Apaches,
apparently uncomfortable, departed, leaving behind a young
girl as an additional hostage. Before they rode off, they
promised that when the weather warmed, four of the five
chiefs would return to make peace, but that the fifth chief
had no interest in befriending the Spaniards.23
The controversy between seculars and clergy eventually
cost Flores his position. He was removed at the urging of
Father González but returned a year later. During his
absence, the missionary suggested that he personally lead an
expedition of seventy men into Apachería. Through kind
treatment and the return of their families, González argued,
peace could be achieved. He apparently never got a chance to
test his theory. Within a year, Flores had vindicated
himself and was reappointed to San Antonio. Father González
was then recalled to the college at Querétaro. Ironically,
he was killed by Indians near the Río Grande in 1728.24
Despite González's apparent defeat in his feud with
Flores, the missionary's peaceful viewpoint won over the
viceroy. Although the Apaches had not been pacified in the
vicinity of San Antonio and continued to cause depredations
throughout 1724 and 1725, the viceroy urged Governor
Fernando Pérez de Almazán to secure an alliance with the
Apaches through gentle persuasion. The viceroy, encouraged
by the peaceful alliance of Apaches with New Mexico, saw no
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reason that a similar alliance could not be constructed in
Texas. The Marqués de Aguayo, then regarded as the resident
expert on Texas, agreed that peace overtures should take
precedence over punitive expeditions. In the end, the
viceroy forbade any campaign against the Apaches unless duly
authorized by him.25
The policy appeared to be justified when Apache
hostility in the San Antonio area virtually disappeared over
the next five years.26 No doubt the Apaches were drawn
northward to meet the increasing threat of the Comanche
invasion. Around 1724, the Comanches and Apaches reportedly
fought a nine-day battle at El Gran Cierra del Fierro,
somewhere in northwest Texas, possibly near the Wichita
River. This battle was the beginning of the decline for the
Apaches on the plains. Accordingly, Apaches near San Antonio
were no doubt distracted from their usual raids on Spanish
settlements by vicious Comanche attacks on their northern
kin, the Jicarillas and Cuartelejos. It is well to remember
that Apaches north of New Mexico were seeking aid from each
other, as well as the Spanish, to meet this onslaught, and
they no doubt sought aid from Texas Apaches as well. 
While Apache activity lessened down near San Antonio,
the Indians nonetheless continued to harass San Juan
Bautista. In 1728 a band of Apaches stole the entire horse
herd from Mission San Juan Bautista.27 These Apaches were
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probably the Faraones living on the southern Río Grande, who
had not yet felt the pressure of the Comanche incursions,
and were too far south to provide aid to their kinsmen.
During this interim of Apache quiescence, Pedro de
Rivera arrived in Texas to conduct his inspection. His
recommendations included reducing the San Antonio garrison
from fifty-three to forty-three soldiers. The resulting
Regulation of 1729, based largely on Rivera's
recommendations, forbade governors or commanders from waging
war on or disturbing peaceful or indifferent tribes. These
officials could launch forays to pursue enemy Indians, but
could not fight against "any nation of gentile Indians who
had been friendly, even though they may give cause for it." 
Finally, the Spaniards were instructed to grant peace to any
Indians who asked for it and to treat them with kindness--
all with an eye toward influencing others to follow suit.28
When enacted, Rivera's recommendations caused enormous
problems along the frontier, and they illustrate a major
problem in Spanish-Apache relations. Because of the Apache
band structure, one might seek peace while others continued
raiding. The Spanish, who rarely made distinctions between
independent bands would assume that the Apaches as a whole
had broken the peace and retaliate. If that action was
against a peaceful band, its members would assume that the
Spaniards' promises of peace were worthless and declare war.
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On the other hand, when an Apache band negotiated peace
with the Spanish, they believed that settlement, such as
with spaniards at San Antonio pertained only pertained to
that location. In other words, if Apaches agreed to peace
with the Spanish at any location, they did not perceive that
that accord applied to the Spanish settlements elsewhere.
Apaches saw Spanish settlements as independent "bands," much
in the manner that their system was organized. Thus, when
the Apaches raided other locations, they did not feel they
had broken their agreement. The Spanish, of course, saw
matters differently. 
Rivera's sweeping recommendations resulted in a flurry
of protests from missionaries and settlers along the
frontier of Apachería. They feared that once the Apaches
learned of the weakened condition of the presidio at Béxar,
they would begin raiding again. And Spaniards had good
reason to fear the renewal of Apache raids. Between 1718 and
1731, twenty-two percent of all recorded deaths of Spaniards
were attributable to Apaches.29 These fears were once
again realized with increased Apache activity starting in
1731. With the removal of three East Texas missions to San
Antonio, traffic in supplies between the Río Grande and
Béxar increased. Apaches took advantage of lightly guarded
travelers, attacking them, and often driving off their
horses and personal baggage. As a result of these attacks,
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Rivera, who had become private counselor to the viceroy in
all matters concerning the frontier outposts, advised that
all missionaries and other travelers be escorted by eight
soldiers and a corporal from the presidios of San Antonio de
Béxar or San Juan Bautista. He also recommended that the
captain of Béxar be given permission to punish Apaches who
continuously harassed the settlements.30
Renewed Apache raids in 1731 climaxed with an attack on
the presidio horse herd. In September a party of Apaches
stole sixty horses. Governor Pérez de Almazán, then captain
of the presidio, sent out five soldiers in immediate pursuit
while he organized a larger party to follow. At a league's
distance from the presidio, the advance party encountered
forty warriors and engaged them. Almazán's relief party
arrived in time to rescue the beleaguered men, but the
Spaniards, numbering twenty-five men, soon found themselves
surrounded by five hundred well-armed and mounted Apaches.
For two hours the Spaniards defended themselves, suffering
two men killed and thirteen wounded. With most of their
horses disabled, the Europeans gathered around a tree and
set up a hastily organized defensive position. Just as it
appeared that the detachment would be overwhelmed by sheer
numbers, the Apaches broke off the attack and departed. The
governor was totally amazed that the Spaniards had survived
the encounter.31
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In fact, however, the Apache retreat was typical of
their warfare patterns. To Apaches, their lives were
precious. The cost of killing the Spaniards in their
defensive perimeter would have been more costly than any
gain the Indians might achieve. The natives had already
acquired as much plunder as they were likely to get, and
further delay might have allowed reinforcements from the
presidio to arrive resulting in the loss of captured
animals. Additionally, Apaches rarely fought to exterminate
their enemy, because their main goal in warfare was plunder.
Exterminating the enemy, or crippling them to the point
where they were less productive or might even be convinced
to abandon San Antonio, would be counter to the Apaches'
best interest. These Indians, whether the Spanish realized
it or not, needed the presence of Europeans at San Antonio
in order to have access to horses, weapons, and, in times of
peace, trade items.
An investigation following the battle revealed that
three distinct tribes had participated in the attack:
Apaches, Pelones, and Jumanes. The Jumanes were the same
natives previously known as Jumanos. They at one time
challenged the Apaches for control of the plains but had
been split by Apache incursions. Those Jumanos who had
traveled to the north became allies with the Caddoan tribes
and remained enemies of the Apaches. The Jumanos who were
228
driven south, found no help from the Spaniards and no
friendly tribes as allies. Given their endangered situation,
they eventually befriended the Apaches. This new
relationship with their old competitors eventually caused
the Spaniards to identify them as Jumano Apaches.
As for the "Pelones" which in Spanish means "bald" or
"hairless one," this appears to have been a generic term
used in several instances to identify a number of tribes. In
all probability, the Pelones who raided San Antonio in
conjunction with the Apaches and Jumanes were later known as
Lipans. They lived at this time in the area between San Juan
Bautista and San Antonio, and their territory extended fifty
leagues upriver from the former.32
Joseph de Urrutia, who had lived in Texas since the
1690s, was amazed that the three tribes were fighting
together. He had known the Jumanos and Pelones as enemies of
the Apaches.33 The fact that the tribes were now fighting as
a united force illustrates an important part of Apache
culture and strategy. Again, these Indians rarely fought to
exterminate enemies, rather they fought to subjugate them.
Once an enemy tribe had been sufficiently weakened, Apaches
often welcomed them as allies, eventually absorbing them
into the greater Apache culture. This adaptability is one of
the major reasons that the Apaches survived as long as they
did, despite the fact that many powerful enemies, such as
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Spaniards, Comanches, and Caddoan groups tried their best to
exterminate them.
The September raid and battle convinced even the
tendentious Rivera to alter his approach to Indian relations
in Texas and admit that it was time to launch a full-scale
campaign against the troublesome Apaches. With typical
parsimony, however, he believed that one hundred and fifty
soldiers, raised from San Antonio, Los Adaes, La Bahía, and
San Juan Bautista, would be enough to assure victory. He
also recommended that Presidio La Bahía be relocated to the
Medina River, just south of San Antonio, which had been the
site of numerous Apache depredations. In January 1732 the
viceroy approved Rivera's suggestions with the exception of
relocating La Bahía.34
Although Captain Almazán received orders to prepare a
campaign, the new governor, Juan Antonio Bustillo y
Ceballos, assumed command. Because of a heated debate that
emerged from the power struggle between the two men, the
expedition did not depart until October 1732. Bustillo
eventually departed San Antonio with 157 Spaniards, 60
Indian allies, 140 pack animals, and a herd of 900 horses
and mules. He hoped to be reinforced by a party of Tejas but
none was forthcoming.35
After a week of waiting for Tejas reinforcements, which
never arrived, Bustillo departed for Apachería. Progress was
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cautious in order that the Apaches not become aware of the
army's presence. After six weeks of travel the expedition
was only seventy leagues from San Antonio in the vicinity of
the San Saba River. There, Bustillo's spies reported the
presence of a large number of Apaches in their rancherías.
The governor led a contingent of one hundred men to attack
the enemy's camp that consisted of four distinct rancherías,
with four hundred tents spread out over half a league. He
estimated that the encampment contained more than seven
hundred warriors.
After contact, fighting broke out almost immediately.
For five hours the struggle continued, the Apaches drawing
fire from the Spaniards, then closing to hand-to-hand combat
before the soldiers could reload. The natives fought bravely
until a prominent chief fell in battle, causing a disruption
within their ranks. The chief had in his possession a
silver-headed baton, indicating that he had at one time been
at peace with the Spaniards, most likely those in New
Mexico. Shortly afterwards, the Apaches withdrew. Bustillo
estimated that two hundred Apaches had been killed, but
because the natives recovered their killed and wounded
comrades from the battlefield, it was impossible to make an
accurate determination. Only thirty women and children were
taken prisoner, but seven hundred horses were recovered and
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one hundred mule-loads of pelts and other plunder were
acquired.
Despite his victory, Bustillo worried about an Apache
counterattack and resolved to retire to the main camp. As he
suspected, Apaches harassed the Spaniards' retreat,
shadowing them all the way back to San Antonio, and stealing
horses whenever the opportunity arose. Upon his arrival at
Béxar, Bustillo was informed that during his absence other
Apache raiders had stolen stock from the settlements.36
It had been determined during Bustillo's campaign that
four tribes had been involved in the battle:  Apaches,
Ypandis (usually identified as Lipans), Ysandis, and
Chentis. The latter two tribes were apparently recent allies
of the Apaches and had just made contact with San Antonio.
After releasing his troops, Bustillo faced a swarm of
petitions requesting that he use the captives as leverage to
assure peace with the Apaches. Citizens and missionaries
alike urged the governor to send one or two of the captive
females as ambassadors to their tribes. This failing, they
suggested that a second, larger campaign be made against the
natives to force their submission. Bustillo accepted the
suggestion, and in January 1733 released a man and a woman,
escorting them as far as the Guadalupe River.37
Father Gabriel de Vergara, president of the missions of
San Antonio, wrote the viceroy in January 1733 requesting
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that missions be established for the Apaches. Having talked
with the prisoners taken by Bustillo, Fray Vergara was
convinced of the good nature and truthfulness of the
natives. He reported that if the Apaches could be converted
they would create a most prosperous mission. They were a
numerous people, he recorded, and their submission would
bring a vast amount of territory under Spanish control.38
During this time, one of the female ambassadors
returned to San Antonio, accompanied by three warriors who
came to check out the woman's statements. They informed
Bustillo that their head chief was assembling Apaches to
discuss peace with the Spaniards. They also informed the
Spaniard that there were thirty-seven bands of Apaches along
the road to New Mexico. Bustillo detained the native
entourage for three days, feasting and regaling them,
perhaps to reinforce in their minds the Spanish desire for
peace. When the natives departed, they promised that four
chiefs with many of their people would return before two
moons had passed.39
The promised delegation never arrived, but small groups
of Apaches trickled into San Antonio to trade and barter.
Their peaceful demeanor encouraged the belief that peace had
been negotiated. Unfortunately, in less than two months the
prospects for peace were shattered. Three warriors and a
woman entered the presidio to trade. Upon accomplishing
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their task they were escorted out of the settlement as was
the usual custom. Two of the soldiers accompanied the
natives to a hill situated about a league and a half from
the settlement. There, two dozen Apaches approached the
smaller party who awaited without fear because of the
assumed peace. The lieutenant of the presidio witnessed the
incident and reported that the approaching natives advanced
with hostile intent in two wings. The two escorts discerned
their malice, but it was too late. The two soldiers fell
from their horses and their bodies were surrounded by the
Indians. When Spaniards recovered the bodies, they had been
horribly mutilated and flayed.40
This incident, which is told from the Spaniards' point
of view and appears on the surface to be a clear act of
unprovoked violence, set of a wave of fear and dismay
throughout San Antonio. To the Spaniards, it was a clear
indication that the Apaches' promises of peace could not be
believed. On the other hand, it is appropriate to consider
the incident, as best we can, from the Apaches' point of
view. First, it should be recalled that at this point the
Apaches had not officially agreed to peace with the
Spaniards. There is no mention of the Apache chiefs having
come to the town to formalize an agreement. Therefore, to
the Apache mind, there was no guarantee of peace. 
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Apaches would generally not kill even a potential enemy
who visited their camp. Once outside the encampment,
however, all bets were off. In this case, the Apaches
probably felt safe while trading, but might not have felt
secure once away from the Spanish settlement. A war party to
meet them a couple of leagues from the settlements could
easily have been prearranged.
Additionally, the "perceived" hostile intent of the two
dozen approaching natives can be questioned. Plains Apaches,
as well as other plains natives often greeted allies with
sham charges that broke off at the last moment. Could this
incident have been a mock charge, misinterpreted by the
Spaniards?  If so, the two Spanish escorts might have drawn
their weapons or even fired at the charging natives,
resulting in their immediate and violent murder by the
Apaches. To the Apaches, the Spaniards appeared to have
treacherously broken the existing peace. To the Spanish
witness, the Apaches seemed to have killed the escorts in
cold blood. Unfortunately, since the Apaches did not keep
written records, their side of the incident will never be
known, but it is important to remember that the information
available on this and almost all confrontations involving
Europeans and natives is told from the European point of
view.
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Whether the incident was a purposeful murder of two
Spanish soldiers or a misunderstanding between to vastly
different cultures, it resulted in several more years of
fighting and distrust. It also caused a flurry of letters to
be rushed to the viceroy requesting reinforcements. Even
Father Vergara stressed the threat of the Apaches and
supported reinforcements. In response to the letters, José
Urrutia was appointed captain of the presidio in July
1733.41
Urrutia himself almost immediately requested
reinforcements. The garrison of forty-three soldiers at San
Antonio was insufficient for the task at hand. Twenty-five
soldiers should be reassigned from La Bahía, or if this was
not feasible he suggested that fifteen soldiers be
reassigned from La Bahía and ten be taken form Los Adaes.
With the additional troops, combined with native allies,
Urrutia felt confident that he could force the Apaches to
submit.42
Many of the depredations committed by the Apaches over
the next several years seem to have been the work of a band
led by a chief the Spanish called Cabellos Colorados, or Red
Hair.43 The rebellious Apache chieftain led a trading party
to San Antonio in 1734. Upon departing, the Apaches
encountered two settlers out looking for lost cattle, tied
them up and carried them off. A company of soldiers pursued
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the natives but were unable to overtake them. The Spanish
prisoners were carried to Apachería and eventually killed.44
Cabellos Colorados discontinued his visits to San
Antonio shortly after the incident, apparently to avoid
punishment at the hands of the Spaniards. He instead shifted
his attention southward to harass settlements along the Río
Grande. In December 1735, seventy Apaches attacked the
mission Indians of Dulce Nombre de Jesús de Peyotes, eight
leagues from San Juan Bautista. In the following year,
Apaches attacked pack animals traveling from San Antonio to
the Río Grande but were unable to overcome the ten-man
escort. For a year following the above incident, the Apaches
discontinued their visits to San Antonio and concentrated on
stealing horses and killing Spaniards as well as mission
Indians who wandered too far from the settlement's
protection. A raid on the mission of San Francisco de la
Espada netted the Apaches forty horses. Pursuing soldiers
discovered a single worn-out horse that had been left behind
by the attackers and recognized it as a mount that had been
purchased earlier from the Alférez  Juan Galván by Cabellos
Colorados. Thus, the old antagonist was implicated in the
raid.45
Apache raids continued, culminating in an attack on the
presidio horse herd, in which the natives drove off fifty-
eight animals. A few days after the raid, the wife of
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Cabellos Colorados with three other women and a warrior
brought buffalo meat to trade for tobacco. Captain Urrutia
received them cordially, gave them presents, but warned them
that the Spanish would only remain friendly if the Apaches
stopped their raids. The Apaches departed peacefully, but
two months later they raided the presidio's horse herd yet
again, stampeding the animals at night and then rounding up
as many as possible in the ensuing confusion. Almost three
hundred horses were captured in this raid. As a result, the
Spanish moved the horse herd closer to the presidio for
better protection and to allow quicker response to Apache
raiders.46
These serious attacks on Béxar were the final straw for
the Spaniards. Ten days after the last raid, the Spanish
captured an Apache among the horses. He informed his captors
that Cabellos Colorados and a fifteen of his people were on
their way to the presidio to discover the location of the
horse herd while feigning interest in securing peace with
the Spaniards. Governor Prudencio de Orobio y Basterra
immediately dispatched lieutenant Juan Galván with twenty-
eight soldiers to capture and confine the rogue chief and
his band. Eight leagues from the presidio, the soldiers
arrested the Apaches, bound them together, and brought them
to the presidio. Basterra informed the captives that they
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were guilty of breaking the peace with the Spaniards and
therefore were to be imprisoned.47 
Cabellos Colorados convinced the governor to release
one of the female captives so that the head chief of the
Apaches might be informed of their incarceration and return
the horses stolen in the last raid thereby securing the
prisoners' release. Basterra agreed and set the woman free.
For the next nine months, the Apache woman and several other
Apache visitors tried to secure the release of the captives.
They brought in a few horses at a time, claiming difficulty
in gathering the entire stolen herd, and promised to return
the rest of the stolen animals if the Spanish would release
their prisoners. Basterra refused to budge until the Apaches
proved their good faith by returning all the stolen
animals.48
At one point the Apaches brought a large number of
horses within sight of the presidio, enticing the Spaniards
to recover them. Urrutia, suspicious of the Apaches'
motives, sent spies to investigate. The spies reported the
presence of a thousand well-armed Apaches in the vicinity,
positioned to ambush any soldiers who ventured to recover
the herd. Urrutia refused to take the bait, and the Apaches
departed peacefully. For the ten months that Cabellos
Colorados remained a captive, the Apaches committed no
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depredations near San Antonio. Accordingly, Spaniards
interpreted this lull as proof of the chief's guilt.49
Whether Cabellos Colorados was responsible for the
attacks on San Antonio or the Apaches called off their
attacks in hopes of securing his release, the peace was
shattered in October 1738 when the Apaches resumed their
raids. Upon hearing of the renewed hostilities, Basterra
ordered that Cabellos Colorados and the other captives,
including the chief's two-year-old daughter, be shipped to
Mexico City, where they disappear from Spanish records.50
The renewed hostilities must have been more intense
than earlier Apache attacks, because whereas five years
earlier Urrutia had asked for twenty-five additional
soldiers to quell Apache hostility, he now requested fifty
soldiers from surrounding presidios and urged that citizens
of Coahuila and Nuevo León be encouraged to enlist. This, he
stated, would give him access to two hundred Spaniards and,
combined with allies from the Tejas nation with whom he had
considerable sway, would allow him to defeat the Apache
hordes. Urrutia intended to pay for the campaign through the
sale of captives, and to encourage enlistments, announced
that all participants would share in the plunder.51
Urrutia set out in late 1739 and encountered the
Apaches in the San Saba River region. He captured a large
number of captives and claimed to have discovered the pass
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through the mountains to the northwest that the Lipans used
to reach San Antonio. Despite the apparent success of his
campaign, Apache raids did not diminish. Urrutia then
requested an increase of ten soldiers for the garrison and
suggested that a presidio constructed on the upper Guadalupe
would guard against Apache incursions.52
The failure of Urrutia's expedition to halt Apache
attacks caused the missionaries to complain that the
campaign had been nothing more than a thinly disguised slave
raid. When José de Urrutia died in 1740, his son, Toribio de
Urrutia, succeeded him as commander of the presidio. The
younger Urrutia immediately began agitating for another
campaign against the Apaches. However, several former Texas
officials joined the San Antonio missionaries in opposing
his plan. Opponents argued that further campaigns would
simply anger the Apaches and cause more retaliatory raids
and their opposition seems to have been vindicated when
missionaries reported in 1744 that Apache hostility had
decreased significantly.53
In March 1743 Father Benito Fernández de Santa Ana,
president of the San Antonio missions, had urged the viceroy
to take immediate steps to convert the Apaches. Santa Ana
believed that a presidio and mission constructed in the San
Saba region, the heart of Apachería, would free San Antonio
from depredations. He spent a great amount of time
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communicating with Apaches who visited Mission Concepción,
as well as the Apache captives at San Antonio. From them he
learned of the increasing pressure that Comanches were
placing upon them. As a result, Apaches themselves who came
to the missions often asked for missions to be established
for them and sometimes allowed priests to baptize their
children.54 
While officials in Mexico debated which course to
follow in Texas, an expedition was launched against the
Apaches from Coahuila. The governor there led a force of two
hundred men in 1743. But Apaches ambushed the Spaniards,
gravely wounding the governor, killing more than half of his
men, and capturing almost all of their horses and
equipment.55 Perhaps this disaster convinced Spanish
officials to order retribution from San Antonio.
In 1745 Urrutia finally received permission to campaign
against the Apaches. Fray Santa Ana accompanied the
expedition, along with fifty Spaniards and native allies.
Eighty leagues from San Antonio, north of the Colorado
River, Urrutia's army encountered a widely scattered
ranchería of Lipan and Natagé Apaches. Many of the natives
were absent from the ranchería at the time, which allowed
Urrutia to round up a significant number of captives and
return to San Antonio. Santa Ana once again complained about
the manner in which the campaign was carried out.56
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The Apache response was immediate. Four of their women
arrived in San Antonio to announce that since the Spaniards
obviously did not want peace, war would be declared. For the
next several weeks, Apaches harassed the settlement,
avoiding only Mission Concepción, which was under the charge
of Fray Santa Ana who had always treated the Apaches kindly.
The Apache attack climaxed in June 1745 with an organized
assault on the presidio itself. Three hundred and fifty
Lipans and Natagés made a concerted attack on the garrison
with plans to burn it. A boy discovered the marauders,
raised the alarm, and roused the citizens to its defense.
The Apaches were slowed but continued progress toward their
goal. Fortunately for the Spanish, one hundred mission
Indians arrived and counterattacked, eventually driving off
the Apaches.57
Strangely enough, out of the battle emerged an
opportunity for peace. During the confusion, an Apache held
at Mission Concepción escaped to his people. The native
informed a Lipan chief that the prisoners had been kindly
treated and that the Spaniards truly desired peace. One of
the natives held at the mission was the chief's daughter.
Upon hearing the news, the Lipan chief ordered his followers
to cease hostilities. The Natagé chief vehemently opposed
the order but was finally convinced to call off his people
as well. After two months of peace, an Apache woman bearing
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a cross and a boy arrived in San Antonio bearing gifts for
Urrutia and an announcement that the Apaches wanted peace.58 
Nevertheless, while the Apaches were negotiating peace
with the Spanish at San Antonio, they continued their raids
elsewhere. It should have become clear to the Spanish that
the Apache nation consisted of several bands with different
goals and motives as reflected in the division between the
Natagés and Lipan leadership. But, even as the Spanish began
recording additional names for different bands, they still
attempted to negotiate with the Apaches as a whole. The Río
Grande valley suffered numerous raids from San Juan Bautista
to the Junta de los Ríos. In response, campaigns against the
Apaches were made from San Juan Bautista in 1747, 1748, and
1750. In one campaign, ninety-five captives were taken.59
Further south, however, some Apaches were active allies
of the Spanish. By 1746, over four hundred Apache warriors
normally camped seventy-five miles from the presidio of San
Francisco de los Conchos. Captain José de Berroterán, a
capable frontiersman with thirty-five years of experience,
had befriended them, giving gifts paid for out of his
pockets. In 1741 the Apaches had assisted Berroterán against
hostile natives in the vicinity of Parras and Saltillo.60
In short, despite the friendliness of certain Apaches,
others continued to raid and pillage frontier settlements.
Berroterán recognized that "thousands of Apaches" from north
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of the Big Bend area had easy access to the settlements in
Coahuila and Nueva Vizcaya. The lack of suitable
fortifications on the Río Grande between El Paso and San
Juan Bautista left the Apaches free access to much of the
terrain of northern Mexico.61
Fermín de Vidaurri was dispatched to reconnoiter the
area for potential locations of future presidios. Vidaurri
encountered an Apache ranchería of 250 natives east of the
Big Bend. The natives were led by an eighty-year-old chief
named El Ligero. In a cordial meeting the Spanish
distributed gifts of flour, meat, and tobacco, and El Ligero
supplied two Apache guides to conduct the Spanish to La
Junta de los Ríos. The elderly chief stated that his people
often traded there. Vidaurri also learned that El Ligero's
Apaches were at war with the Natagés.62
As Vidaurri's party approached La Junta, they
encountered another elderly Apache chief named Pascual.
Pascual and his family had been baptized, and he possessed a
baton to indicate his authority. He was on friendly terms
with Berroterán and claimed to control five rancherías of
thirty families.63
As Apaches to the southwest of San Antonio were either
allying themselves with the Spaniards or fighting against
them, Apaches to the northeast also created a quandary.
Since Father Santa Ana had been requesting a mission and
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presidio for the Apaches, other missionaries began working
toward the establishment of a mission for a number of native
groups to the northeast of San Antonio. Because of a
perceived trustworthiness of the Apaches, the northeastern
tribes won out. In 1746 construction began on the San Xavier
mission on the San Gabriel mission. Unfortunately, its
locations was just below a pass through which the Apaches
frequently passed on their trips to the buffalo on the
prairies, and the natives gathered there were traditional
enemies of the Apaches.64
The Spanish had hopes that the location would help
guard against Apache activity in the area and prevent the
natives from communicating with the French. Trouble started
almost immediately. Temporary buildings were established in
1746, but orders from Mexico to establish a garrison there
were delayed for two months on the Río Grande because of
Apache hostility. When the orders eventually arrived in San
Antonio, Urrutia delayed the detachment further because of
increased Apache hostility in the Béxar vicinity. There were
also rumors that a large number of Apaches had encamped near
the San Xavier mission site.65
In the spring of 1747, a dozen prospective neophytes
arrived in San Antonio, apparently to protest the delay of
the mission's establishment. Fray Mariano Francisco de los
Dolores y Viana, the leading proponent of the venture, sent
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some Indians from Mission San Antonio de Valero along with a
Spaniard to begin planting crops as a diversion. Upon their
arrival at San Xavier, a number of potential converts
gathered and set to work planting crops. In the midst of
their labor, however, Apaches attacked and disrupted the
effort. One of the tribes departed in fear, claiming that
the Spanish had betrayed them. Their leader promised to
return if the Spanish could prove their good intentions.66
The formal founding of mission San Francisco Xavier
occurred in early 1748. Within a few months, however, sixty
Apaches descended on the mission, ransacked the buildings,
and attempted to stampede the horse herd. Mission
inhabitants managed to drive off the attackers but the
Apaches shouted promises to return soon with a larger force
to destroy the mission. The Apaches did indeed return
shortly and ran off the mission's horse herd. A total of
four raids were made on the mission in 1748, each resulting
in the loss of horses and a total loss of life at the
mission of three soldiers and four native converts.67
In early 1749, the Spanish decided to try a new tactic
against the Apaches. Father Santa Ana had long contended
that bloody campaigns against the Apaches increased the
ferocity of their raids. Instead, campaigns should
concentrate on taking captives, not for sale as slaves as
had been previously done, but to be held as hostages and
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treated humanely to convince the natives that the Spaniards
truly desired peace. With this new concept in force, Urrutia
set out in February to punish the Apaches. With two hundred
men, mostly converted natives, Urrutia attacked a small
ranchería, taking eight women and children captives.68
Upon his return, Urrutia discovered that Apaches had
stolen cattle from Mission Concepción. He gathered three
hundred men to pursue the raiders. On the Guadalupe River,
twenty leagues from San Antonio, the army encountered a
ranchería of four hundred Apaches. Most of the natives were
absent hunting buffalo, and the Spanish quickly overran the
encampment capturing thirty men, ninety women, and forty-
seven children. The captives were transported back to San
Antonio where the men were imprisoned. The women and
children were distributed among citizens and missionaries
with orders to treat them with kindness but not allow them
to escape.69
Urrutia and Santa Ana now cooperated to bring about a
peaceful conclusion to the campaign. Two Apache women and a
warrior were selected to act as ambassadors to their people.
Urrutia informed them that if the Apaches would live
thereafter in peace and friendship with the Spaniards, the
prisoners captured on the Guadalupe would be released, along
with the captives taken in earlier campaigns. The three
delegates departed San Antonio in April. In early August the
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three native returned and informed the Spanish that four of
their chiefs, with one hundred followers each, were encamped
on the Guadalupe, waiting for permission to enter the
settlement to establish peaceful relations.70
On August 16, 1749, the Apaches arrived and were
greeted two leagues from San Antonio by Urrutia, his troops,
the missionaries, and citizens of the settlement. After
extending greetings, the Apaches were treated to a feast in
a specially built structure. Following two days of
celebration, the captives were released, and on the
nineteenth, an elaborate peace ceremony took place. A great
hole was dug and a live horse, a hatchet, a lance, and six
arrows were placed in it. After the participants danced
around the hole in unison, the ceremony was completed when,
at a signal, everyone raced to the hole and buried the horse
and their instruments of war, bringing an official end to
the conflict.71 
Thus, after thirty years of almost constant warfare,
the Apaches and Spaniards concluded a peace lasting more
than fifteen years. The Comanches, who were beginning to
reach further into Texas were a large factor in convincing
Apaches that in order to survive they must seek allies.
Since they needed access to horses and guns, the Spaniards
seemed the most tempting. Only four Apache chiefs negotiated
249
the treaty at San Antonio, but they must have been
influential and have convinced most of their kinsmen to
honor the agreement, at least around San Antonio. The peace
ushered in a new phase of peaceful relations between the
Apaches and Spanish which centered on the mission.
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ALLIES OF THE SPANISH: THE MISSIONARY PERIOD
OF THE PLAINS APACHES, 1733-1768
When the Comanches began their invasion of the plains
in the early eighteenth century, the Apaches who lived there
found themselves in a precarious position. Having made
enemies of most of their neighbors, they had no allies.
Between the turn of the century and the 1740s almost all
plains Apaches groups, with the exception of a few isolated
bands, began seeking peace with the Spaniards. Northern
Apaches were the first, but by the 1740s even the plains
Apaches in Texas and northern Mexico reluctantly looked to
the Spanish for protection. The latter hoped to use the
Apaches as a bulwark against Comanche hostility, but
bureaucratic delays, insistence that the Apaches convert to
Christianity and become "civilized" farmers, along with
other requirements, caused the eventual failure of a lasting
peace.
As mentioned, the northern plains Apaches first sought
an alliance with the Spanish, actively asking for
missionaries and the attendant protection that would
accompany them. However, by 1725 these Apaches had been
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dispersed by the Comanches. The vast region of El
Cuartelejo, which once stretched from Nebraska in the north
to Kansas or possibly Oklahoma in the south, and from
eastern Colorado in the west to central Kansas in the east,
was rather quickly invaded and dominated by Comanches
pouring out of the Rocky Mountains. 
The Apaches living in that region scattered. By 1725
the most northern Apaches groups were abandoning their semi-
permanent rancherías and moving south, or were cut off by
advancing Comanches. These unfortunates were eventually
wiped out or weakened to the point that they lost their
identity and were absorbed by stronger tribes. Only a few of
the remnants might have consolidated and kept their
Athapaskan identity as Kiowa Apaches.1 
The promising beginning with the French quickly fell
apart. Once Bourgmont returned to France, the French in
Louisiana began dismantling his peace with the Padoucas. The
desire for slaves caused them to encourage the Kansas and
Pawnees to resume raids on Apache tribes by 1730. When the
French finally returned to the central plains and made their
way to New Mexico, the Apaches had been almost completely
displaced by the Comanches. Aside from those who fled
southward, some congregated in the vicinity of La Jicarilla
to the north of Taos, others joined together around Pecos
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pueblo, and still others merged with the Lipan and Mescalero
bands in Texas.2
Many of the Apaches who settled in the vicinity of La
Jicarilla, fled into the Sangre de Cristo Mountains for
safety. It will be remembered that the Spanish lost interest
in constructing a presidio at La Jicarilla once the French
threat had disappeared, but the Spanish finally established
a mission for the Jicarillas in 1733. It was located on the
Trampas River about a dozen miles from Taos. One hundred and
thirty natives were at the mission the following year but
these natives raised the ire of many missionaries by
flaunting the strict rules of worship that had been imposed
upon them.3
The mission had difficulties from the beginning.
Although the governor of New Mexico, Gervasio Cruzat y
Góngora, at first endorsed the project, even outlawing the
sale of captive Apaches to Pueblos with severe punishment
for violators, he later sent soldiers to the mission to
drive away the neophytes. Despite the Apaches' fear of
returning to the mission, many continued to seek out
missionaries individually. Another blow to the success of
the mission came when the governor restricted trade with all
heathen natives, destroying the Apaches' economy by cutting
off their trade in hides.4
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Father Juan Mirabel, in charge of the mission, argued
that the Jicarillas, as Christians, could be used as allies
in wars against the Comanches. Cruzate's order of May 20,
1735, however, forbade the sale of arms to recently
converted gentiles, with hefty fines enforced on Spanish
violators as well as 100 lashes and 50 days in prison for
Indian transgressors. While the law was no doubt aimed at
preventing weapons from falling into the hands of Comanches
and other hostile tribes, it also hampered the effectiveness
of friendly Apaches about whom, the governor still had
doubts. The mission continued to exist into the 1740s but by
1748 it had been all but abandoned by the Jicarillas.5
Because the mission did not offer the security they
desired, some of the Apaches fled to live with the Navajos.
Others found relief among the Utes and Comanches, apparently
choosing to join their enemies rather than to be
exterminated by them. The bulk of the Carlanas, Cuartelejos,
and Palomas, along with some Sierra Blancas and Calchufines,
fled to Pecos, where they established themselves on the
Galinas River. There they supported themselves by killing
buffalo on the southern plains and by using Pecos as a
defensive backdrop when attacked. From their new location,
the Jicarillas opened trade with the Faraones and obtained
horses from them. The Faraones, who had always been enemies
of the Spanish, repeatedly stole horses from the Europeans.
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When these mounts began showing up among the displaced
Jicarillas, the Spanish suspected them of aiding and
abetting the Faraones, or perhaps carrying out raids
themselves.6
In July 1739 a party of French traders led by Pierre
and Paul Mallet arrived in Santa Fe. Although they had few,
if any, trade items, having lost seven horses laden with
merchandise while crossing a river, their successful
completion of a trip from French Louisiana to Santa Fe began
a series of trade expeditions between the two localities.
Significantly, the French traders encountered no Apaches on
the plains between the Platte River and Santa Fe. They
returned by a more southerly route, following the South
Canadian River. Along the way, they encountered two men and
three women from the Padouca tribe who greeted them with
handshakes. Soon afterwards, however, the Padoucas became
frightened, abandoned the meat they had been carrying, and
fled. The French could not induce them to return and
eventually continued their journey to New Orleans.7
The Mallet expedition presents conclusive evidence that
Padouca power had been destroyed. The small remnant
encountered by the traders seemed more interested in
avoiding discovery by the Comanches than anything else. In
addition, the expedition encountered numerous bands of
Comanches on both legs of their journey, demonstrating the
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extent to which they controlled the plains. Some Jicarillas
and Carlanas, however, maintained access to the plains. In
1741 a French expedition encountered a Jicarilla party some
thirty leagues east of Pecos and were escorted to that
pueblo to trade.8
More importantly, however, the expeditions gave the
French an opportunity to negotiate peace with the Comanches,
who then dominated the region between the French and Spanish
colonies. By 1747 the French were trading rifles and
ammunition to the Comanches and other allied tribes north of
New Mexico. The Spanish in New Mexico hungered for trade
with the French, despite knowing that Spanish mercantile
policy prohibited it. However, when French traders escorted
by heavily armed Comanches arrived at Taos in 1748, the
Spanish began to fear French motives.9
A few months earlier, in January 1748, the Comanches
had launched an organized assault on Pecos. An urgent
message arrived in Santa Fe informing the governor that a
large force of Comanches were encamped two and a half
leagues from Pecos and appeared to be organizing for an
attack. Governor Joaquín Codallos y Rabal quickly organized
a relief expedition of twenty-five individuals and marched
through the snow at night to reach the beleaguered pueblo at
two in the morning. Seventy young men, some of them
Jicarillas, were rounded up at Pecos to help meet the
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assault. More than three hundred mounted Comanches, armed
with shields, lances, bows and arrows, as well as some with
swords and warclubs, participated in the attack, but they
were beaten back by the Spaniards and their Pueblo and
Jicarilla allies. The Spaniards lost a dozen native allies
in the battle. Although Comanche casualties are unknown,
they were heavy enough to force the Indians withdrawal.10
Thus, when a small party of Comanches from a camp of
one hundred lodges in the Jicarilla valley entered Taos and
informed the Spanish that thirty French traders had been
among them trading a large quantity of muskets and
ammunition, the Spanish became concerned. Had those
Comanches who attacked Pecos been armed with muskets rather
than bows and arrows, the outcome of the battle might have
been much different. As a result of this disturbing
information, Governor Codallos recommended that a presidio
be constructed north of Taos to halt French intrusions from
that direction.11
 Unfortunately for the Spanish, the Jicarillas who might
have supplied a support base for such a presidio no longer
resided in the valley of La Jicarilla or in the pass through
which the Comanches entered New Mexico. In 1749 the
Comanches, having successfully weakened the Apaches and
gained permanent access to the plains, turned on their
former allies, the Utes. The Utes immediately sought aid
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from the Spanish and made alliances with scattered bands of
Apaches in northern New Mexico. The alliance helped the
Apaches maintain their position longer than they might have
otherwise, but even with the Utes and Spanish, the Apaches
were no match for the French-armed Comanches. In fact,
Comanches who arrived in Taos to trade were better armed
than the Spanish. The Indians had new French muskets, two
pounds of powder, and a pouch of musket balls.12
Governor Tomás Vélez Cachupin (1749-1754) managed to
stabilize relations with the Indians during his term of
office. In September 1752 he reported that the Faraones
living east of Albuquerque were causing little trouble in
the area. In fact, he continued, they had twice refused to
join the Gila Apaches in attacks in the vicinity of El Paso.
Once, the Faraones repulsed an attack and quickly reported
the incident to Vélez. Despite their apparent friendship,
the governor discouraged any association between the
Carlanas/Jicarillas and the Faraones, perhaps fearing that a
combination of the two groups might turn against the
Spanish.13
When Vélez left office he had drafted detailed
instructions to his successor regarding Indian policy. Of
prime concern was the maintenance of friendly relations with
the plains Apaches, especially the Carlanas. Those natives
would prove most valuable in case of war with the Comanches.
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They should be discouraged from contact with the Faraones
and Natages who were currently at peace in New Mexico. These
latter tribes, however, supplied horses to the Carlanas in
exchange for buffalo meat. Since the Faraones and Natages
obtained their horses from raids on Nueva Vizcaya and other
north Mexican provinces, limiting contact with the plains
Indians would reduce the necessity of the raids.14
Vélez further recommended that his successor personally
attend the trade fairs at Taos. The new governor should
adorn his uniform with much splendor and be surrounded by a
suitable guard to emphasize his station. Providing guards
for the native rancherías and horse herds should be a high
priority. Above all, however, the governor must prevent any
hostile incidents among between the Comanches, Utes, and
Apaches in attendance, thereby preserving the peaceful
interlude.15
Finally, Vélez suggested that if the peace with the
Utes, Comanches, and Apaches looked stable for the future,
the new governor should campaign against the Faraones. Even
though those natives had been peaceful toward New Mexico
during most of Vélez's term, their raids on Nueva Vizcaya
and Sonora were intolerable and needed to be punished.
Officials in New Mexico, he noted, were in a much better
position to punish the transgressors than were those in
Nueva Vizcaya.16
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Nonetheless, Vélez's successor was unable to maintain
the peaceful balance. Comanche raids resumed and the
Apaches, pressured from the north, began raiding farther
south. During the 1740s, Apache raids in northern Coahuila
had intensified. After the peace treaty between the Lipans
and the Spanish at San Antonio in 1749, Apache raids shifted
farther to the south and west. Between 1749 and 1763 Apache
attacks on Chihuahua and settlements within a two-hundred-
mile radius of the villa had resulted in more than eight
hundred deaths and destroyed 4,000,000 pesos worth of
property.17
In contrast, San Antonio enjoyed a respite from Apache
depredations after the treaty of 1749. Following the peace
treaty, Spanish missionaries began working toward the
complete conversion of the Apaches. Several plans were
proposed as the Apaches began congregating in the vicinity
of San Antonio to await their own mission. A few Apaches had
been taken into Mission Nuestra Señora de la Concepcion de
Acuña but with little success in converting them. The
existing missions were unable to handle the new influx of
natives, and many missionaries feared the detrimental
effects of having the Apaches so near the mission
neophytes.18
Father Benito Fernández de Santa Ana proposed founding
a mission for the Apaches in a mountainous region near the
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Pedernales River. He wanted the presidio at San Antonio and
its entire garrison moved to the new location, so that a new
settlement might be created, as well as a mission for the
Apaches. If the Apaches could be converted, asserted Santa
Ana, San Antonio would be free to develop her resources and
the whole region would prosper.19
When Father Santa Ana retired because of illness,
Father Mariano de los Dolores became the leading proponent
of a mission for the Apaches. Dolores proposed that it be
established on the Guadalupe River. This location would be
close enough that no presidio would be required, yet distant
enough to prevent the Apaches from having detrimental
effects on the mission Indians of San Antonio. Dolores hoped
to establish one or two missions until such time as it could
be determined how many Apaches would gather. Unfortunately
for the missionary, Spanish officials rejected his plan
because of expense, lack of information, and competing
plans.20
Confusion created by lack of a unified plan delayed
fulfillment of any concerted action. The first formal
mission for the Apaches, therefore, was established not by
San Antonio missionaries, but in the jurisdiction of San
Juan Bautista on the Río Grande. In February 1752, Father
Alonso Giraldo de Terreros received appointment to succeed
Father Dolores as president of the Texas missions. Terreros,
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however, never traveled to San Antonio, but instead became
minister at the mission of San Juan Bautista where he began
working toward the conversion of the Apaches with as much,
if not more, fervor as Dolores and Santa Ana had
demonstrated in San Antonio.21
In June 1754, Pedro de Rábago y Terán, the governor of
Coahuila, wrote the viceroy that peace treaties had been
negotiated with the Apaches. As a result, more than nine
hundred natives were camped on the Río Grande in the
vicinity of the newly settled villa of San Fernando de
Austria. The bulk of the Apaches were Natagés, who had
frequented San Juan Bautista in the past, alternately to
trade or commit depredations. Apaches called Cíbolas and
Tucubantes were also noted as being present. The combined
Apaches were led by three chiefs who were interested in
missions. Spanish officials were cautious in their response
and ordered an investigation to locate a favorable site for
the mission.22
In Rábago y Terán's absence, lieutenant governor Juan
Antonio Bustillo y Ceballos and Father Terreros led an
expedition to find a suitable location for the mission.
Although the Apaches expressed a preference for a mission on
the San Rodrigo river, a more favorable site was located at
San Ildefonso, eighteen leagues west of San Juan Bautista
and two leagues from San Fernando de Austria. Bustillo y
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Ceballos and Terreros then held council with headmen of the
Apaches then numbering two thousand. After explaining
mission life to the Apaches and accepting their approval of
the site, the lieutenant governor established the mission of
San Lorenzo in December 1754.23
Father Terreros took charge of the mission, and by
early March fifty-two Apaches had congregated there. At the
end of the month, eighty-three native inhabited the mission.
Buildings were constructed, and an irrigation ditch was dug
to assist in growing crops. Father Terreros, after getting
the outpost off to a good start, retired from its management
to work on the larger-scale project of a mission in the San
Saba region. Several months after his departure, the Apaches
grew restless. Despite the efforts of the missionaries, in
October 1755 they sacked and burned the buildings and
permanently deserted the mission.24 
The destruction of San Lorenzo convinced some Spaniards
of the inconstancy of the Apaches and their unwillingness to
settle in missions. Missionaries, on the other hand, became
convinced that the failure had been caused by the reluctance
of the Apaches to settle so far from their homeland.
Accordingly, the religious were more determined than ever to
place a mission in the heart of Apachería.25
Between 1753 and 1755, three expeditions penetrated the
San Saba region locate possible sites for a mission.
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Lieutenant Juan Galván of the San Antonio presidio led the
first of these entradas. Scouting along the Pedernales,
Llano, and San Saba Rivers, Galván found two suitable
locations on the last stream. The expedition encountered a
large party of Apaches on the river who, when they learned
the purpose of the Spaniard's presence, welcomed them with
expressions of great joy. The Spanish distributed gifts and
held a worship service before departing.26
In 1756 Pedro Rábago y Terán led a second expedition
was led by Pedro Rábago y Terán. He retraced Galván's route
and came to the same conclusion that the San Saba site had
the best potential. This expedition encountered two groups
of Apaches who promised to enter the mission when it was
founded. Upon returning to San Antonio, Rábago found
surprising support among its settlers for the proposed
Apache mission. The Apaches had been peaceful for five years
and Bexareños saw a mission as the best way to assure a
continuance of the peace. Captain Urrutia added his support,
estimating that there were four thousand Apaches to be
converted.27
A final expedition was launched before approval of the
venture. This expedition was led by Bernardo de Miranda, the
lieutenant governor of Texas, but it was more interested in
discovering valuable mineral deposits than a site for an
Apache mission. Accordingly, Miranda spent most of his time
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exploring the vicinity of the Llano River and taking samples
from a hill of red hematite. He also encountered Apaches who
informed him of rich silver deposits, described as a
mountain of pure silver, just six days journey above the
Llano in Comanche country. Miranda returned to San Antonio
with glowing reports of the potential wealth of what would
be called the Cerro del Almagre mines.28
Armed with the information gained from the expeditions,
a junta in Mexico City considered the situation. It proposed
to relocate the presidio of San Xavier, whose missions had
become nearly useless, to the San Saba River, to increase
the garrison's size to one hundred soldiers, and to
establish three missions. Fray Alonso Giraldo de Terreros
was to oversee the project, primarily because of the
influence of his wealthy cousin, Pedro Romero de Terreros.
Colonel Diego Ortiz Parrilla was to command the San Sabá
presidial forces.29
By September 1756 Ortiz Parilla and Fray Terreros were
in Mexico City organizing their expedition. On their return
trip to San Antonio, the party encountered a group of
Apaches in Coahuila. Presents were distributed and the
Apaches, upon seeing the great wealth of supplies destined
for the mission, promised to assemble on the San Saba
without fail. The two Spaniards and their retinue arrived in
San Antonio in December 1756.30
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For three months the party stayed at San Antonio and
continued preparations for the presidio and mission. Soon
after they arrived, messengers were sent to contact Apaches
in the San Saba area. Two Lipan chiefs and some of their
people arrived at Mission Valero bearing apologies for the
absence of the other tribes: the Natagés, Mescaleros,
Pelones, Come Nopales (prickly pear eaters), and Come
Caballos (horse eaters). They expressed their willingness to
be congregated in the new mission. Over the next three
months, bands of two to three hundred Apaches visited the
town and received gifts from the. Father Terreros stated
that the Indians were eager to please the Spaniards and were
peaceful. Contrariwise, Colonel Ortiz Parilla caustically
noted that the Apaches seemed more interested in the gifts
than in conversion. In a letter to the viceroy, the colonel
stated that the Apaches were as treacherous as ever and he
feared the outcome of the venture.31
When warm weather returned in April, Ortiz Parilla
decided to begin the march to the San Saba River. After
scouting possible sites for the mission and exploring the
river to its source, the colonel called a council to discuss
the situation. Since no Apaches had been encountered, the
commander urged abandoning the project. The missionaries,
however, were determined to found the missions. They were
confident that, given time, the Apaches would arrive.
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Despite his reservations, Ortiz Parilla agreed to begin
construction of the necessary structures. As the
missionaries began building on the first of two planned
missions on the south bank of the river, Ortiz Parilla began
constructing the military installation some three miles
upstream on the north bank. The missionaries hoped that the
distance from the presidio would prevent the soldiers from
having a negative influence on the neophytes.32
As the buildings were being completed, one of the
missionaries, Benito Varela, who was knowledgeable of the
Apache language went out in search of the elusive natives.
Arriving at the San Marcos River, he learned from a woman
that the Apaches had suffered a devastating defeat on the
Colorado River and had been forced to flee. At about the
same time, a Lipan chief, El Chico (Chiquito), arrived in
San Antonio. There, Father Dolores chastised him for failing
to keep his word and ordered him to go to San Sabá at
once.33
The missionaries at San Sabá were heartened when in May
1757 Apaches began arriving. By June, three thousand natives
had appeared. Unfortunately for the friars, only a small
portion of the Indians were inclined to enter the mission.
Chiquito, who led people in thirty-two tents, or about three
hundred people, seemed interested in mission life. But
another chief, Casablanca, who governed three hundred tents
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made it clear that the Apaches were on their way to hunt
buffalo and campaign against their northern enemies.
Casablanca's brother had been killed in a Norteño34 raid on
the Apache camp on the Colorado. With an emotional plea, the
powerful leader convinced Chiquito not to desert his kinsmen
in their time of need. Soon afterward, the entire Apache
camp departed, leaving behind only a couple of sick natives
in the care of the disappointed and disgruntled
missionaries.35
Chiquito was identified as a Lipan Chief while
Casablanca was denoted as a Natagé leader. The Lipans, as
identified by the Spanish, generally tended to be more
positively perceived by the Spanish than their Natagé kin.
It is therefore likely that Chiquito was in earnest with his
desire to enter the mission and in his promises to return.
Tribal pressure, however, forced him to accompany his
kinsmen on a revengeful raid. Although it is unlikely that
Chiquito and his people had any intentions of adopting
Christianity and a completely settled life-style, he might
very well have agreed to use the mission as a ranchería-type
settlement where the Apaches would plant their crops and
live until harvest time. As Casablanca pointed out, the
primary sustenance for his people was the buffalo, not
agricultural goods.
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When the Apaches returned from hunting and raiding,
burdened as they were with buffalo meat, they again resisted
entering the mission. Throughout the fall of 1757, small
groups of Apaches stopped by the mission to visit, but they
never stayed more than a few days before hurrying
southward.36 The Apaches no doubt feared a retaliatory raid
from their northern enemies and wanted to distance
themselves from it. In doing so, they also led their enemies
into the lap of the Spaniards. If this resulted in a Spanish
defeat of the Comanches, it would prove the worth of an
Apache alliance with the Spaniards and no doubt speed up the
conversion process. Also, the Apaches would be more willing
to settle in the missions once they were assured of
protection. Until that happened, they were not willing to
take up residence in such an exposed locale. The Spanish, of
course, were completely unaware of the Apaches' motives.
Further hindering  Apache settlement in the missions
was a deadly epidemic that swept through the Apache camps in
late 1757, which discouraged close contact with the
Europeans. In any case, the Spaniards were soon to learn
firsthand the wrath of the Comanches and their allies. 
After a raid on the presidial horse herd and an attack
on the supply train from San Antonio, the northern tribes
swept down on San Sabá in March 1758. Two thousand warriors,
many of them armed with French guns, surrounded the mission.
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They claimed to be searching for Apaches. After wrangling
their way into the mission, the Norteños began their bloody
work of ransacking the place. They killed Father Terreros
and seven others, burned the mission, and then turned their
attention to the distant presidio. Ortiz Parilla was
helpless to defend the mission and its personnel from two
thousand warriors, and he wisely kept his people within the
walls of the presidio. The Norteños, unwilling to launch a
direct assault on the garrison, eventually retired to the
north to celebrate their victory and divide their plunder.37
The massacre at the San Sabá mission sent a wave of
hysteria throughout the Texas frontier. In San Antonio,
Toribio de Urrutia, commander of the presidio, feared that
San Antonio itself might be the attackers' next target. He
begged for reinforcements from the viceroy and from all the
principal settlements of Texas and Coahuila. At San Sabá,
Ortiz Parilla used the disaster to recommend once again that
the project be abandoned, or at least be relocated to a more
favorable locale. But, he also proposed mounting a campaign
against the Norteños to avenge the massacre.38
Officials in Mexico City refused to relocate the
presidio fearing that such action would be interpreted by
the natives as a retreat, but they did support Colonel Ortiz
Parilla's suggestion of organizing a punitive campaign.
While Ortiz Parilla was awaiting a decision at San Sabá, the
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Apaches continued to suffer attacks from the Comanches--some
of them coming almost within sight of the presidio.
Chiquito's Lipan band was attacked and nearly wiped out
while hunting buffalo. In all, more than fifty Apaches were
killed. In December 1758 Comanches surprised a group of
thirty-four Apaches camped near the presidio. Only thirteen
escaped with their lives.39
With the loss of their people virtually under the noses
of soldiers at the San Sabá garrison, it is little wonder
that the Apaches were reluctant to settle nearby. In fact,
an Apache chief informed Ortiz Parilla as he was preparing
for his expedition against the Norteños that the Apaches
were also in the process of undertaking a campaign against
their enemies. Because of this, they had chosen to have no
fixed habitation in order to avoid surprise attacks. After
the campaign, assuming it was successful, the Apaches would
be ready to congregate at missions.40
In June 1759 Ortiz Parilla traveled to San Antonio to
organize his campaign against the Norteños. By August the
expedition, consisting of 139 presidial soldiers, 241
militia, 120 Indian allies, and two priests, departed San
Antonio. One hundred and thirty four Apaches joined the
expedition. The Spanish commander was doubtful of the
loyalty of the Lipans but could do little to prevent their
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joining. As it turned out, they proved to be a useful
addition.41
The Ortiz Parilla campaign achieved an early victory by
surprising a Tonkawa camp, killing 55 Indians and capturing
another 149. Within the camp were items taken from San Sabá,
confirming the natives' guilt. Rather than be satisfied with
the quick, cheap victory, Ortiz Parilla pressed northward,
anxious to further avenge the attack on the mission. The
Tonkawas encouraged the colonel's decision by freely
offering information about the location of a Wichita
village.
On the banks of the Red River near present-day Spanish
Fort, the Spanish encountered a well-fortified village
surrounded by a stockade and a moat. The natives launched a
coordinated attack against the Spanish, repulsed several
Spanish counter assaults, and eventually forced the Spanish
themselves to retreat, abandoning two cannons as they
withdrew. In the shelter of some trees, Parilla took stock
of the situation and decided to order a full retreat. The
natives harassed the Spanish army all the way back to San
Sabá but did little damage to it.42
The role of Apaches in Parilla's campaign is rather
confused. Many historians state that the Apaches deserted at
the first sign of trouble and hint that much of the blame
for the failure of the campaign was their fault.43 Even
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Ortiz Parilla gave the Apache allies mixed reviews. He
stated at one point that some of the Lipans retreated
"impetuously," taking not only their own horses but some of
the Spaniards' as well.44
Later, however, the Spanish commander admitted that the
Apaches had been valuable allies. Although they were not as
reliable as trained soldiers, they comported themselves well
throughout the campaign, even during its critical moments.
He admitted that having the Indians protect the flanks had
been a mistake, because the Apaches did not fight in
European style. Instead, they separated to fight in their
manner of combat. This scattering could have easily been
misinterpreted by the militia as a mass desertion of the
Apaches, and it might have caused the militia themselves to
break ranks and retreat.
There were still Apaches acting as scouts when Ortiz
Parilla held his council to decide whether to retreat of
not, and at least one historian gives the Apaches credit for
saving the colonel's army from annihilation by acting as a
rearguard. In addition, the Spanish commander must have
considered the Apaches' contribution significant, for they
received ninety-seven of the Tonkawa captives, which they
preceded to trade to the Spanish for merchandise.45
Additionally, Ortiz Parilla placed no blame on the
Apaches for their unwillingness to settle in Missions at San
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Sabá. He blamed, at least partially, the failure of the
Spanish to prove that they could protect the Apaches. Until
such assurance could be guaranteed, the commander had little
faith that the Apaches would settle at fixed locations,
although he urged that the Spanish continue their alliance
with them. Otherwise, Ortiz Parilla warned, the Apaches
would seek other alliances against the Spanish.46
Despite the lack of a clear decisive victory, the
Lipans returned to their families to celebrate. The families
of the participating Lipans had been left among the Natagés,
Mescaleros, and Faraones farther to the southwest and thus
were relatively safe from Comanche incursions.47 Although
the Lipans celebrated the campaign as a victory in their
camps, they were well aware that it was by no means
decisive. The Norteños had not been crippled, or even badly
injured. It would only be a matter of time before they once
again began to take a toll on the Apache population.
Realizing the isolation of San Sabá, the Apaches began
requesting a mission further to the south, somewhere between
the two outposts that had already proven to be failures.
Colonel Ortiz Parilla, meanwhile, was replaced by
Felipe de Rábago y Terán who had been instrumental in
causing the failure of the San Xavier missions and had
created a great deal of friction with the missionaries in
the San Antonio area.48 Upon his arrival at San Sabá, Rábago
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set about earnestly improving the condition of the presidio,
making sure the men were properly clothed, fed, and armed.
He then replaced the presidio's wooden stockade with one of
stone surrounded by a moat.49
Perhaps because of Rábago's activities, the Lipans
began to visit the presidio frequently. The new commander
plied visiting natives with presents and furnished escorts
to protect them from Comanches while they hunted buffalo. In
October 1761, Cabezón, one of the most influential of the
Apache chiefs, informed Rábago that he and his three
thousand followers were prepared to settle at missions.
Rábago immediately sent word to Father Diego Jiménez,
president of the Río Grande missions who arrived at San Sabá
in November.50
Cabezón, Rábago, and Jiménez held a meeting in November
to discuss matters. Cabezón stated that there were ten
rancherías subject to two chiefs that were interested in
missions. A short time later, these chiefs returned with
Cabezón and agreed to recognize the Lipan leader as their
spokesman. The chief then requested that the new mission be
located on the upper Nueces, an area technically outside
Rábago's jurisdiction; but, desperate to make progress,
Rábago conceded.51
Even so, Rábago was forced to make other concessions to
ensure Lipan settlement at the new mission. First, the
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Apaches asked that more soldiers than ever before be
supplied for a large buffalo hunt. Both Spaniards agreed
that a successful hunt would help the success of the mission
by supplying large amounts of food for the Apaches, thereby
avoiding the necessary expense of having to supply them from
Spanish reserves. Second, Cabezón demanded that the daughter
of a leading Natagé chief, then being held in Nuevo León, be
returned to her people. In exchange, the Natagé chief
promised to use his influence to restrain the Mescaleros
from raiding into Coahuila. Should those natives continue
their raids, the Natagé captain promised to recover the
horses and bring them to Rábago so that he could return them
to their owners. The presidial commander refused a third
Lipan demand--a combined campaign against the Comanches.52
While Rábago and Jiménez worked out the final details
for establishing the new mission, actions were under way to
close the inroads of Apaches into Coahuila. Captain Alonso
Rubín de Calís of the El Paso presidio traveled in June 1759
to the junction of the Río Conchos and Río Grande. He was
accompanied by fifteen soldiers and two missionaries. The
mission Indians there welcomed the soldiers
enthusiastically. During the Spanish sojourn, two Apache
captains with their people visited the missions. The native
warrioprs carried short shotguns, pistols, and swords; and
they wore leather jackets. On arrival, they discharged their
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guns, dismounted without a word, and entered the trading
post to exchange mules and hides for horses. The Indians
attempted to secure powder and musket balls, but the Spanish
commander had forbidden his soldiers and Christianized
Indians from selling these items on pain of death.53
Four days later, another band of Apaches arrived armed
with only bows and arrows. They brought buffalo meat and
nuts to trade for mission products.54 This difference in
armament reflects a sharp division growing between various
Apache groups. By this time, the Faraones, or Mescaleros as
they were more commonly being called, were well armed and
arrogant. They traded with certain Spaniards while
simultaneously raiding others. Accordingly, they were the
cause of much consternation among the Spaniards.
Contrariwise, the Lipans were armed with bows and arrows,
had few fire arms, and arrived meekly to trade the few
products they could wrest from the country where they had
safe access. These Lipans were most likely the same natives
who had requested missions from the Spanish.
The differences in Apache groups is further clarified
by an expedition sent from New Mexico in 1763. Tomás Veléz
Cachupín had reassumed the governorship of New Mexico, and
he sent a pair of natives from the Pecos mission to find a
route to San Sabá. Two hundred miles downstream from Pecos,
the party reached a Lipan village. Comanches attacked the
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ivillage while the visitors were there but caused only minor
damage. Traveling another three days downstream, the small
exploring party found a Mescalero camp among some sand
dunes. The Mescaleros welcomed the visitors until some
wounded Mescaleros entered the camp claiming that Spaniards
had attacked them. The Apaches angrily planned to avenge
themselves upon the visitors but they escaped during the
night.
Five miles farther down the Pecos the fugitives
encountered a camp of friendly Lipans. The Lipans promised
to supply guides to take them to San Sabá. Ten days of
travel later, the explorers and their guide entered another
Lipan camp. There they encountered a Spanish force from the
presidio of la Junta de Los Ríos. The Spanish commander
informed them that he had been sent to punish the Apaches
who were responsible for raiding the Río Grande settlements.
The two New Mexican natives accompanied the Spanish back to
la Junta de los Ríos, and from there returned to New Mexico,
having abandoned their attempt to reach San Sabá.55
The small expedition also reveals some interesting
facts about the Apaches at this time. Comanche raids were
reaching hundreds of miles south of Pecos, but there were
still significant numbers of Apaches in the region. Both
Mescaleros and Lipans lived in close proximity to one
another, but while the Lipans seemed to be invariably
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friendly toward the Spanish, the Mescaleros were less
faithful and had apparently committed recent raids on the
Río Grande settlements. The proximity of the two Apache
groups no doubt cast suspicion on both when raids occurred,
and many Spaniards responded by wanting to punish any
"Apaches" that they found. In the case above, however, the
Spanish commander from La Junat de los Ríos appears to have
been a rarity on the Spanish frontier, a man who attempted
to establish guilt before administering punishment, or at
least one who distinguished between Lipans and Mescaleros.
Back at San Sabá, Cabezón's band returned from their
buffalo hunt in December 1761 and expressed their intentions
to settle in missions. Rábago wrote a hasty note to Father
Jiménez urging him to meet the Indians on the upper Nueces.
He then appointed thirty soldiers and a lieutenant to
accompany himself and the Apaches to the mission site. Seven
days and one hundred miles later, the party arrived at a
spring in a region known as El Cañon. Father Jiménez arrived
a week later with an additional missionary, several wagons
of supplies, and a few Christian natives to help build
irrigation ditches.56
On January 23, 1762, Mission San Lorenzo de la Santa
Cruz was formally established near present day Camp Wood. A
small hut with a bell served as the church. More than three
hundred natives congregated in response to the bell and
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attended the founding ceremony. After the ceremony, Rábago
appointed Cabezón war captain of the newly established
village of Santa Cruz, deferring the appointment of other
officials until they had received his instructions.57
Father Jiménez was quick to note a key difficulty in
converting the Apaches. Unlike the Coahuiltecans of the Río
Grande missions, who were poor and easily satisfied with the
meager offerings of the missions, the Apaches were an
active, wealthy, and proud people. They were accustomed to
living well off the buffalo, had large numbers of horses,
and even planted their own corn, melons, squash, and
tobacco. Many had accumulated European goods such as brass
utensils, articles of clothing, and a few firearms. As a
result, the missions had little to offer the Lipans. In
order to keep the Apaches satisfied, considerable
expenditures would be required, but Jiménez believed that in
the long-run the results would be worth the cost. If the
Lipans could be converted, they would have a positive effect
on their kinsmen, and peace would eventually spread across
the entire frontier.58
Rábago left a garrison of twenty men at San Lorenzo
when he returned to San Sabá. There he was met by a Lipan
chief named El Turnio who claimed leadership of 114 warriors
and as many as 400 band members. El Turnio insisted on a
mission for his people, and Rábago, although reluctant
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because of a lack of sufficient soldiers to garrison it,
acquiesced. Thus, ten miles below San Lorenzo, near present-
day Montell, Rábago established Mission Nuestra Señora de la
Candelaria on February 6, 1762.59
Within a week, four hundred Apaches had gathered at
each mission. Many more passed through the area to visit,
causing much confusion. Construction of more permanent
mission buildings was begun, and fields were cleared for
planting. In the spring, twelve bushels of corn were planted
in the hope of lessening dependence on the San Juan
missions, which were strained to the breaking point. The
corn made a good start but visiting bands of Apaches would
ransack the fields, gathering the ripening corn before it
was ready and leaving almost nothing behind for the
mission.60
Still other problems soon emerged. Comanches began
probing the vicinity. Between March and July, the Comanches
launched three attacks on nearby Apache rancherías, killing
more than fifty Lipans. The few Spaniards stationed at the
mission were too few and too poorly informed to launch a
retaliatory strike. They were, however, apparently able to
discourage the Comanches from a direct assault on the
mission itself. Rábago wanted to place fifty soldiers at the
mission to assure its protection and aid the conversion
process but lacked the manpower.61
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In addition, the Lipans had to leave the mission to
hunt buffalo, because there was not enough food. Once away
from the missions, the Lipans fell under the sway of pagan
influences. Many Lipans worried that their wives and
children would not be safe in the care of the missionaries
and often hurried back from the hunt to check on them. One
chief believed that the missionaries planned to gather the
Apaches in one place in order to kill them, and he
encouraged his companions to rise up and slaughter the
Spaniards before they themselves were killed. The chief was
unsuccessful in his ploy and soon departed.62
Some success was achieved however. The chiefs sought
permission before leaving the mission to go on hunts and
returned  faithfully  when they promised. In mid 1762
Jiménez reported to the Lipans that the Comanches had told
the Spaniards in San Antonio that they would not attack the
Lipans at the Nueces missions, although both he and the
Lipans were skeptical of the promise. 
At the new missions, Spaniards became familiar with
eight Lipan leaders:  Cabezón, El Turnio, Teja, Boruca,
Panocha, Bordado, El Lumen, and El Cojo. The first two,
known as the "founding chiefs" were the most influential.
Bands led by other chiefs often visited briefly, and some
made vague promises to settle when more Spanish soldiers
arrived to assure protection. They never stayed long,
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however, and the missionaries, already overburdened, did not
encourage them to do so.63
Eventually, twelve bands were associated with the
missions of El Cañon. There were, however, numerous small
groups of Apaches who remained enemies of the Spaniards and
continued to commit depredations.64 It must be remembered
that Apache chiefs did not have absolute authoritative power
over their people. They ruled by power of persuasion.
Therefore, while Cabezón might have earnestly wished to live
peacefully in the mission, only those of his people who
agreed with his decision would follow his example. There
would undoubtedly be a few of his band who had no desire to
live at the mission and would refuse to enter. In the Apache
system, this was perfectly acceptable, and Cabezón would
have no power over the dissenters. From this point on, they
would select a new leader and act as an independent entity.
However, because of the former connection, they would
probably still have sporadic contact with their former band
and even be assisted by them in times of crisis.
This system, of course, was unacceptable to the
Spanish. They could not deal with Apaches who recognized no
authoritative leader, nor could they readily understand such
a system. Therefore, when a former member of Cabezón's or
any other leader's band committed depredations, the
Spaniards suspected treachery and sometimes punished the
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innocent. This led the Apaches to distrust the seemingly
haphazard actions of the Europeans.
By 1764, Father Jiménez was hopeful about the success
of the missions. Great strides had been made. Jiménez
reported with pride that while the missions of San Juan
Bautista had been in decline for the last couple of years,
the missions of El Cañon each had more than four hundred
Lipans. Still, the friar remarked, many of the neophytes
were warlike and treacherous, and none was well taught. This
was because the viceroy had not seen fit to supply a
garrison to protect the missions. Despite the lack of funds,
stout adobe structures had been built. A church, sacristy,
and quarters for the priests had been constructed, as had a
storehouse for corn. The Lipans had been much impressed with
the latter. They told Jiménez that if enemies came, they
could hide in the structure. They then requested that the
priest build similar houses for them to live in.65
In addition, the Lipans, who had previously resisted
Christian instruction, had begun to listen. They even asked
questions,allowing the missionaries to clarify some of their
misconceptions. Some Lipan parents brought their children to
be baptized and took the missionaries to visit and baptize
their sick and elderly. In twenty-two months, Jiménez
reported sixty-three baptisms. The Lipans never left the
missions without first asking permission and often left
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their women, children, and elderly at the missions when they
went on raids against their Comanche enemies.66 This last
practice served to doom the missions.
The first crisis came in the form of a small pox
epidemic. In late 1764, the priests at San Lorenzo baptized
forty children and twenty-seven adults. Those at Candelaria
baptized two adults and five children. The majority of those
baptized, however, died. As early as 1762, the Comanches had
begun raiding the vicinity of San Sabá. In 1764 they
launched a particularly severe attack on the presidio. From
that point on, the presidio was virtually under siege by the
marauding Comanches.67
The increased Comanche raids resulted from Lipan forays
into Comanche lands. On these occasions, the Lipans would
take European articles with them and scatter them about the
site of the raid in order to implicate Spaniards in the
raid. Likewise the Lipans would leave Comanche articles near
Spanish locales after they themselves had committed
depredations in order to mislead the Spanish into thinking
that the northern nations had committed these offenses.68
This practice warrants attention. The events are
accepted as fact by almost all historians, but a closer
inspection reveals some problems. First of all, the Apaches,
if indeed they committed these acts, slit their own throats.
By bringing the wrath of the Comanches down upon their only
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allies, the Spanish, the Apaches weakened their defensive
bulwark. Obviously, having the Comanches retaliate against
the Spanish would be better than having them revenge
themselves upon the Lipans, but in the end the Lipans would
also suffer. There is no likelihood that the Comanches would
believe that only the Spanish were involved and the
Comanches would eventually attack the Lipans. Therefore, the
Lipans had no motive for committing such action, unless they
truly believed that the Spanish were powerful enough to
defeat the Comanches and therefore prevent the northern
natives from reaching them. After witnessing the fiasco of
the Ortiz Parilla campaign, there would be little reason for
the Apaches to hold such a belief.
So, if the Lipans would not benefit from such actions,
then who would?  Perhaps the Comanches themselves. If the
Comanches claimed that the Lipans had taken such action and
informed the Spanish of them it would serve two important
purposes. First, it would allow the Comanches to justify
their attacks on the Spanish. They could claim that they
"thought" that the Spanish had been actively assisting the
Lipans in their raids. Thus the Comanches could talk peace
with the Spanish but also justify their raids against them
because of the perceived participation in campaigns against
them.
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In addition, by informing the Spanish of the Lipans
"actions," the Comanche could sow the seeds of mistrust
between the two allies. If the Spanish believed that the
Lipans were betraying them, which they obviously did, they
would likely terminate their alliance, which they also did.
While this is all speculation, if indeed a Comanche plot to
divide the Spanish and Apaches existed it worked better than
even they probably expected.
Between 1751 and 1765, the Apaches had been relatively
peaceful in the area to the south and east of the Junta de
los Ríos. In 1765, however, that peace was shattered as
Apaches furiously attacked Spanish posts in Nueva Vizcaya,
Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Nuevo Santander. The outbreak was
attributed to the unjust murder of three Apaches by horse
herders of the Marqués de San Miguel de Aguayo. Many
Spaniards noted, however, that the Apaches were deposed to
fight and were looking for the pretext to go to war.69
On the other hand, the Apaches had rarely been peaceful
in the El Paso region. Mescaleros living in the Organ
Mountains would negotiate peace with the Spaniards and then
violate it on their way home. In January 1765 two Apache
leaders arrived in El Paso carrying a Holy Cross as a symbol
of peace. They professed to be seeking peace for themselves
and four other chiefs. The Spaniards gave them a cordial
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reception but refused to negotiate a peace unless the
leaders came in person.70
Over the next several months, small groups of Apaches
drifted into El Paso seeking peace. The Spanish refused,
insisting that the chiefs come in person to negotiate.
Finally, Pedro José de la Fuente, the captain of the
presidio suggested that the Apache bring in a number of boys
from three to seven years of age to act as hostages to
ensure good behavior on the part of the adults. If the
natives would agree to that, they would be welcomed into
Spanish land, and, in fact, would be given lands to
cultivate. The Apaches of course refused the offer.71
Fuente eventually sent a campaign against the Apaches
to discourage their depredations. The Spaniards and
auxiliary natives marched into the Sacramento Mountains and
attacked a small ranchería of ten huts. The natives fled
upon the Spaniards' approach, but the Europeans pursued,
killing six and capturing seventeen. The victory had little
effect on discouraging raids that lasted until the 1770s.72
In October 1766 the Comanches finally raided the
mission of San Lorenzo. By this time El Turnio and his band
had abandoned the Candelaria mission. Within a year of the
Comanche attack on San Lorenzo, the Apaches abandoned that
site.73
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It was about this time that the Marqués de Rubí arrived
on the scene. Appointed in 1766, Rubí arrived in Mexico with
orders to inspect the entire frontier of New Spain and to
report the status of each presidio from California to East
Texas. Rubí arrived at the Nueces missions in mid 1767 to
find Candelaria abandoned and San Lorenzo occupied by two
missionaries, thirty soldiers and no Indians. Rubí's party
then continued on to Presidio San Sabá. Rubí described the
presidio as "without doubt the worst in the entire kingdom." 
It served no useful purpose,he declared, and if the
Comanches discovered the true condition of the presidio,
they might easily exterminate it. As a result, they would
become so emboldened that they might then endanger San
Antonio.74
Rubí completed his inspection of the frontier, and upon
his return to Mexico drafted his recommendations. He
suggested that the Comanches and other northern tribes only
attacked the Spaniards because of the latter's connection
with the Lipan Apaches. The inspector was assured that
friendship could be cultivated with the northern tribes and
that with their help the Apaches could be exterminated or at
least sufficiently reduced. In addition, the presidio at San
Sabá should be removed and part of its garrison used to
strengthen San Antonio.75
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Rubí's recommendations were eventually sent to Spain
where they were transformed into the Reglamento, or New
Regulations of 1772. Even before they became official,
however, many Spanish officials took Rubí's suggestions to
heart and began their own campaigns bent upon crushing the
Apaches. Thus, Rubí's inspection ushers in the last phase of
Apache-Spanish relations, an unrelenting campaign to destroy
the power of an entire people.
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